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Abstract 
 
‘Out of control: organizational defensive routines’ 
       Yumei Yang 
The current theory posits that organizational defensive routines (ODRs) are one of 
the reasons to explain why organizations still fail to achieve their learning goals.  
However, this assumption lacks consistent empirical evidence.  This study is one of 
very few attempts to refine the concept of ODRs and analyze empirically the role 
ODRs play with respect to organizational learning.   
 
The thesis is a collection of essays that addresses the challenges of understanding the 
effect of ODRs at organizational learning.  Each essay has its own focused research 
objectives to respond the main research questions.  The researcher first examines the 
characteristics of ODRs based on the concept of organizational routines, then the 
researcher addresses the theoretical debate of how ODRs can affect organizational 
learning.  At organizations, not only organizational factors such as structure, size and 
age can affect organizational learning, but so does individual factors such as 
individuals’ personality. Hence, the model integrated both organizational factors and 
individual factors into the model. To empirically assess the relationships proposed in 
the framework, it requires a reliable scale to measure ODRs which is missing in 
previous research.  Therefore, the first study focuses on developing a measurement 
of ODRs through psychometric assessment and validation procedures.  This study 
results in a construct measuring ODRs at the organizational level with two factors 
with eight items, namely organizational cover-up and organizational pretense.  
Additionally, ODRs at an individual level are measured by a scale with two factors 
and six items, namely embarrassment avoidance and rigidity at work.  
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Equipped with the newly developed measurement of ODRs, the researcher 
conducted another two studies to test theoretical relations between ODRs and 
organizational learning. The second study uses multiple regressions to analyze the 
sample of 358 working on organizations of various size, structure, and age.  The 
study includes some important predictors such as age, size and structure of 
organizations. The researcher confirms that centralized and formalized structures are 
negatively associated with organizational learning, but age and size do not have 
statistical influence on learning. The researcher confirms that high ODRs worsen the 
negative relationship between formalization and organizational learning.  
 
The third study applies the ODRs scale at the individual level to test role of these 
routines on organizational learning.  It employs multiple regressions to analyze a 
sample of 351 observations.  All the participants have more than one year working 
experience in their current organizations. The study includes three important 
personality traits as predictors, namely conscientiousness, openness to experience 
and neuroticism.  The researcher confirms that openness to experience and 
neuroticism affect organizational learning.  However, the researcher fails to find 
support on the theoretical hypotheses which predict the level of ODRs has an effect 
on relationships between organizational learning and those three traits.   
 
Theoretically, this study clarifies the definition of ODRs and built a close link with 
the organizational routines. It also enriches current understanding on the 
characteristic of routines being stable at the lens of defensive routines. The newly 
developed scale provides an opportunity to empirically test their roles on 
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organizational learning and other organizational variables.  While findings of the 
empirical study targeting the organizational level lead to the conclusion that 
organizations should endeavor to reduce ODRs, findings of the other empirical study 
suggest that individual’s perception of ODRs could be beneficial for organizational 
learning.  This work claims that there seem to be a collective/social effect that is not 
apparent at the individual level while it influences the organization.  Results 
diverging from theoretical deductions stimulate interesting prospects for further 
research in the future which are also discussed.  Finally, the study indicates that 
structure is the most effective factor of organizational learning in comparison with 
age and size.  Hence, organizations should endeavor to reduce the level of 
formalization and centralization to create a learning environment.   
The study can benefits organizations at following three aspects. First, organizations 
can make use of the new scale to identify ODRs at any stages of their development. 
This would prevent organizations from suffering serious consequences of by-passing 
and covering up negative issues caused by ODRs.  Second, the organizations 
regardless of age and size can learnt from this study about the importance to realize 
the contributions of ODRs at organizational level and individual level. In order to 
alleviate ODRs, organizations should consider changing organizational factors which 
encourage people at organizations collectively avoid open communication. 
Meanwhile, they also need to pay attention at educating individuals who tend to be 
more likely to avoid discussing embarrassing issues.  Third, organizations should 
design an appropriate organizational structure to facilitate information sharing and 
empower employees at decision making.   
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CHAPTER ONE: Introduction and Rational  
 
 
In the 1970s, Ford produced Ford Pinto cars with a faulty design. The cars leaked 
oil at low speeds of 20mph resulting in fatal accidents.  Staff were aware that the 
speed did not meet the Federal requirement of 30mph, but they feared proposing a 
different opinion to managers would put their job in danger (case summarized from 
Boddy and Paton 2011).  
 
 In 1986, the Challenger space shuttle exploded after 73 seconds of launch.  All the 
astronauts onboard died.  Though the managers had knowledge of the “O” ring 
inadequacies, their “can do” attitude and avoidance at asking hard questions 
prevented the commission from identifying errors and avoiding the catastrophe (case 
summarized from Moorhead, Ference and Neck, 1991).  
 
1.1 Problem Statement 
 
Human beings are social animals.  At an early age, people learn social virtues in 
order to be accepted by society, such as respect for others, suppressing their own 
negative feelings and trying to avoid embarrassing other people in public.  Those 
social virtues are assimilated into organizational life and affect people’s behavior 
when dealing with issues that are complex, embarrassing, or threatening, especially 
when organizations have a culture not to encourage people to show different 
opinions to authorities.  When a negative issue is communicated, people tend to 
make their fellow colleagues realize the mistakes and, at the same time, they try to 
communicate the negative message without upsetting anyone.  Therefore, messages 
are often crafted ambiguously and inconsistently.  On the one hand, this inconsistent 
behavior protects people from experiencing pain; on the other hand, it keeps people 
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from learning the core reasons of causing the pain.  People often employ this covert 
behavior in the name of caring and diplomacy.  Nevertheless, the unintended 
consequences of this behavior have adverse effects organizational values, goals and 
productivity (Sales et al. 2013).  Based on Argyris’ consultancy experience, he 
generalized that "any actions and policies that organizations or segments used to 
avoid embarrassment and threat are organizational defensive routines" (hereafter 
ODRs) (Arygirs, 1990, p.25).  Argyris’ seminal work on defensive routines revealed 
how individuals’ good intention to avoid embarrassment results in a negative impact 
on organizational effectiveness.  He concluded “By adeptly avoiding conflict with 
co-workers, some executives eventually wreak organizational havoc.”  (Argyris, 
1986, p. 74).  ODRs are thought to be a crippling source of malaise and a barrier to 
organizational learning.   They can damage organizations in the long term and cause 
disastrous results. Ford Pinto cars and the Challenger space shuttle are examples 
showing colossal damage of ODRs to organizations  
 
ODRs occur regularly in organizations of any size. The following two examples 
illustrate how ODRs are elicited and what damages these routines can cause to 
organizations. First, Xerox is a known company that suffered from ODRs.  In 2014 
the Xerox executive team met to discuss the sale of its information-technology-
outsourcing (ITO) business to a French company.  At meetings everyone expressed 
that it was a right decision.  However, disagreement was only discussed secretly in 
private meetings.  People in the organizations were disingenuously polite and tended 
not to be forthcoming about their feelings. This is typical organizational 
defensiveness at play.  The reason why people do not show their disagreement 
openly at a meeting is because they want to avoid embarrassment to themselves and 
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to others. However, this avoidance behavior makes the meetings meaningless. Those 
private meetings only create an air of secrecy and restraint among teams (Tech 
Inside, 2016).   
The second example is about an anonymous institution
1
. The institution initiated a 
consultation to discuss whether it was right to downgrade some administrators. The 
meeting assessed administrators’ workload, and the result was to be announced at a 
due date.  However, the administrators already knew the decision before the meeting, 
because one email from a decision maker was mistakenly sent to one of 
administrators.  This email stated who was going to be downgraded before the 
consultation.  Administrators were furious by this dishonest behavior, but nobody 
revealed their genuine feeling at the meeting.  Everyone went along with the meeting 
and pretended everything was perfect.  This looks like an extreme example of ODRs, 
but it may happen frequently in organizations.  Meetings are not for discussing 
different perspectives toward organizational issues, but they are masked as a strategy 
for management to demonstrate their leadership skills by deceivingly involving 
employees into decision making.  Employees’ voices do not have much effect on 
final decisions. That is why quite often meetings become meaningless.   
 
Organizational defensive routines handicap employees from reflecting on their own 
contribution to cause counterproductive effects on organizational learning.  They 
tend to be automatic and mindless so that people who perform ODRs do not realize 
that their good intention of being “kind” actually becomes a hurdle for other people.  
This hurdle discards open discussions related to negative organizational issues.  
                                                 
1 This is based on a real event. The organization’s name is not revealed due to 
confidentiality.  
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Without realizing errors in their behavior, problems will continue to lay underground 
in organizations.  Consequently, only easy solutions are made toward improving 
existing behavior, but radical changes for solving important issues are avoided 
(Argyris, 1990, 1993; Noonan, 2007) inhibiting organizational learning.   
  
Through organizational learning organizations are able to improve competitiveness 
(e.g. Cohen & Levinthal, 1990; Levitt & March, 1988).  In order to learn, 
organizations need to identify errors in current individual and organizational routines 
and have an environment to share information (Argyris, 2001; Huber, 1990).  While 
ODRs exist, people suppress certain uncomfortable issues related to conflict and 
embarrassment.  Accordingly, the issues are buried deeply and day-to-day 
operational activities take priority.   Hence, on the surface such organizations seem 
to be flawless.  This deceiving image of organizations prevents people from 
exploring issues present in the organization which are uncomfortable to reveal but 
are crucial for organizational performance.   
 
The impact of this negative routine behavior on the organizational learning abilities 
illustrates that it is still instrumental for academics and practitioners to understand 
ODRs.  Nevertheless, current knowledge about ODRs still remains at a stage similar 
to what Argyris proposed in 1970s.  There is very limited empirical research carried 
out to verify the theoretical inferences of ODRs. The theoretical assumption that 
ODRs are barrier to organizational learning is well accepted by academics, even 
though only limited empirical studies have been carried out to test this assumption 
(e.g. Chouikha, 2016; Easterby-Smith, Snell & Gherardi, 1998; Hernes & Irgens, 
2012). Thus, the current situation creates major challenges for understanding the 
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impact of ODRs in organizational life. The reasons why ODRs are not explored 
much at the current literature can be explained from two facets. The first facet is 
from a methodological perspective. The current literature on ODRs is mainly based 
on consultants’ case studies. These methods provide detailed explanation of the types 
of ODRs and the damages of ODRs based on specific organizational cases. However, 
they do not provide a systematic and consistent understanding at the role of ODRs. 
The lack of a scale measuring ODRs creates a challenge for researchers to explore 
ODRs and generalize their effect on organizational practices.  Because of this 
methodological restriction, researchers often resort to two other related concepts of 
ODRs, red tape and organizational silence to explain reasons why people suppress 
their opinions and avoiding potential negative consequences (Bozeman & Feeney 
2011; Morrison and Milliken 2000; Brinsfield, 2013).  However, these two concepts 
are different from ODRs empirically (see Chapter 4). The other reason is at 
theoretical perspective. ODRs are defined as a subset of organizational routines 
according to Argyris (1990), yet Argyris did not provide much explanation on how 
these two concepts are related to and distinguish from each other.  For example, how 
the characteristics of organizational routines being a repetitive, recurrent and 
collective behaviour can be related to ODRs.  Additionally, it is still contentious to 
perceive routines being inertia or/and a source of change.  The recent understanding 
of routines being a source of both change and stability also has not been applied to 
understand ODRs. Hence, lack of clarification on the relation between organizational 
routines and ODRs also prevent research on investigating the role of ODRs. 
 
First, it prevents the generation of knowledge on the nomological network of ODRs. 
Second, one driver of this situation might be the lack of a measurement scale.  In 
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order to address these two shortcomings, the aims of this thesis are (i) to develop and 
validate an ODRs scale; (ii) to start building empirical evidence on the effect of 
ODRs with respect to the relations between organizational and individual factors and 
organizational learning.  
 
1.2 Purpose of the Study 
 
The few existing studies on ODRs are based on qualitative information provided by 
Argyris and others who theoretically proposed that ODRs might negatively affect 
organizational learning regardless the organizational characteristics (size, age, 
structure and people).  However, there are questions that are not answered in the 
current studies of ODRs.  
(1) How can ODRs be empirically measured at both organizational and 
individual levels?  
(2) Do ODRs have negative effects on organizational learning empirically? 
(3) Do different levels of ODRs affect organizational learning differently when 
organizational factors (size, age and structure) are considered?  
(4) Do different levels of ODRs affect organizational learning differently when 
individuals’ personality is considered?   
These four unanswered questions in the literature serve as research questions of this 
study. They also indicate the primary purpose of this study, which is to empirically 
study the role of ODRs with respect to organizational learning, through developing a 
scale for ODRs and constructing extended models which test the theory.   
 
In order to carry out empirical research, the study first requires developing a scale to 
measure ODRs. The scale development study follows the processes suggested by 
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(DeVellis, 2012; Hinkin, 1998).  The second question is to test the theoretically 
assumed relationship between ODRs and organizational learning.  The third and 
fourth questions are to find whether ODRs moderate the relationship between 
organizational factors and organizational learning; and the relationship between 
individual factors and organizational learning. The theoretical models are developed 
based on these questions. The first question is the ultimate objective for the study in 
order to proceed further to answer the other three questions.  
 
Based on these four research questions, the following research objectives are 
outlined:  
1) to develop a measurement for ODRs;  
2)  to assess the relationship between ODRs and organizational learning;  
3) to estimate whether ODRs moderate the relationship between organizational 
factors and organizational learning;  
4) to assess whether ODRs moderate the relationship between individual factors 
and organizational learning.  
 
1.3 Significance of the Study 
 
 
The study is significant to academics, practitioners and organizations trying to 
understand the mechanisms contributing to organizational learning.  The significance 
of the study is addressed in terms of its theoretical and practical contributions.    
 
1.3.1 Theoretical Contribution  
 
The study makes two theoretical contributions: First, the concept of ODRs is 
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extended and its relationship as a moderator to organizational learning is explored.  
Based on the existing theory of ODRs, this study develops a scale to measure ODRs 
at an organizational level and an individual level via six sequences of studies and 
three groups of samples. The theoretical models developed for constructing the 
components of the scale systematically generalized the characteristics of ODRs.  The 
newly developed scale provides a tool for academics to empirically test the effect of 
ODRs on individuals and organizations.  
 
Two empirical studies implement the scale of ODRs to gain empirical evidence on 
the relationship between ODRs and organizational learning in consideration of other 
organizational and individual factors.  The findings of the studies empirically assess 
the effect of different levels of ODRs on organizational learning.  This builds 
empirical knowledge which is able to identify and help explain what the effects of 
ODRs are in reality.  Thus, it constitutes to the knowledge on the negative effect of 
ODRs on organizational learning- a theoretical argument frequently found in the 
literature.  
 
Second, the study contributes towards the literature of organizational learning.  It 
tests the impact of organizational factors and individual factors on organizational 
learning. The finding broadens the knowledge on the antecedents of organizational 
learning and initiates more academic interest to explore other factors contributing to 
organizations’ learning ability.  
 
1.3.2 Practical Contribution of the Study to organizational defensive routines 
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Organizational defensive routines exist in most organizations regardless of their age 
and size (Argyris, 1990). Organizational defensive routines are prevalent and 
intangible most times.  Hence, it is challenging for organizations to identify this 
destructive behavior.  Having an instrument to measure ODRs helps organizations to 
recognize their weakness in covering up core issues, especially at the time when 
candor opinions are most needed for generating changes and improving 
organizational performance.  Organizations also could benefit from applying the 
scale to staff training.  Making the constituents of ODRs explicit can evoke 
employees’ consciousness on their contribution to these negative practices in 
organizations.  Hence, employees can identify these automatic and mindless 
activities by referencing the items against their own behavior towards handling 
uncomfortable issues.  Furthermore, another potential benefit of the scale is to 
advance organizational development via identifying and attenuating the defensive 
organizational culture.  As organizations with ODRs often restrict themselves to the 
short-term solutions towards existing problems, this only produces incremental 
changes.  Long-term organizational development requires a context which 
encourages employees to discuss the underground issues.  
 
The findings of the empirical studies have practical implications for managers.  If the 
study finds ODRs mitigate the effect of individual and organizational characteristics 
on organizational learning in a negative way, this is consistent with theoretical 
assumptions made in existing literature. It will be rational for organizations to reduce 
or eliminate ODRs regardless of their resources and labor force.  Additionally, 
evaluating the relationship between organizational factors and organizational 
learning could assist organizations in designing their structures for facilitating their 
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learning abilities.  Furthermore, the findings of the study on the relationship between 
individual factors and organizational learning could give guidance to organizations 
for composing teams and recruitment.  
  
1.4 Snapshots of the thesis 
 
The thesis is composed of eight chapters.  The following paragraphs briefly 
summarize each of them.  Chapter 2 reviews the current literature on organizational 
routines, organizational learning, organizational factors (size, structure and age) and 
individual personality traits (conscientiousness, neuroticism and openness to 
experience) and organizational defensive routines.  A theoretical model emerges 
from existing literature suggesting that ODRs are a moderator of the relationship 
between organizational factors and organizational learning; and the relationship 
between individual factors and organizational learning.  
 
Drawing on the understanding of organizational routines and linking them with the 
characteristics of ODRs, the study concludes that ODRs share the characteristic of 
being a source of stability instead of change.  Due to this inert and covert nature, 
organizations with well selected people and appropriate resources still often failed to 
achieve their learning goals.  Hence, the study suggests that it is ODRs that partially 
explain why an inferior learning outcome happens.  However, based on the 
researcher’s knowledge, the literature fails to provide a reliable scale to measure 
ODRs.  Hence, developing a measurement for ODRs becomes an inevitable step 
before testing this model.    
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Chapter 3 explains the choice of philosophical paradigm and research design.  After 
comparing three research paradigms which are often used in social science, this 
study adopts post-positivism.  The study employs quantitative method via data 
collection and data analysis to test hypotheses.  The study applies test-retest 
measures for variables of the framework except ODRs.  
 
Chapter 4 develops a scale to measure ODRs.  Best practice recommendations of 
scale development require a sequence of six studies to be carried out.  The first step 
involves the process of reviewing research about ODRs in order to identify 
components of ODRs.  From the theoretical review, it is concluded that ODRs have 
two levels: organizational level and individual level (see Chapter 2).  Then based on 
the well archived existing qualitative research, an item pool is created.  People from 
both academia and the industry were invited to comment on the items.  Refined items 
are then combined into a survey.  Exploratory factor analysis (EFA) results in two 
factors to measure ODRs at the organizational level.  The researcher generalized the 
common theme of items and named the factors organizational cover up and 
organizational pretense.  EFA also results in a two second-order factors to measure 
ODRs at an individual level, which are named embarrassment avoidance and rigidity 
at work.  Following the EFA, another different group of sample is applied for 
confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) which further tests the model suggested by EFA.  
The findings of CFA show a good model fit for both constructs.  To compare ODRs 
with their similar constructs, the researcher combined the survey with another project 
to collect an additional sample for assessing convergent and discriminant validity.  
Results from the analysis show that ODRs at organizational level are similar to the 
concepts of organizational silence and red tape, but empirically different.  They also 
  
 
26 
show that ODRs at individual level are similar to defensive silence and employee 
silence behavior, but again empirically different.  This supports the convergent and 
discriminant validity of the scales.  The researcher also established predictive 
validity by showing that ODRs can negatively and significantly predict 
psychological safety at an organizational level; and it can negatively and 
significantly predict job satisfaction.  As the final step of measurement development, 
the researcher established measurement invariance with the assistance of multi-group 
CFA which compares the construct with samples from the UK and US.  This series 
of studies followed best practice recommended for scale development (DeVellis, 
2012; Hinkin, 1998).  The scales meet all reliability and validity criteria and thus can 
now be tested in empirical settings.  
 
Chapter 5 empirically assesses how ODRs affect the relationship between 
organizational factors (size, structure and age) and organizational learning using the 
newly developed scale from Chapter 4. This allows the researcher to empirically test 
the model introduced in Chapter 2.  Chapter 5 tests half of the model which is about 
the relationships between organizational variables (size, age, structure and ODRs) 
and organizational learning.  Theoretically the relationship between organizational 
factors (size, age and structure) and organizational learning are established again 
based on the argument presented in Chapter 2 and additional literature.  The analysis 
is undertaken using a sample of 440 observations.  The result shows that ODRs 
moderate the relationship between formalization and organizational learning. That 
means ODRs worsen the negative relationship between formalization and 
organizational learning.  The result also confirms the theoretical suggestion that 
ODRs are counterproductive to organizational learning.  
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Chapter 6 empirically tests the remaining part of the model which assumes ODRs 
moderate the relationship between individuals’ personalities (conscientiousness, 
openness to experience and neuroticism) and organizational learning.  The researcher 
used the same sample from Chapter 5.  The findings of the analysis indicate that 
ODRs do not moderate any of the relationships proposed theoretically. It also 
counterintuitively shows that ODRs at an individual level are positively related to 
organizational learning.  
 
Chapter 7 provides a general discussion on the findings of all the studies in the 
thesis.  It also proposes the implication of the studies towards academics and 
industries.  Chapter 8, the final chapter, concludes the thesis with limitations and 
recommendations for future studies.  
  
The researcher would like to give three reasons why the thesis constructs 
propositions in Chapter 2, then converts propositions into hypotheses in Chapter 5 
and Chapter 6. First, there is lack of systematic understanding on the components of 
ODRs, which only allows the researcher to conceptually propose the relationships 
between variables based on the existing research. However, after a robust process of 
scale development for ODRs presented in Chapter 4, the researcher is able to refine 
those propositions and deduce hypotheses for empirical tests on these variables. 
Second, operationalization of concepts for testing hypotheses requires different 
arguments in comparison of constructing theoretical propositions.  Third, this thesis 
estimates some very complex organizational concepts such as organizational 
learning, and organizational defensive routines. Researchers view these two concepts 
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from different disciplines and levels (e.g. Easterby-Smith, et al., 1998; Rerup and 
Feldman, 2011; Cohen, 2012).  These different arguments are all beneficial for this 
study, but will make the literature review very cumbersome. Therefore, the 
researcher has allocated the information into multiple chapters serving the respective 
chapters’ need. This way of structuring the thesis not only makes the arguments in 
each chapter concise, but also enhance the readability for Chapter 5 and Chapter 6 
which can be considered as two complete empirical studies.  
 
1.5 Summary 
  
A brief explanation of the study of ODRs reveals a gap in the literature that there is a 
need to empirically test the theoretical assumptions postulated by Argyris.  The 
assumption is that ODRs are one of the reasons to explain why organizations with 
adequate resources still fail to reach their learning goals.  This theoretical assumption 
is well recognized and accepted by academics and practitioners, but there is a lack of 
empirical support to this assumption.  This highlights a need for empirical studies to 
test this assumption.  
 
Based on the literature gap, four research questions are proposed to guide the 
directions of the study.  Four objectives are identified in order to answer the 
questions.  
 
This chapter also explained the significance of this study towards academics and 
industries.  In general, this study attempts to develop a scale to measure ODRs.  The 
scale will contribute towards further development of frameworks for understanding 
ODRs empirically.  This study also provides empirical evidence as to the negative 
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effect of ODRs on the organizational learning proposed by Argyris.  Furthermore, 
this study provides information that organizations with desire for increasing their 
learning capacity which should not only pay attention to organizational design and 
personnel selection, but also a need to reduce ODRs.  Finally, the chapter briefly 
summarized each individual chapter, which indicates the structure of the thesis.   
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CHAPTER TWO:  Literature Review and Theoretical Framework
2
 
 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
The previous chapter provided an outline of the whole study.  This chapter now 
reviews the literature related to organizational learning, ODRs, and organizational 
routines.  It also forms propositions based on the theoretical deductions on 
relationships between concepts, namely, ODRs, organizational learning, personality 
traits and organizational factors (size, age and structure).  The framework designed in 
this Chapter serves as a foundation for the whole thesis. The propositions introduced 
here are then refined and converted into hypotheses in Chapter 5 and Chapter 6 after 
the scale of measuring ODRs is developed in Chapter 4.  
 
2.2 Organizational Learning 
 
ODRs could have an effect on other organizational factors, but so far they have been 
closely linked to organizational learning.  This close link between these two concepts 
mainly relies on the studies from Argyris and Schön (1978) and Argyris (2001).  
Therefore, as a stepping stone before proceeding to empirically analyze the interplay 
of ODRs with other organizational factors, this section focuses on assessing the 
currently well-accepted theoretical inference on the negative effect of ODRs on 
organizational learning.  In order to understand the theoretical relationship, it is 
essential to clarify (1) the nature of organizational learning, (2) to discuss its 
                                                 
2.  A paper based on this Chapter has been presented at the British Academy of Management 
2014 annual conference. 
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emergence, (3) to define different levels of organizational learning and (4) to identify 
impediments to organizational learning. 
  
2.2.1 The meaning of organizational learning 
 
Though the concept of organizational learning has been in existence for over 50 
years (March 1958), there is no unanimous definition for organizational learning 
(Easterby-Smith et al., 1998; Popova-Nowak and Cseh, 2015). Researchers from 
different fields tried to define learning on their own philosophical stances (details see 
Popova-Nowak & Cseh, 2015). The functionalist paradigm is a dominant way of 
understanding organizational learning and it considers individuals as key agents in 
collecting, interpreting, disseminating, storing, and retrieving information within 
organizations, and this learning process interacts with the organizational structure 
which provides reference for individual’s cognition and behavior (Popova-Nowak & 
Cseh, 2015).  Argyris & Schön (1978) define organizational learning as a process of 
detecting and correcting error.  In respect of this concept of learning, if errors are 
discovered, learning will not occur.  Fiol and Lyles (1985) consider learning as a 
process of improving actions through better knowledge and understanding.  To Levitt 
and March (1988), learning is about encoding past experience into routine behavior.  
It is a process of developing new knowledge through which potentially changes 
behavior (Huber, 1991). Despite the diverse views on learning, researchers often 
assume organizational learning as a “linear process that is the same across all levels 
of analysis” (Popova-Nowak & Cseh, 2015, p. 305). 
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2.2.2 How organizational learning takes place via three perspectives  
 
Learning in organizations has been studied from various perspectives based on 
different disciplines (cf. Antonacopoulou and Chiva, 2007; Easterby-Smith et al., 
1998).  The focus of this study is not to discuss the differences of perspectives, but to 
study factors influencing organizational learning. Here the researcher briefly reviews 
organizational learning based on an individual learning theory and a social learning 
theory.  Individual learning theories are traditionally adopted to explain how 
individuals act on the behalf of organizations to process information and make 
decisions (March and Olsen, 1975).  Individuals hold mental models in their minds 
which stores information to guide actions (Senge, 1991).  Learning causes changes of 
individual mental models, and these changes affect organizational learning through 
their influence on organizations’ shared mental models (Kim, 1993).  Proponents of 
this view suggest that organizations learn through individuals who acquire 
knowledge, distribute knowledge, interpret and integrate to organizational routines 
codified as rules or procedures (Cohen and Bacdayan, 1994; Hayes and Allinson, 
1998; Huber, 1991).  However, it needs to be clear that organizational learning is 
more than the cumulative sum of each member’s learning.  Organizational learning 
does not only influence each current member, but also future members who learn 
from the experiences of others via organizational memories such as norms, histories 
and routines.  Therefore, Daft and Weick (1984) suggested that organizations are 
considered to have their own cognitive systems and memories.  Organizations store 
the knowledge and accumulate over time from their members in a form of rules and 
procedures, and individual organizational members associate with those beliefs. Over 
time, both mutually affect and modify each other (March, 1991).  It is important to 
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be aware of that it is incorrect to equal organizational learning to individual learning, 
yet individual learning has been considered as an essential part of organizational 
learning process (e.g. Huber 1991; Crossan et al, 2011; Friedman 2002; Kim 1993). 
Huber (1991) contends that organizational learning goes through four processes.  The 
first two process, knowledge acquisition, information distribution are carried out by 
individuals.  Crossan et al. (2011) though had a different view from Huber, he also 
agreed that organizational learning first starts from individuals.  Hence, learning 
should not be simply equal to organizational learning, but should presume that better 
individual learners might contribute more to organizational learning.  
 
The other perspective is the social learning view which implies that individuals are 
social actors who learn from social interactions within a social system such as 
organizational context (e.g. Antonacopoulou and Chiva, 2007; Easterby-Smith, Snell 
and  Gherardi, 1998).  This view emphasizes learning in a group and organization 
through participation and interaction, rather than the mind of individuals (Elkjaer, 
2003).  An individual is a social being who constructs learning in a social-culture 
setting which impacts learning in return.  Hence, learning and social context are not 
independent from each other.  Instead, they mutually influence each other.  The 
social view on organizational learning treats organizations as social worlds whose 
members’ knowledge acquisition is not merely for work, but for social identities 
(Gherardi et al., 1998).  In order to integrate into society, individuals have to learn in 
order to engage with others in a continuous practice. During the learning process, it 
is inevitable to cause conflict when old knowledge or experience is demolished and 
established social relations are disturbed (Elkjaer, 2004).  Additionally, organizations 
are social systems in which emotions and intuition can play an important role in 
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learning.  If those emotions are not dealt with appropriately, it could make 
individuals in organizations be defensive towards negative performance.   Hence, it 
is important to have a proper organizational context to appreciate the benefit of 
conflict and resolve the conflict with open discussion.   This view directed the locus 
of information process to the participation of individuals in an organizational context 
which learning takes place.  In this perspective, language becomes a central element 
of learning as it is a medium of knowledge transmission and culture (Gherardi et al., 
1998).   Furthermore, this perspective of viewing learning as a social activity 
naturally puts learning as a mutual formation of individuals and organizations. This 
shows that organizational learning could be affected by both factors accordingly.   
 
Another view of understanding organizational learning is from a perspective of 
general routines.  Levitt and March (1998, p. 320) defined organizational learning as 
“a process of encoding inferences from history into routines that guide behavior”.  
On the one hand, individuals in organizations learn most of their work-related 
performance via stored organizations’ memory—organizational routines and 
procedures. On the other hand, organizational learning is like a synergy of individual 
memories.  It stores individual knowledge and hands it down to the new members 
(Cohen and Bacdayan, 1994; Becker, et al., 2005).  Tranfield et al. (2000) viewed 
organizational learning as just routines although from another perspective. They 
categorized routines into two types: enabling routines and defensive routines.  These 
two types of routines are in a state of quasi-equilibrium towards organizational 
learning; organizations only learn when enablers’ driving forces are stronger than 
defensive routines.   
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2.2.3 Levels of Organizational learning 
 
Argyris and Schön (1978) separated the broad field of organizational learning into 
single-loop and double-loop learning.  Single loop learning involves detection and 
correction on the mismatch between expectation and outcomes.  This learning does 
not change the governing policies and values.  In contrast, double loop learning 
involves re-examination and change of governing policies and values.  Therefore, 
“Single-loop learning is usually related to the routine, immediate task. Double-loop 
learning is related to the non-routine, the long-range outcome” (Argyris, 
1993,p.116). 
 
From a cognitive perspective, single loop learning is characterized by low levels of 
learning and corrective learning (Fiol and Lyles, 1985) and exploitative learning 
(March, 1991; Lavie et al., 2010).  It changes people’s behavior, but does not change 
cognitive processes stimulating that behavior.  Therefore, the change is temporary 
and only produces a “bandage effect” as a means-end solution to organizational 
problems.  Single-loop learning only creates incremental change on existing 
organizational routines.  It hides and by-passes the fundamental causes of 
organizational problems and leads to the obsolescence of capabilities on adapting 
changes (Farjoun, 2010). Most learning in organizations is single-loop learning or 
incremental learning (Fiol & Lyles, 1985; Miner & Mezias, 1996).  From the 
organizational perspective, this kind of learning costs less by adjusting well-
practiced routines rather than conducting transformative changes on routines.  For 
employees, most people are comfortable with what they know.  Hence, it is easier for 
employees to accept minor modifications of their behavior than to carry out a 
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dramatic change on their daily routines.    Therefore, single-loop learning takes up 
the majority of organizational learning.  
 
In contrast, double-loop learning is characterized by high levels of learning or 
generative learning (Lopez, 2006).  It is a cognitive process which involves people 
reflecting on the differences between what they think and what they really do in 
practice.  By reflection, people change their actions to be more congruent with the 
values they perceive as appropriate. Normally it produces a new understanding of 
situations and leads to change the fundamental way of doing things.  This kind of 
learning is considered a high level of learning; it causes radical forms of learning and 
genuine learning (Mazutis et al., 2008). For example, double-loop learning aims to 
change overall organizational norms rather than refine specific organizational actions 
(Henderson et al., 2013).  
 
The theory of single and double loop learning has been challenged by some scholars 
(Miner & Mezias, 1996; Lipshitz, 2000; Miner et al., 2008), because Argyris’ early 
work described single-loop learning and double-loop learning as a dichotomy: one is 
extremely good and the other is extremely bad for organizations to solve difficult 
problems (Miner & Mezias, 1996).  However, Gupta, Smith and Shalley (2006) 
proposed that organizations should achieve a balance between both types of learning.  
Organizations need single-loop learning to increase production efficiency via 
adjustment of existing routines.  However, single-loop learning should not be the 
major strategy for organizations to deal with problems, as single-loop learning can 
camouflage organizational issues with short-term solutions resulting in doing the 
wrong things rightly (Greenwood & Jennifer, 1998).  Single-loop learning or 
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exploitative learning is more suitable for organizations in the context of being stable 
and safe, and double-loop learning operates more effectively when organizations are 
going through changes and complex situations (Kim, Song and Kerkar, 2012).  
Therefore, both types of learning are required for organizations in accordance with 
their situational needs. Argyris (1996, p.80) even concludes “while technical theories 
were implemented correctly, single-loop learning can be liberating alternatives.” 
 
 
2.3 Organizational Routines 
 
Studying general organizational routines could improve understanding of ODRs.  
Different from the limited studies on ODRs, academics have paid substantial 
attention to the understanding organizational routines.  They have attracted 
continuous interest from researchers with respect to various issues such as change, 
learning or organizational actions (e.g.Becker & Zirpoli, 2008; Nelson & Winter, 
1982; Pentland, et al., 2010).  The current debate on routines is mainly about whether 
routines are inflexible and mindless, or they are a resource of both change and stable.  
The more traditional approach of routines is explained by three famous metaphors, 
individual habit, programs and genes. However, contemporary literature on 
organizational routines tend to consider routines being stability and change (Feldman 
& Pentland, 2003; Gilbert, 2005; Rerup et al., 2011).   
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2.3.1 Organizational routines and stability 
 
The traditional view treated organizational routines as (a) individual habit, (b) 
performance programs, and (c) employed the metaphor of “genes.”  According to the 
first perspective, routines are like individual habits in that they become reflex and 
automatic actions (e.g. Becker and Zirpoli, 2008).  Also routines operate via 
individual habitual behavior that mainly is non-deliberative and non-intentional 
(Hodgson, 2008). However, habits are different from routines. Habits are often 
referred as individual-level dispositions to engage in a particular behavior in 
response to stable contextual cues (Knudsen, 2008). From a view of pragmatist 
philosophy and instinct psychology, Hodgson and Knudsen (2004) posited that habit 
is propensity to react to certain stimuli and social institutions help to reinforce habits. 
Routines are meta-habits, existing on one ontological layer above habits themselves 
(Hodgson and Knudsen 2004, p. 289). Organizations provide social and physical 
environment to guide individuals’ habitual behavior.    In the second perspective, 
routines have been equated to performance programs that are institutionalized rules 
or standard procedures from previous successful experiences (Cyert and March, 
1963; Levitt, et al., 1999).  They require more adjustment than habits because they 
involve compromises from each member’s habit to suit organizational development.  
However, they do not require deliberate consideration as most decisions are made in 
advance (Feldman and Pentland, 2003).  The third theoretical perspective relates 
routines to biological “genes” (Nelson and Winter, 1982).  Employees in 
organizations change over time, but some information is stored and carried forward, 
like genes inherited by the new employees. Routines here are like the memory of the 
organization. The gene analogy highlights that organizational routines have an 
important function as a capability reservoir for organizations (Hodgson, 2008). This 
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prevailing understanding of routines being like ‘genes’ is from an evolutionary 
theory which borrowed biology. Some routines persistently passed down after the 
process of variation, selection and information transfer (Knudsen). It emphasizes the 
characteristics of routines being repetitive, recurrent and automatic.   
 
These three popular metaphors of organizational routines reflect a common feature: 
stability.  In this perspective routines are mundane, mindless and lack deliberation 
(Becker, et al., 2005).  Nelson (1991) also described routines as a partially automatic 
collective performance that is embedded in organizational capabilities in the form of 
implicit knowledge.  This implicit knowledge such as abstract and generalized rules 
is labelled as the ostensive aspect of routines by Feldman and Pentland (2008).  
Feldman and Pentland (2003) criticized the traditional views on routines as an 
incomplete perspective without consideration of employees participating in the 
routines. However, the traditional view overlooks that employees are the agents of 
routines and they can deliberately adjust routines or modify them in coordination 
with other individuals to suit different situations.  Therefore, Feldman and Pentland 
(2003) suggested that routines have a performative aspect, too. This means 
modification on routines can emerge from employees’ performance on routines. The 
ostensive and performative aspects of routines are interdependent, and thus can 
sometimes act in a complementary and sometimes in a contradictory fashion.   
 
2.3.2 Organizational routines and change 
 
A more current view not only recognizes routines as being stable, but also points out 
that organizational routines are effortful accomplishments of employees who 
mindfully select action at specific time and specific situation (Feldman 2000). 
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Recently organizational studies published a special issue on routine dynamics. 
Mainly these research challenges the conventional understanding on routines being 
inertial. For example, using simulation techniques, Yi et al. found that ‘a reduced 
rate of change at the routine level may cause variations in the pace and sequence 
with which planned changes to the routines and their effects take place, and such 
reordering of the planned changes may open the door to further organizational 
exploration and adaptation’ ( 2016, p. 796).  In other words, the current research on 
routines advocate that routines are a source of stability and change (Feldman and 
Pentland, 2003).  Farjoun (2010) noted that they are interdependent and influence 
each other.  This is because the stability side of routines or the ostensive factor of 
routines gives directions or guidelines to employees, but the agency of actors who 
perform routines in organizations intentionally or unintentionally tailor routines 
based on the situations (Howard-Grenville, 2005).  Employees’ reflective talk on the 
established behavior could elicit a new way of acting (Dittrich, Guerard and Seidl, 
2016).  Consequently, these patterns change in the organizational context and/or their 
own performance. Feldman and Pentland (2003) generalized these two 
characteristics of routines and defined routines as “a repetitive, recognizable pattern 
of interdependent actions, involving multiple actors, but they cannot be understood 
as static unchanging objects” (p.95).   
 
In this definition “A repetitive, recognizable pattern” echoes the traditional view on 
organizational routines being stable; but “multiple actors” emphasizes the roles of 
employees as the agent carrying out the routines.  This is because individuals 
interpret and conduct routines differently in accordance to either their own 
experience or a particular situation requirement, despite the fact that written routines 
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are invariable. For example, Howard-Grenville (2005) observed employees’ behavior 
in a high-tech manufacturing company and found that employees interpret routines 
differently depending on time and situation.  Overall it is worthwhile noting that 
routines do not only present themselves in archived rules, schedules, and standard 
operating procedures, but also develop through interaction and cooperation among 
actors (Turner and Rindova, 2012). The literature on routines also posited that 
collective reflect communication at the situating problems is an important factor of 
contributing to changes at current routines (e.g. Dittrich et.al. 2016; Howard-
Grenville, 2005). Hence, routines are not static, but can be modified during the 
process of performing them.  Some of the variations can be institutionalized and 
become part of legitimate routines; some others may not be incorporated.  
 
It is important to recognize the role agents at organizational routines.  However, the 
role of institutions should be acknowledged as well.  Based on DiMaggio and 
Powell’s work, organizations change routines can be categorized into three 
mechanisms, namely coercive isomorphism which stems from political influence; 
mimetic isomorphism resulting from standard responses to uncertainty and normatice 
isomorphism associated with professionalization (1983, p. 150).   These three 
mechanisms indicate whether stabilizing or changing the current routines is not only 
a choice of individuals; but also a force of different institutions. These institutions 
could be government bodies, competitors or professional associations.  
2.4 Organizational Defensive Routines 
 
As a subset of organizational routines, ODRs share the characteristic of being stable. 
Employees who produce ODRs are not aware of their counterproductive actions.  
They carry out these defensive actions automatically by following organizational 
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norms or protecting themselves.  Such ODRs recur mindlessly and unreflectively.  In 
this sense ODRs share the feature of having recurrent, repetitive and persistent 
patterns (Feldman 2000).  However, the factor of being stable has different meaning 
between ODRs and general routines.  The stability provides ready-made solutions for 
employees to act efficiently.  With the development of organizations, some routines 
will be changed to fit the organizational context.  These changes could be partial 
(improvement routines) or complete (transformational routines) (Tranfield et al., 
2000). Another kind is standard routines comprising the most observable way of 
organizations being run on daily bases (Tranfield et al., 2000).  Another subset of 
routines is ODRs. These routines become inertial and resist changes.  Rather than 
playing a vital role in organizational capability and efficiency (Dosi et al., 2000), this 
inertial characteristic in ODRs prevents rational reflection on automatic behavior and 
as a consequence this leads to counterproductive performance and reinforced  errors.  
 
ODRs can also be understood as “sticky” routines based on Howard-Grenville’s 
description (2005).  Howard-Grenville defined “sticky routines” according to the 
extent of their changes over time; a “sticky” routine is “very persistent; little impetus 
or change from within” (2005, p.633).  Argyris (1986) explains this feature of ODRs 
with a three-loop mechanism: In loop 1 top line executives representing 
organizations bypass threats and the causes of threats; in loop 2 employees 
automatically adopt their own defensive routines to avoid the same threat which 
organizations try to avoid; in loop 3 employees reflect on counterproductive 
consequences by mainly blaming defensive routines from others rather than their 
own contribution towards them.  The second loop nests inside the first one, and the 
third loop nests inside the second and the first.  These three loops create a safety net 
  
 
43 
to protect people who are performing ODRs from embarrassment and threat. This 
“nesting” is a strategy that employees unconsciously employ to cover up 
embarrassment for their superiors and themselves.  Therefore, they do not have 
motivation to change their behavior.  ODRs make employees feel helpless and 
cynical about their ability to change.  Therefore, organizations and employees try to 
engage with, avoid, or reduce ODRs.  Instead, they reinforce ODRs and make ODRs 
extremely difficult to identify and change (Argyris, 1986).  Without the awareness of 
producing ODRs, it is challenging for organizations to detect the barriers for learning 
by internal processes (Riley et al., 2013).  
 
Routines have been considered to be changeable and open to variation (Cohen, 2012; 
Feldman, 2003).  Employees who perform the routines have the choice of adjusting 
or altering them to match their own needs together with organizational issues at hand 
(Feldman and  Pentland, 2003; Turner and  Rindova, 2012).  Howard-Grenville 
(2005) pointed out that the performing agents might ignore the feedback from 
reproduction of organizational routines in order to avoid changes generating 
embarrassment or threat.  This leads to organizational inertia generated by ODRs.  
Argyris’ (1990) example about changes on cost reduction program has clearly shown 
employees have the choice to generate change (or not).  In the example, employees 
covered up the valid information for about one to three years, because they presumed 
that the organization does not want to change.  
 
Some organizations change their routines on purpose to generate innovation (Jones 
and Craven 2001).  Changes in organizational routines are especially evident when a 
crisis happens (Gersick and Hackman 1990) and they are essential for organizational 
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development.  However, changing routines themselves will meet resistance from a 
majority of employees who are afraid of embarrassment and failure.  A longitudinal 
study of 500 large Australian organizations during 1993 and 1996 revealed that 
employee resistance was the most frequently cited implementation problem 
encountered by management when introducing change (Bovey & Hede, 2001 cited 
by Waldersee and Griffiths, 1997).  Bovey and Hede (2001) found that individuals 
with a tendency of resisting changes are also more likely to behave defensively 
toward change.   
 
ODRs can be changed but this is restricted by the way these routines are formed and 
implemented unconsciously.  It is known that routines are difficult to change (Cohen 
and Bacdayan, 1994).  The changes of routines require organizations to reflect 
cautiously on behaviors, identify errors and correct these errors.  However, 
organizations practicing ODRs try to cover up the errors automatically without 
reflection (Wilson, 2000).  Employees or organizations practice routines as rational 
and natural (Hansen and Vogel, 2011).  Also, employees tend to apply mixed 
messages which are inconsistent and ambiguous with respect to conveying 
uncomfortable information. Furthermore, ODRs, skilled incompetence and fancy 
footwork form a defensive routines pattern, and they are interactive and reinforce 
each other (Argyris, 1990).  Skilled incompetence is the tendency of individuals to 
employ strategies that lead to counterproductive consequences automatically.  Fancy 
footwork is the way that employees blame other individuals or organizations for the 
consequences of their own actions or deny their inconsistent actions (Noonan, 2007).  
The coexistence of these three elements in organizations creates difficulties for 
changing defensive patterns.  In order to change ODRs, it is crucial to understand 
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what causes ODRs. Thus, the following section will review the literature on ODRs 
with emphasis on their determinants. 
 
2.4.1 The differences between organizational routines and ODRs 
 
The main difference between ODRs and organizational routines is the extent of their 
emphasis on stability and change. The above sections at this chapter show that the 
traditional view on routines was perceived as individual habit, performance programs 
and gene. This perspective is rooted in evolutionary theory. It considers routines to 
be inertial and inflexible. This views on routines have been challenged by many 
scholars recently (e.g. Feldman et al. 2016; Aroles and Mclean, 2016) and pointing 
out that the traditional view neglected the role of routine participants. The 
contemporary view on routines considers routines being the source of change and 
stable. That means routines are still building blocks of organizational capability by 
provide efficient solutions to certain issues (Becker 2004), but they provide source 
for change through the improvisation associated with routines (Aroles and Mclean 
2016).  This view becomes the well accepted by current researchers at routines. 
Based on the current perception on routines, the last sections explained 
characteristics of ODRs which share the feature of routines being stable instead of 
change.  This characteristic of ODRs resisting change is analyzed by considering 
routine performers.  Arygris (1990) and Morrison et al. (2000) posit that performers’ 
perceptions on the negative consequences of revealing genuine opinions determines 
their routine behavior.  Hence, employees at organizations with high ODRs tend to 
stick with the recognizable routines in order to avoid any blames.  Individuals 
interact and independent to each other when perform a routine at organizations.  
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According to social exchange theory, individuals afraid to receive negative 
reciprocation if they do not follow social rules at organizations (Cropanzano and 
Mitchell 2005).  When organizations contain high ODRs, individuals conceive that 
negative feedbacks are not welcome.  Without receiving different ways of 
conducting the routines, changes are difficult to identified and implicated in 
organizations.   
 
2.4.2 Elements that contribute to ODRs 
 
ODRs arise because, most of the time, actors are not aware that their defensive 
actions contribute to counterproductive organizational performance.  They perceive 
ODRs as rational things to do in order to avoid conflict and create a harmonious 
working relationship with others (Noonan, 2007).  Argyris (1990) claimed that one 
of the reasons for ODRs to emerge is due to employees’ unilateral control under the 
disguise of social norms such as avoiding upsetting employees, not to appearing 
negative and being supportive.  However, all the actions they implemented are to 
protect themselves from failure and conflict (Cheng, 2011). Argyris generalized four 
principles guiding the defensive routines: (1) obtain unilateral control, (2) maximize 
winning and minimize losing, (3) minimize negative feelings, and (4) maximize 
rationality (1993, p.80).  Generalizing from the existing studies, these four rules are 
enacted by three observable elements: dysfunctional communication, conflict 
avoidance and risk aversion. These three elements will be discussed in detail in 
Chapter 4.  The second factor causing ODRs is organizational culture and norms that 
encourage employees to use ODRs to protect themselves and colleagues from 
embarrassment and threat.  One example to demonstrate the issue is from Noonan’s 
(2007, p.79-p.100) consultancy practice: the organization he was studying had a tacit 
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culture to encourage competition between departments instead of cooperation.  When 
the operations department found a problem in a machine, the sale department was 
informed immediately to postpone customers’ orders.  Both departments only 
considered the interest of their own departments and made negative assumptions 
about each other.  As a result, they were unaware of how their actions affect others 
and how their behavior was part of a larger system.  Therefore, employees often 
failed to realize how well intended actions create counterproductive patterns of 
behavior in an environment which other departments’ success is a threat to them 
owns instead of an opportunity of collaboration.  The third factor could be individual 
embarrassment.  Argyris’s definition on ODRs indicates that ODRs are elicited 
during situations which can cause embarrassment and threat. Employees sense the 
situation and react based on their assumptions about the presumed consequences 
without testing their reasoning (Argyris, 1993). Therefore, it can be deduced that 
employees who are more likely to get embarrassed can contribute ODRs more than 
those employees who experience lower levels of embarrassment.  The fourth factor 
that contributes to this defensive behavior is individuals’ cognitive rigidity at work 
(Ashforth and Lee, 1990).  Individuals’ cognitions are “one of many important 
building blocks for understanding collective phenomena such as routines” (Felin, 
Foss, Heimeriks & Madsen, 2012, p. 1358).  Cognition in organizations is about how 
individual members of an organization reflect upon their experience, make plans, or 
take action (Boland, Tenkasi and Te’eni, 1994, p. 456).   Individuals who are prone 
to stay in their comfort zone and carry on with their routine performance are less 
likely to reveal the information that stimulates changes (Ashforth & Lee, 1990).  
From the elements that affect ODRs, it can be clearly seen that ODRs are a mix of 
individual, social, and organizational constructed phenomena.  
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2.4.3 Research on ODRs besides Argyris’ work 
 
Limited research has been conducted on ODRs following Argyris’ seminal work 
(Argyris, 1985).  Ritchie (1999) conducted a quantitative study in three different 
organizations regarding the relationship between communication and organizational 
defensiveness.  She found that lack of communication is a predictor of organizational 
defensiveness.  However, generalizability of Ritchie’s finding related to ODRs is 
limited. The reason for this is the low reliability of the measurement construct used 
in the study.  Nevertheless, Ritchie (1999) provides some initial attempt to 
quantifying these complex routines in future studies.  Chiu (2006) applied Ritchie’s 
scale of ODRs and found that total quality management (TQM) moderates the 
relationship between organizational defensive routines and double loop learning.  
Chiu pointed out that Ritchie’s scale was not validated, yet he didn’t conduct a series 
of validity tests before implementing the scale to his own study.  Yau and Cheng 
(2010) also carried out a quantitative study in two transport companies in Hong 
Kong.  Studying the three mechanisms of organizational defensive patterns originally 
developed by Argyris including ODRs, fancy footwork, and skilled incompetence, 
they suggested that ODRs impede organizational learning. These three mechanisms 
positively associate with each other and all have negative influence on organizational 
learning in varying degrees (Yau and Cheng, 2010).  The finding confirms Argyris’ 
theoretical suggestion on that these three mechanisms coexist and reinforce each 
other (Argyris, 1990).   
 
  
 
49 
Apart from these limited quantitative studies, some researchers try to conceptualize 
ODRs via case studies. Fontaine et al. (2012) suggested that ODRs should not be 
prevalent in Islamic societies due to their beliefs in sincerity to others and mutual 
consultation.  This belief on sincerity does not encourage employees to cover up their 
true opinions for their own benefit; mutual consultation encourages members share 
ideas with one another.  If these two beliefs are practiced effectively, they could 
reduce ODRs in the Muslim community.  These two beliefs echo Argyris (1990) and 
Noonan’s (2007) suggestions on solutions to reducing ODRs, i.e. advocating own 
opinions and encouraging other employees’ queries on your opinions.  Additionally, 
they used a short case to suggest that there are other methods such as distributed 
thinking and social awareness training to overcome ODRs besides Argyris’s 
solution.  Fontaine et al.’s (2012) study is the first study suggesting a cultural 
influence on ODRs, but it lacks empirical support.  Noonan (2007) applied Argyris’ 
theories on ODRs in his own consultancy experience.  He identified ODRs in 
different levels of organizations with case studies, which clearly illustrated that 
ODRs are self-reinforcing processes resulting in unproductive conversation and 
delayed decision-making.  Tranfield, et al. (2000) conducted an empirical research in 
nine manufacturing companies using case studies.  They divided ODRs into four 
types based on how employees divert the blame or responsibilities, namely diverting 
defensiveness outwards (external to themselves and firms), diverting defensiveness 
upwards (senior teams); diverting defensiveness downwards (subordinates) and 
depersonalizing (computer, system). Their study showed that if ODRs are prevalent 
in organizations, organizational learning does not emerge until the force of ODRs are 
reduced or eliminated. Further research on ODRs was conducted by Yau (2013).  
Using interviews, she studied ODRs on women active in the engineering profession.  
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Her findings strongly support the view that ODRs hinder female engineering staff 
from learning.  Riley et al. (2013) adopted a case study and found that defensive 
routines are not more prevalent in engineering manager participants than non-
engineering manager participants.  However, with the same method and size of 
sample, Riley and Cudney (2015) found that defensive routines are more commonly 
practiced among engineering managers than non-engineering managers.  
 
The existing research mainly focuses on consequences of performing ODRs on 
organizational learning, yet the lack of a reliable measurement on ODRs raises some 
concerns with regard to generalization and the reviewed literature lacks large scale 
quantitative empirical evidence.  The dominating findings about the negative effect 
of ODRs on organizational learning clearly portray that it is necessary to attenuate 
ODRs so that organizations can improve their capacity to learn and adapt to the 
current volatile market.  Therefore, it is crucial to develop a scale to measure ODRs 
by following a rigorous process and apply the scale empirically to the field.  
 
 
2.4.4 ODRs as barriers to organizational learning 
 
Organizational defensive routines are claimed to inhibit learning and are 
overprotective toward organizations (Argyris, 2001).  The issue of being 
counterproductive to learning can be explained drawing on two aspects. The first 
aspect is ineffective communication. Mixed messages are one manifestation of 
defensive routines happening most often (Noonan, 2011). People performing ODRs 
manipulate messages as ambiguous and inconsistent.  As a consequence, validity of 
some messages either is lost or is interpreted wrongly due to the ambiguity.  In 
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addition, people performing ODRs advocate their opinions with weak, unsupported 
and stereotypical arguments (Argyris, 1990), such as “trust me it is right”, “I know 
the best” and “that is how our organization operates”.   These soft data are articulated 
in such an unsubstantiated way.  They cover up the inference of their opinions and 
impede chances for other people to assess rationalities of the opinions. Hence, 
organizational defensive routines eliminate the opportunity of learning.   
 
Another way by which ODRs hinder learning is self-censorship (Argyris, 1990).  
Organizations with ODRs possess a fear environment for sharing opinions, 
especially from subordinates to supervisors (Madrid et al., 2015).  People privately 
censor negative information in order to avoid embarrassing other people or triggering 
conflict in organizations.  However, this avoidance behavior may create temporary 
harmony in the working environment, yet it becomes haphazard for organizational 
learning. Hence, Senge (1991, p.254) pointed out that “the more effective defensive 
routines are, the more effectively they cover up underlying problems, the less 
effectively these problems are faced, and the worse the problems tend to become.” 
 
The second aspect to explain the counterproductive effect of organizational defensive 
routines to learning is based on characteristics of routines such as being mindless and 
automatic. One purpose of routines is to increase efficiency by reducing peoples’ 
cognitive load to analyze repetitive issues (Cyert & March, 1963).  Yet, repetitive 
and recurrent actions to similar stimuli can reduce people’s vigilance on recognizing 
the negative result caused by some obsolete routines (Nelson & Winter, 1982).  
Recent works (e.g. Feldman & Pentland, 2003; Pentland & Feldman, 2012; Rerup et 
al., 2011) provide a more comprehensive perspective on conceptualizing routines.  
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These works posit that routines can be stable to increase efficiency, also can be a 
source of generating new routines.  However, some routines like ODRs share more 
characteristics of routines being repetitive automatic and mindless, because people 
learn skillfully to avoid embarrassment and conflict from an early age (Noonan, 
2007).  This characteristic of being mindless and automatic makes ODRs seem 
legitimate for covering-up or bypassing problems in organizations. Without exposing 
organizational problems, organizations miss chances to solve problems in the early 
stages of ODRs.  
 
2.5 The role of ODRs in Relation to Organizational Learning: A Theoretical 
Framework  
 
Organizational learning has received substantial attention from both academics and 
practitioners. The number of publications on organizational learning has been 
phenomenal (e.g. Cohen and Levinthal, 1990; Crossan et al., 1999; Easterby-Smith et 
al., 1998; Levitt and March, 1988; Marengo and Pasquali, 2012; Swift and Hwang, 
2013).  Organizational learning is acknowledged as an instrumental factor for 
corporate competitiveness (Levitt and March, 1988).  Therefore, researchers 
continuously attempt to find the factors that drive organizational learning.  Some of 
the research explores organizational learning from a specific organizational context 
or connects it with organizational knowledge and innovation (e.g. Dodgson, 1993; 
Levitt & March, 1988; March, 1991).  Despite scholars’ foci on various factors 
influencing organizational learning such as social context (Antonacopoulou & Chiva, 
2007), organizational context (Ashton, 2004), leadership (Vera & Crossan, 2004), 
cognitive trust (Swift & Hwang, 2013), employees’ motivation, attitudes (Friedman, 
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2002), and personality (Back & Seaker, 2004), little research has investigated the 
mechanisms through which ODRs affect organizational learning.  
 
Due to the multi-faceted nature of both concepts, this thesis combines micro and 
macro organizational variables contributing to organizational learning. For 
organizational factors, the researcher focuses on three organizational characteristics: 
age, structure and size.  This is because structure is considered as an instrumental 
factor in organizational learning (Fiol & Lyles, 1985).  Organizational learning 
varies with different structural arrangements (Martínez-León & Martínez-García, 
2011). Structure is important for knowledge creation because it has a bearing on how 
people interact and communicate in organizations (Walsh & Ungson, 1991).  
Experience comes with age, and organizations learn from experience (Argote & 
Miron-Spektor, 2011).  Hence, age could be an important factor contributing to 
organizational learning.  Size is a most obvious indicator of organizational resources.  
Firm size has also been recognized as a key variable to affect organizational learning 
or a hindrance to organizational knowledge development (Marquardt and Reynolds, 
1994).  Based on these reasons, size, age and structure are selected to be predictors of 
organizational learning.   
 
This chapter develops a theoretical framework about the relationships among ODRs, 
organizational learning and other organizational factors. The propositions developed 
here will be refined later in Chapter 5 and Chapter 6 after a systematic understanding 
on components of ODRs.  
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2.5.1 Organizational factors and organizational learning 
 
Mintzberg (1983, p. 2) defined organizational structure as “the total of the ways in 
which its labor is divided into distinct tasks and then its coordination is achieved 
among these tasks”.  Coordination is achieved through controlling and integrating 
work activities in accordance with formal or informal rules (Child, 1972).  
Organizational structure is in a decisive role at how decision-making power is 
allocated (e.g. centralization), and how rules and procedures are used to facilitate 
learning (e.g. formalization; Bunderson & Boumgarden, 2010). By leading members’ 
behavior, organizations can guide employees to work toward organizational goals.  
However, too much control of employees’ can constrain employees’ opinion about 
operational issues. Organizational structure also determines the channel of 
communication (Thompson, 1965).  For example, if organizations have very clear 
rules and procedures guiding members’ work tasks, less communication on tasks 
might be needed. In terms of organizational learning, Cohen (1991, p.135) posits that 
organizational structure is “a design of organizational learning, for acquiring 
information about the state of the world and for improving what the organization can 
do.”  Organizational structure is characterized by a variety of dimensions. The most 
common characteristics are formalization and centralization. Among others, previous 
research showed that centralization and formalization are decisive dimensions of 
organizational structure (e.g. Chen & Huang, 2007; Cosh, Fu & Hughes, 2012; 
Fredrickson, 1986).   
Centralization. This concept contains a broad range of elements in the organization 
including layers of hierarchy, centralization of authority and horizontal integration 
(Dalton & Tudor, 1980; Damanpour, 1991).  Centralization is characterized by the 
decision-making power being controlled by a small group people of organizations, 
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normally top managers (Damanpour, 1991).  A centralized mechanistic structure 
naturally limits knowledge creation and knowledge sharing (Pertusa-Ortega  et al., 
2010).  A less centralized structure is found positively related to organizational 
learning (lane & Lubatkin, 1998).  Because the power is centralized in a small group 
of leaders on top of the hierarchy, this structure does not motivate employees to 
reflect on improvements or solutions (Pertusa-Ortega et al., 2010).  In addition, most 
ideas or policies are discussed in small groups, which will restrict the development of 
diverse views on problems due to bounded rationality (Thompson, 1965; Simon, 
1991; Secchi & Bardone, 2013). Bisel et al. (2012) argue that centralized structures 
constitute particular relational contexts that constrain interactions between 
supervisors and their subordinates supporting the argument that centralized structures 
are less suitable for organizational learning.  
 
In organizations with centralized structures managers tend to fail to involve 
employees in the decision-making process (Damanpour, 1991).  Hence, 
communication between management and general staff become limited resulting in 
reduced knowledge creation (Nonaka et al., 2000).  Decentralized structures are more 
likely to enable the flow of information and innovation but hinder knowledge storing 
and limit the organizational memory. Though, organizations with decentralized 
structures have fewer rules and procedures, which could reduce the accumulation of 
individuals’ tangible knowledge.  When knowledge is not formalized by 
organizations it will disappear when employees change their jobs (Glisson & Martin, 
1980).   However, a decentralized decision making structure empowers the lower 
level employees to practice their autonomy and encourage freedom of sharing 
opinions (Nonaka et al., 2000).  As a result, it allows flexible co-ordination for 
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completing tasks and responding to different situations.  Decentralization encourages 
better communication across unit boundaries in the workforce which could 
contribute to efficient knowledge sharing (Willem & Buelens, 2009). Better 
interaction between employees could potentially reduce the loss of tangible 
knowledge caused by employees quitting their jobs or being made redundant.  
 
Proposition 1a: A centralized organizational structure is negatively related to 
organizational learning. 
 
Organizational defensive routines are a repetitive behavior which people perform to 
avoid issues related to embarrassment and threat (Noonan, 2007). Highly centralized 
organizations tend to generate environments characterized by high power distance 
(Mintzberg, 1983; Hofstede, 1991), as only a small group of people have the 
autonomy to make decisions. This power distance could be enlarged when defensive 
routines are in place. This is because people may think it could cause conflict or put 
their work in jeopardy, if they point out the flaw of decisions made by the 
organizations’ top managers (Madrid et al., 2015).  Therefore, debatable decisions 
made by a small group of people in a centralized organization might only be 
challenged in a subtle and opaque way resulting in covering up organizational 
problems (Argyris, 1990). Or, people may just keep silent (Morrison & Milliken, 
2000). Consequently, defensive routines can hinder organizations with high levels of 
centralization from identifying problems. Without tracking organizational problems, 
organizations are unable to learn and will not improve the current way of operating.  
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Proposition 1b: Organizational defensive routines moderate the negative relation 
between organizational learning and centralized organizational structure, such that 
the relationship is stronger when organizations have high organizational defensive 
routines. 
 
Formalization. This aspect refers to the extent to which employees’ behavior is 
guided by rules, procedures and instructions (Schminke et al., 2000).  Rules are a 
part of organizational routines which can be a source of stability and change, and 
they can provide solutions to problems efficiently (Feldman & Pentland, 2003).   
Formalization similar to routines can also improve co-operation and collaboration 
resulting in a better knowledge sharing and better organizational memory (Walsh & 
Ungson, 1991). However, in a highly formalized system, decisions are made in 
congruence with the legitimate rules or policies rather than in consideration with 
situation’s need.  It is in general associated with bureaucratic red tape (Kaufmann & 
Feeney, 2012) and is considered to be a hindrance to organizational development 
(Glisson & Martin, 1980).  Hence, it has been argued that high formalization can 
drive out creative and proactive behavior (Fredrickson, 1986).  The great degree of 
formalization reduces the creation of new competence (Martínez-León & Martínez-
García, 2011).  Formalization only allows decisions made around the formal systems 
and changes in decisions are likely to be incremental (Fredrickson, 1986). Repetitive 
practices on established procedures can reinforce established knowledge, but they 
constrain the opportunities of exploring alternative solutions to organizational issues 
at present.  Especially nowadays with a dynamic business environment, 
organizations need to have a flexible structure to facilitate knowledge sharing among 
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departments.  High formalization is empirically found to have a negative effect on 
organizational learning (Martínez-León & Martínez-García, 2011).  
Proposition 2a: A formalized structure in the organizations is negatively related to 
organizational learning.  
 
When organizations are swamped with defensive routines, people are more likely to 
cling onto established policies to avoid being blamed for mistakes.  This results in 
bypassing and covering up organizational issues (Ashforth & Lee, 1990).  When 
ODRs are high, rule designers tend to compose more rigid rules and procedures to 
stay in control (Argyris, 1990), which further restricts employees’ behavior and 
discourages employees to share knowledge.  Additionally, giving ambiguous 
messages are one common practice in organizations with ODRs (Noonan, 2007). 
This working environment could make employees feel psychologically 
uncomfortable as there is lack of clear expectation on their behavior.  Accordingly, 
the positive effect of formalization on co-ordination and communication reduces, 
which results in deteriorated learning.  
 
Proposition 2b: Organizational defensive routines moderate the negative relation 
between organizational learning and formalized organizational structure, such that 
the relationship is stronger when organizations have high organizational defensive 
routines.  
 
Firm size.  Organization size is among the strongest predictors of innovation and 
organizational learning and it operates as facilitator to innovation (Baldridge & 
Burnham 1975).  Group size affect the way of interaction between individuals. The 
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larger the organizations get, the more complex forms of communication are required 
(Haveman, 1993). The communication in large organizations tend to be more formal 
than face-to-face. This could cause information to misinterpret, also great barriers for 
knowledge sharing.   Small companies tend to be more innovative than large 
companies (Camisón-Zornoza and Lapiedra-Alcamí, 2004).  This can be explained 
by the fact that small organizations tend to have easier communication and more 
transparent decision-making in comparison to larger companies (Kotha et al., 2011).  
Large companies have the resources at their disposal to purchase the latest 
technology in facilitation of organizational learning. Therefore, it has been argued 
that large firms are in a better place to build networks with other firms and acquire 
available knowledge to remain competitive when confronting small and medium size 
firms (SMEs).  However, large organizations tend to be bureaucratically rigid 
creating inertia and constraining information sharing (Haveman, 1993).  As a result, 
large organizations are more likely to be rigid than small organizations in terms of 
change.  SMEs are found to be good at facilitating the sharing of experience, learning 
and innovation among its members (Nonaka & Takeuchi, 1995; Senge, 2006).  
 
Proposition 3a: Size is negatively related to  organizational learning.  
 
Large firms have more resources to facilitate organizational learning, but they are 
likely to have rigid routines and structures that hinder organizational learning 
(Nelson & Winter, 1982).  Larger firms are normally older firms.  Senior managers 
in these two kinds of firms tend to maintain status quo on problem solving; they are 
more willing to invest on their existing routines than in new routines (Kotha et al., 
2011).  Improving existing routines without investigating the roots of problems will 
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just cover-up the drivers of problems temporarily.  If the ODRs exist in 
organizations, they will reinforce organizations’ way of bypassing the problems and 
prevent organizations from exploring solutions.  High level of ODRs will create 
barriers for members to adopt abundant resources at their full potential. 
Organizations with ODRs tend to maintain their status quo and make decisions based 
on routines. This mechanical behavior will impede members to make good use of the 
vast organization resource for learning and innovation.   
 
Proposition 3b: Organizational defensive routines moderate the negative relation 
between organizational learning and size, such that the relationship is stronger when 
organizations have high organizational defensive routines. 
 
Firm age.  Research has explored the effect of organizational age on other concepts 
related to organizational learning, such as innovation (e.g. Balasubramanian & Lee, 
2008; Huergo & Jaumandreu, 2004; Sorensen & Stuart, 2000).  However, little is 
known about how organizational age affects organizational learning.  Organizations 
with a long history normally have accumulated standardized procedures and routines 
from successful experience.  Their information supply proliferates, but mostly is 
acquired passively (Hannan, 1998). The vast experience facilitates employees’ work 
performance and enhances organizations’ capabilities, but it also traps organizations 
in a dilemma to give up their earlier competences to welcome alternative new 
solutions.  Changing the current way of doing things is costly. Hence the status quo 
is more likely to be stable.  Less experienced organizations try to be innovative, 
actively seek information and bravely experiment with new technologies because 
they have less experience and limited environment to rely on (Crossan et al., 1999b).  
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They are more likely to dive in and develop novel strategies to fit in the competitive 
environment (Balasubramanian & Lee, 2008). As organizations get mature, they are 
more likely to follow established patterns of communication and interaction. 
However, young organizations with centralized structures may inhibit an innovator’s 
interaction with other members.  From these arguments, it can be seen that 
organizational learning is affected by the age of organizations.  Young organizations 
tend to initiate new ideas and implement them more efficiently than the older 
organizations. As a consequence, they enforce innovation and learning, while older 
firms consume more time for learning.  In contrast to old firms, young firms are 
more willing to embrace changes and engage organizational learning.   
 
Proposition 4a: The age of organizations is negatively related to organizational 
learning.  
 
The aforementioned reasoning posits that old companies are more likely to be 
confined into convoluted rules and procedures, prior successful experience and 
complex bureaucracies (Le Mens et al., 2011). Additionally, moreover, former rules 
or procedures have been deeply rooted in old organizations and these could become 
part of their employees’ unconscious actions in the workplace.  Hence, old 
organizations are less inclined to explore radical changes on their current technology 
than young organizations (Kotha et al., 2011).  This shows the feature of “stability”, 
instead of “change”; the pressure for conformity would be high in old organizations.  
If ODRs are in place, “bad” routines will be camouflaged as being suitable for 
organizational development.  This is because members in old organizations have 
been practicing the current routine for a long time and they are very comfortable with 
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what they are doing.  They tend to reinforce the present routines in order to keep in 
line with other members.  Hence, they are likely to neglect changes in the 
competitive environment (Thornhill & Amit, 2003).  Additionally, old organizations 
have established self-esteem and self-identity which motives them to preserve the 
current routines (Brown and Starkey, 2000).  Whereas, the existence of ODRs make 
organizational members feel anxious towards the learning, especially if the learning 
threats their self-identity. Furthermore, organizations with ODRs tend to practice 
rigid rules, which could aggregate already declining rate of learning at established 
organizations (Zahra, Sapienza and Davidsson, 2006).  Consequently, the effect of 
age on learning will be affected by the existence of ODRs.   
 
Proposition 4b: Organizational defensive routines moderate the relation between 
age of organizations and organizational learning, such that the relationship is 
stronger when organizations have high organizational defensive routines. 
 
2.5.2 Individual personality and organizational learning 
 
The literature of organizational learning shows that organizations learn through 
individuals.  Individual personality traits have a direct effect on individual 
disposition at sharing knowledge (Borges, 2013; Matzler et al. 2008). Hence, 
individuals with appropriate personality in relation to the task might contribute more 
to improve overall organizational learning than individuals with a different 
personality. For example, high affective and cognitive trust among employees can 
increase knowledge sharing and benefit organizational learning (Hoe, 2007; Swift & 
Hwang, 2013). Self-realization and motivation are vital variables for organizational 
learning (Friedman, 2002).  Research has also found that personality plays an 
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important role on job recruitment and academic achievement (Noftle & Robins, 
2007). Back and Seaker (2004) posited that personality types are correlated with the 
style of learning people prefer.  Personality traits are found to be a determining factor 
of learning styles (Furnham, Jackson & Miller, 1999) and predictor of academic 
outcomes (Noftle & robins, 2007). Thus, this research investigates the relations 
between the personality and organizational learning by using Big Five personality 
traits model.  Big Five personality is considered as one of most parsimonious way to 
understand personality (Gupta, 2008).  
The Big Five personality traits are openness, conscientiousness, neuroticism, 
extraversion and agreeableness (Digman, 1990).  However, this work here only 
focuses on openness to experience, conscientiousness, and neuroticism. This is 
because the literature suggests that conscientiousness and neuroticism are robust and 
consistent predictors of job attitudes (Judge & Ilies, 2002).  Openness to experience 
is often used to explain knowledge sharing and decision making in organizations 
(LePine, Colquitt and Erez, 2000; Matzler, Renzl, Müller, Herting and Mooradian, 
2008).  Therefore, these three traits should be particularly relevant in understanding 
the relationship between personality traits and organizational learning.  
 
Open individuals are imaginative, open-minded, and original (Barrick & Mount, 
1991). People with openness characteristics are likely to be creative in the workplace 
and have a positive attitude towards change.  They enjoy learning new things and 
find using innovative methods to improve their performance is a pleasure (LePine et 
al., 2000).  Openness may facilitate the novelty of efficient learning skills, but failed 
to follow the routine tasks (De Fruyt & Mervielde, 1996).  In a meta-analysis, 
openness has proven to be a valid predictor of training proficiency but not job 
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proficiency (Back & Seaker, 2004).  Individuals who are rated high in the openness 
trait are willing to expose their ideas, participate in discussion and engage in self-
assessment that is necessary for learning in changing contexts (Barrick & Mount, 
1991).  High openness is not only positively linked with learning, but it also is a vital 
factor to benefit learning (Barrick & Mount, 1991).  Research has shown (Matzler et 
al., 2011) people rated high in openness are better learners and contribute more to 
sharing new knowledge.  High openness has the feature of being open-minded and 
welcoming assessment of their own ideas. Whereas, ODRs inhibit individuals from 
sharing their genuine feelings towards uncomfortable issues.  Therefore, when ODRs 
exist in the organizations, it will hinder other members from opening up their 
opinions, giving valid feedback or generating productive queries.  Consequently, 
ODRs will weaken the positive link between openness and individual learning. Thus, 
the researcher proposes: 
 
Proposition 5a: Openness to experience is positively related to organizational 
learning 
Proposition 5b: Organizational defensive routines moderate the positive relation 
between openness to experience and organizational learning, such that the 
relationship is weaker when organizations have high organizational defensive 
routines. 
 
Conscientiousness includes volitional aspects that are related to one’s willingness, 
diligence self-motivation and perseverance.  It also includes a dependability aspect 
that is related to self-discipline, orderliness and cautiousness (Barrick & Mount, 
1991).  Conscientiousness has been the most consistent predictor of job performance 
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across a wide variety of job types among the five personality traits (Behling, 1998; 
Noftle & Robins, 2007).  High conscientiousness has been identified as a significant 
characteristic of better learners and has been associated with personal attributes 
necessary for learning such as striving for success, being dutiful, exercising self-
control, and being organized, dependable, and efficient (Chamorro-Premuzic & 
Furnham, 2003).  High conscientiousness is not only contributing to better learning 
performance in stable environments but also in changing contexts (LePine et al., 
2000).  Perseverance is important in learning organizational routines and procedures 
to the extent that individuals must persistently practice the information and try to 
learn how to perform efficiently, even act mechanically at the end.  Learning is likely 
to be higher for people who tend to be self-motivated, organized and goal orientated, 
especially during organizational changes.  Individuals with low self-motivation and 
task commitment are more likely to abandon or lower the goal facing new challenges 
during changes such as learning new technologies or skills. Individuals with high 
conscientiousness tend to analyze all available information before making decision 
(LePine et al., 2000), that made them better learners and decision makers.  However, 
organizations with high ODRs restrict valid information sharing between members 
and create goal ambiguity on tasks (Noonan, 2007).  These negative effects on 
members’ behavior could cause frustration for highly conscientious people with 
regards to achieving their goals.  Additionally, it is likely to result in less learning.  
From the reasoning above, the researcher proposes: 
 
Proposition 6a: Conscientiousness is positively related to organizational learning 
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Proposition 6b: Organizational defensive routines moderate the positive relation 
between conscientiousness and organizational learning, such that the relationship is 
weaker when organizations have high organizational defensive routines. 
 
Neuroticism is often associated with the sense of being anxious, depressed, angry, 
embarrassed, emotional, worried and insecure (Judge et al., 2002).  Especially when 
employees face changes in workplace, they tend to get so stressed and fear that they 
choose to quit or resent their jobs (Judge & Ilies, 2002).  Neuroticism in most cases 
is negatively correlated with work performance (Colquitt et al., 2009).  This is 
because individuals with high neuroticism cannot cope with stress and threat as well 
as individuals with low neuroticism.  Learning is not always pleasant.  People with 
high neuroticism may find frustration to replace the existing knowledge or share new 
knowledge.  This negative attitude towards change continue until ‘not-learning’ 
becomes an obvious barrier to the organization’s development (Coutu, 2002).  Based 
on the characteristics of high neuroticism, it can be inferred that people with high 
neuroticism are less likely to initiate change and share ideas contributing to improve 
current routines.  With the tendency of anxiety and being depressed, individuals 
scoring high on neuroticism will contribute less to learning than individuals with low 
neuroticism.  Organizations with high ODRs create an environment in which 
negative information and uncomfortable issues should not be openly discussed 
(Holmer, 2013). The latter makes highly neurotic individuals feel that it is rational 
not to share knowledge or reveal some crucial knowledge relating to errors of current 
routines (Gupta, 2008).  Thus, the researcher’s final set of propositions is: 
 
Proposition 7a: Neuroticism is negatively related to organizational learning 
  
 
67 
Proposition 7b: Organizational defensive routines moderate the negative relation 
between neuroticism and organizational learning, such that the relationship is 
stronger when organizations have high organizational defensive routines.  
 
Figure 1 summarizes the proposed relationships. It displays the relationship between 
variables including organizational factors (centralization, formalization, size and 
age), individual factors (openness to experience, conscientiousness and neuroticism), 
ODRs and organizational learning. The propositions developed here will be refined 
into hypotheses in the later chapters.  
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Figure 1: Conceptual Framework of the study 
 
 
 
 
  
Note: solid lines represent direct effects while dotted lines are moderation effects. 
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2.6 Theoretical Contribution of the Framework 
 
Apart from Argyris’ seminal works on ODRs, not much research has been developed 
in the area.  One contribution of this chapter is that it raises academics’ awareness of 
ODRs.  This serves the purpose to trigger more attention and future enquiries in this 
area of research.  Additionally, not only has this chapter reviewed Argyris’ and other 
scholars’ work on ODRs—such as the characteristics of ODRs, determinants of 
ODRs and understanding ODRs in the context of general organizational routines—
but it also has brought in new perspectives to analyze ODRs as a moderator of the 
relations that organizational and individual variables have with organizational 
learning.  Theory suggests that ODRs can contribute to explain why organizational 
learning does not proceed as expected by most organizations, despite the provision of 
learning resources.  The model could provide a stepping stone for researchers 
working towards capturing the effects of ODRs empirically. 
 
Second, this is a first study to provide a nuanced understanding on how 
organizational learning is affected by ODRs. For example, the study deduced that 
learning ability decreases with the age of organizations.  ODRs moderate this 
relationship.  This means that organizational learning will be negatively affected by 
ODRs at old organizations despite their rich resource and experience.  This clearly 
highlights the importance to think about reducing ODRs in old organizations. Third, 
the study extends the theory of organizational routines by identifying the particular 
characteristics of ODRs and positioning them in the larger literature on routines. 
Routines have two characteristics: they are simultaneously stable and changeable.  
Studying ODRs delineates that these two features are not balanced all the time.  
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Particularly in the study of ODRs, the analysis has highlighted that ODRs tend to be 
inert and resistant to change.  Routines are recognized as a principal engine for the 
work that organizations accomplish, or are treated as knowledge-based reservoir for 
organizations to regenerate (Cohen et al., 1996; Turner & Rindova, 2012). This 
research claims that ODRs can be a barrier for organizational development. 
 
Third, the chapter theoretically explained the relationship between organizational 
routines and organizational defensive routines. It clarified the characteristics of 
ODRs, which benefit the future research at building up compositions of ODRs. Clear 
understanding on the concept also provides a solid foundation for future research to 
explore the effect of ODRs. The comparison of organizational routines and ODRs 
indicate that some routines tend to be more inertial than others. In order to 
implement new routines, the ineffectiveness of old routines have to be communicated 
in organizations. This means reducing ODRs is a crucial step for changes at routines.  
2.7 Implications of the Theoretical Framework for Practitioners.  
 
 
The proposed moderating effect on organizational and individual learning benefits 
managers in organization to realize that ODRs can interfere with institutional 
learning at all levels.  It suggests mangers should not only devote themselves on 
improving their organizational resources, personal selection or training, but also try 
to identify and reduce ODRs.  If ODRs are not contained, organizational learning 
generated by other factors will be reduced and the core reasons of organizational 
problems tend to be covered up temporarily. Eventually, covered up problems will 
damage organizations further in long term.  
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Emerging from the theoretical arguments above is stability as a key feature of ODRs. 
Stability in ODRs is different from stability in general routines.  The main function 
of stability for routines is that work can be coordinated more efficiently. It also 
serves as a memory for organizational learning.  However, stability in ODRs 
becomes a resistant force for organizational learning or change.  Managers should 
recognize the damage ODRs could unconsciously do to impede organizations’ 
development.  Even with awareness of ODRs’ existence in organizations, managers 
should also know that introducing changes in ODRs is difficult.  This is because the 
resistance of changes in ODRs is related to the inconsistence of understandings about 
how organizations operate. It is further related to the performances that create and 
maintain these understandings (Feldman, 2003). As a result ODRs prevent members 
from revealing valid, but negative information related to improving organizational 
effectiveness (Argyris, 2002). This deception will hinder organizations to recognize 
the need for change.  
 
2.8 Limitations of the Theoretical Model and Outlook 
 
Several limitations and opportunities for future research can be identified from this 
research. Here the researcher reviews the limitations first, and conclude with ideas 
for further research. 
 
Although the study analyzed three very important organizational characteristics, 
other organizational characteristics may be considered in future works. For example, 
if large organizations have a good appraisal system to motivate members to share 
their ideas and encourage innovative methods to compete their tasks, they might be 
able to set up mechanisms to assist learning.  
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In terms of individual characteristics, the conceptual framework also only explored 
three personality traits.  However, other individual factors like level of education and 
age may play role in relation to learning and ODRs.  Argyris studied highly educated 
professionals and found that some of them tend to become defensive.  This is 
because they rarely fail, so that they cannot take failure and criticism easily.  They 
feel embarrassed to admit that they made mistakes or they lack knowledge in some 
area (Argyris 1991). Overall, they are not used to receive critical feedback.  Similar 
conditions have been identified to cause overconfidence in CEOs (Malmendier & 
Tate, 2008). Thus, the inclusion of further personality variables is a promising way 
for future research. 
 
Another limitation is that this conceptual model neglects the cognitive mechanisms 
affecting organizational learning.  Many researchers of OL, such as Huber (1991) 
and Crossan et al. (2011), pointed out that cognition plays an important role in 
acquiring and distributing knowledge in organizational learning processes. Cognitive 
mechanisms partly explain the reasons why people automatically follow routines or 
create ODRs.  Some of these reasons have been studied such as bounded rationality 
(e.g., Clark, 2008; Gigerenzer & Selten, 2001; Secchi & Bardone 2013).  Simon 
(1991) discussed how individual bounded rationality affect individuals at transferring 
information to organizational level. Individuals not only rely on their experience to 
guide their behavior, but also apply their experience to foresee the future scenarios 
outside their context (Felin et al. 2012).  The researcher is also aware of the fact that 
learning is not only about changing peoples’ action or their feelings.  Fundamentally, 
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it needs to change the cognitive rules or reasoning they applied to design and 
implement their actions. Hence, there is scope for further expansion of the model.  
 
2.9 Chapter Summary 
 
This chapter systematically reviewed the relevant literature about organizational 
learning, routines and organizational defensive routines.  A theoretical framework is 
developed based on the literature.  The framework is composed by two parts.  One 
part is about the relation between organizational factors and organizational learning; 
the other part is about the relation between individual factors and organizational 
learning.  In order to make the argument easy to follow for readers, the framework 
will be tested separately in two empirical studies (Chapter 5 and Chapter 6). The 
prerequisite for empirically testing the framework is to have a scale to measure 
ODRs.  A review on the current research did not reveal a reliable scale measuring 
ODRs.  Hence, before conducting empirical studies, Chapter 4 explains how the 
scale of ODRs is developed.  The following chapter will discuss methodology of the 
study.  
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CHAPTER THREE:  Methodology 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
The conceptual underpinnings of the researcher’s model have been presented in 
Chapter 2. Chapter 3 now presents the methodological approach taken in Chapter 4 
(ODRs scale development), Chapter 5 and Chapter 6 (empirical tests of the 
theoretical model).  Since multiple samples were required for scale development and 
empirical testing the respective details on samples, measurement and analytic 
techniques are presented in the respective chapters. This Chapter focuses on 
providing an explanation on the researcher’s decision on research paradigms and 
choice on the methodological approach. Briefly it summarizes the issues of all the 
studies in terms of samples and measures.  As understanding the different research 
paradigms is prerequisite for conducting a research in order to have a proper research 
design, this chapter will first start comparing the different research paradigms, and 
then proceeds explaining the choice of paradigm and the choice of research method 
taken for this study.  
 
3.2 Research Paradigms 
 
A research paradigm refers to “a set of basic beliefs (or metaphysics) that deals with 
ultimate or first principles.  It represents a worldview that defines, for its holder, the 
nature of ‘the world’, the individual’s place in it, and the range of possible 
relationships to that world and its parts.” (Guba & Lincoln, 1994, p. 107).  Simply 
put, the research paradigm is about how researchers view the world (Jonker & 
Pennink, 2010). It provides guidance for the process of research design. The 
paradigm addresses three fundamental questions (Punch, 2014, p. 15): “(1) What the 
reality is like (ontology); (2) What the relationship is between the researcher and the 
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reality (epistemology); (3) What methods can be used for studying the reality 
(methodology).”  The way of answering the three questions are intimately related. 
For example, the researchers’ view of real world (epistemology) decides the methods 
which are used to understand the world. The former is a philosophical, the latter is a 
more practical question. There are different categories and boundaries of paradigms.  
This section explains three paradigms, positivism, critical realism and interpretivism. 
 
Positivism is a paradigm using scientific methods to advocate the application of the 
natural science to study social reality and beyond (Bryman, 2012).  Positivists 
postulate that a social world external to individual cognition can be studied through 
direct observation and measurement (Burrell & Morgan, 1979).  Deductive reasoning 
is applied to generate hypotheses based on the existing theory.  Structured survey and 
data collection techniques are most often chosen to test hypotheses (Saunders et al., 
2012).  It is instrumentally important for positivists to select an instrument reflecting 
the reality.  Therefore, researchers adopting positivism need to present the reliability 
and validity of the chosen instruments before contributing their findings to the 
existing knowledge (Brannick & Coghlan, 2007).  While positivist researchers 
analyze and interpret data, they should remain as objective as possible.  Traditional 
positivists believe in the absolute truth of knowledge which is independent from 
researchers themselves (Creswell, 2013).  Over the past century, positivism has been 
a dominating approach for studies of social behavior.  However, the debate about the 
appropriateness of applying natural science models for the study of society also has 
been long standing, because studying social issues is more complicated than studying 
physical objects (Bryman, 2012). Furthermore, positivism seems to face a paradox to 
control both researchers’ bias and nature’s tendency to confound (Guba, 1990).  
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Post-positivism is a modification of positivism which attempts to limit the weakness 
of positivism, but it still believes in the existence of a true, objective reality in the 
world (Bagozzi, Yi and Phillips, 1991).  It still has a creed that reality can be 
observed objectively through instruments and nature still can be predicted from 
causes and outcomes via a scientific formulation (Bagozzi et al., 1991).  However, 
post-positivists admit that it is impossible for humans to discover the ultimate truth 
due to humans imperfect sensory and intellectual mechanisms (Guba, 1990).  Hence, 
what we see is only part of the big picture (Saunders et al., 2012).  There are two 
main differences between positivism and post-positivism (Saunders et al., 2012).  
First, while post-positivism agrees with positivism in that the real world can be 
observed and measured, it critically points out that observation cannot be totally 
independent from researchers’ value and bias. Second, positivism perceives the 
world is relatively stable and business operates on one level.  In contrast, post-
positivism recognizes that the social world is constantly changing and business 
issues should be studied at multiple levels.  
 
Critical realism is another philosophical stance that believes the social events can be 
studied via a scientific approach.  Different from positivists who believe researchers’ 
conceptualization of reality can directly reflect the reality, critical realists believe that 
the reality is indirectly observed through data collection and explanation.  Because it 
is indirect observation, categories which are adopted to disclose the reality are 
considered to be provisional in nature (Bryman, 2012).  Critical realists work on an 
identification of a generative causal mechanism which serves to explain observed 
reality via either qualitative or quantitative research methods.  
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Interpretivism which is also combined with constructivism is considered as an 
alternative to positivism (Bryman, 2012).  Interpretivists believe that individuals seek 
understanding of the world from their subjective experience. This understanding is 
gained from qualitative methods, such as interviews, through which researchers 
gather views from interviewees.  It is crucial for researchers to have empathy so that 
they can understand the views from other peoples’ situations.  The construction of 
the reality with this method is formed through the interaction between research 
subjects and researchers. The interpretation of the views is influenced by researchers 
own historical and social perspectives (Creswell, 2013).  Hence, researchers often 
acknowledge the process of the interaction among individuals. Different from 
positivism which deductively hypothesizes relationships between variables based on 
the existing theories, interpretivism aims to make sense of the meaning of the world 
from others’ views.  Instead of starting from theories, interpretivists inductively build 
theories from data.  
 
3.2.1 Choice of research paradigm 
 
From the discussion of different paradigms above, it would be a mistake to think one 
paradigm is better than another. The choice of paradigm should be based on the 
following three aspects (Saunders et al., 2012).  Firstly, the chosen research 
paradigm serves researchers to solve research questions.  Additionally, it should fit 
the assumptions researchers made about what the reality is (ontology) and what the 
relationship between the world and the researcher (epistemology) is.  Finally, the 
researcher’s own experience and values also play a role when choosing a research 
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paradigm.   
 
The research objectives in this study emphasize the empirical relationships between 
different variables, which fits the positivism way of perceiving the real world. Also, 
given the researcher’s own values on the real world and her experience on applying 
mathematical methods for assessing social issues, positivism seemed a more 
appropriate philosophical stance for this study than others.  Nonetheless, the 
researcher believes that it is impossible to find ultimate truth, and the unobserved 
truth is restricted by researchers’ knowledge, bias and other external factors (Guba, 
1990).  Consequently, the post-positivists’ position that the social world is constantly 
changing is in line with this study’s purpose about understanding how organization’s 
learning behavior changes under the influence of other factors.  Furthermore, the 
researcher also believes that it is important to study organizational learning from 
multiple levels rather than from a single level.  Hence, based on the three reasons 
addressed, post-positivism is better to answer the research questions, and it is 
consistent with the researcher’s way to interpret the real world.  Despite the 
reasoning on the choice of post-positivism, the researcher is also aware of the 
limitation of using hard data and highly structured instruments to study human 
related issues like one would study physical objects.  However, compared with other 
paradigms, post-positivism is the most appropriate for the study.  
 
3.2.2 The choice of a quantitative approach 
 
The discussion on the research paradigm shows that the choice of the research 
approach depends on the research questions and the choice of philosophical stance.  
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The research questions of this study are deducted based on the existing theories and 
aims to examine the relationship between variables of interests.  Additionally, the 
choice of post-positivism also guides the researcher to adopt a quantitative approach, 
as the researcher believes the relationship between variables can be verified through 
analyzing hard data objectively.  Previous studies on ODRs mainly rely on action 
research (e.g. Argyris, 1990; Noonan, 2007).  This implies that most of the existing 
knowledge on ODRs is extracted from reflective accounts of researchers’ 
consultancy experience. But data driven empirical insights have not been gained yet. 
This is due to the fact that as consultants, they are hired to identify problems and 
provide solutions, which requires collaboration between researchers and members of 
a research site.  These well-documented qualitative studies provide a great detail to 
assist the research to establish the theoretical relationships between variables.  
Empirical verification through a quantitative study will respond to the criticism of 
action research which is considered as lacking rigor and being too partisan (Punch, 
2014).   Additionally, the objective of this study is not to provide solutions or to 
observe the changes of employees’ behavior, but to empirically test the established 
theoretic relationships between variables.  Hence, the quantitative method is the most 
appropriate for this study.  
  
3.2.3 Data collection method 
 
The field of quantitative design mainly involves two strands, namely experimental 
design and non-experimental design.  Experimental design serves as a base for 
establishing cause-effect relationship via comparisons between groups.  Researchers 
need to manipulate the independent variable in order to determine whether it has 
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influence on the dependent variable.  Due to the difficulties of controlling all the 
factors influencing the dependent variable, experiments face threats to external 
validity of an investigation (Bryman, 2012). Additionally, studies on social 
psychology often apply laboratory experiments.  The setting of the laboratory is 
likely to be different from the real-world.  Hence, it is challenging to establish how 
well the findings are applicable to the real world. However, replicating the controlled 
environment of experimental laboratories is rarely possible in organizational settings.  
Hence, this is the reason why non-experimental design, such as survey research, 
prevail in quantitative organizational studies (Punch, 2014).  With this design, 
researchers statistically control variables which are related to independent variable, 
or dependent variables.   
 
There are two reasons for why this study chooses a non-experimental design.  First, 
the independent variables (organizational size, age and structure and individual 
personality traits) in this study are unrealistic to be manipulated.  The second reason 
is related to research questions and objectives.  This study is exploring the patterns of 
the association between variables such as organizational learning, ODRs, 
organizational factors and individuals’ personality rather than establishing cause-
effect relationship. The effect’s direction here is inferred from the theory as 
explained in previous chapters.  Third, the relationships between variables are 
theoretically established based on existing literature.  This study attempts to find 
empirical support for the theoretically proposed relationships.   Based on these three 
questions, the non-experimental design is most appropriate choice for this study. 
3.2.4 The choice of survey questionnaire  
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The design of questionnaires can differ based on how they are administered 
(Oppenheim, 2000).  There are two main ways of administering questionnaires.  One 
is self-administered questionnaires which can be administered electronically using 
the internet or handed/mailed to respondents.  The other one is interviewer-
administered questionnaires which could be done through the telephone or meeting.  
The questionnaires of this study are mainly administered electronically using the 
internet through a research company, Qualtrics.  Only a small amount of data is 
collected by the paper-and-pencil survey method.  
 
Online surveys are used in this study, which solved the problem of getting access to 
various organizations at a low cost. However, it is inevitable to have weaknesses as 
any other method.  First, the survey could be assessed by a large number of unknown 
individuals (Schmidt, 1997). Though the researcher attempted to eliminate the 
unqualified respondents by restricting their characteristics, respondents can fake their 
identity (Wright, 2005).  Second, long questionnaires could cause the possibility of 
‘respondent-fatigue’. Third, respondents may submit the set of questionnaires 
multiple times due to mistake or deliberation (Schmidt, 1997).  Regarding the listed 
information, effort has been put in questionnaire design to reduce the limitation 
inherited from using questionnaires.  For example, the researcher arranges the survey 
on multiple pages instead of listing a long survey on one page.  This reduces 
respondent-fatigue.  The researcher also restricts respondents to submit the survey 
twice from the same computer by a setting in the survey system.  In addition, the 
researcher also strategically arranges the dependent variables and independent 
variables on different pages in order to avoid the possibilities that the respondents fill 
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in the survey according to social desire instead of genuine information (Bryman, 
2012).  
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3.3 Questionnaire Design 
 
This section provides an overview of the measurements used for the three studies and 
layout of questionnaires and sampling issues.  
 
3.3.1 Measurement of the variables 
 
Chapter 5 and Chapter 6 will explain the measurements of independent variables and 
a dependent variable. In order to avoid duplications, the researcher decided not to 
present all the measures in this chapter.  However, this section summarizes the 
measures, their sources, reported Cronbach alpha from their original sources and 
Cronbach alpha from this study.  All of these pieces of information are displayed in 
the following table 1 and table 2.  Cronbach’s alpha for all the variables have reached 
the most referenced threshold, 0.7.  The exception is ‘formalization’, which presents 
a Cronbach alpha of 0.63.  Two reasons lead me to believe the reliability of 
‘formalization’ is appropriate. First, a scale with Cronbach alpha less than 0.7 is 
considered acceptable, if it has less than five items (Nunnally, 1978; Peterson, 1994).  
Second, the formalization measure frequently falls short of the 0.7 threshold but has 
still been used in various studies (see. e.g. John, 1984; Feeney, 2012; Levin & Cross, 
2004). Thus, the researcher takes it forward to the analyses.  
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Table 1: Summary of the Measures for the Empirical Study at Chapter 5 
Variables   No. of items Source of scale 
Reported 
alpha 
Chapter 5-
study 
alpha 
Independent 
variables 
organizational 
size 
1 N/A N/A N/A 
Organizational 
age 
1 N/A N/A N/A 
centralization 5 
Ferrell and 
Skinner (1988) 
0.82 0.88 
formalization 2 
Ferrell and 
Skinner (1988) 
0.75 0.63 
Dependent 
variable 
Organizational 
learning 
13 
Lopez, et al. 
(2004) 
0.9 0.91 
Moderating 
variable 
ODRs 8 
Newly 
developed by 
the researcher 
N/A 0.76 
Note: N=358, ODRs= organizational defensive routines.  
 
Table 2: Summary of the Measures for the Empirical Study at Chapter 6 
  Variables 
No. of 
items 
Source of 
scale 
Reported 
alpha 
Chapter 6-
study alpha 
Independent 
variables 
Conscientiousness 9 
John and 
Srivastava 
(1999) 
0.82 0.83 
Openness to 
experience 
10 
John and 
Srivastava 
(1999) 
0.81 0.77 
Neuroticism 8 
John and 
Srivastava 
(1999) 
0.84 0.83 
Dependent 
variables 
Organizational 
learning 
13 
Lopez, et 
al. (2004) 
0.9 0.91 
Moderating 
variables 
ODRs 6 
Newly 
developed 
by the 
researcher 
N/A 0.74 
Note: N=351, ODRs= organizational defensive routines at individual level 
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3.3.2 Layout of questionnaires 
 
The way of structuring questionnaires can reduce common method bias, and it could 
also make the questions easy to follow for participants. Common method bias arises 
because of common method variance, which is the variance “attributable to the 
measurement method used rather than to the constructs” (Podsakoff, MacKenzie, 
Jeong-Yeon & Podsakoff, 2003, p. 879). Thus, Bryman (2012) suggests researchers 
spend some time considering the design of questionnaires.  All the questionnaires in 
this study had a cover letter at the beginning which informs the respondents about the 
purpose of the study and indicates that respondents can drop out anytime of their 
own will.  The cover letter also assures respondents that there are no right and wrong 
answers, and promises respondents to protect their anonymity.  These assurances will 
make respondents less likely to answer the questions to be more social desirable and 
lenient (Podsakoff et al., 2003). Following the cover letter, there is demographic 
information.  These questions are easy to answer so that they motivate participants to 
proceed onto the next sections.  The web-based survey tool enabled me to apply a 
function which allows to randomize items. This helps to reduce priming effects and 
also reduces common method bias.  
 
3.3.3 Population and sample  
 
The study relies on the individuals’ perception to measure organizational behavior. 
Hence, the population of the study is composed of individuals who work in different 
industries at UK organizations. This way of collecting data is to avoid the possibility 
of obtaining homogeneous population on the common factors. That could restrict the 
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generalizability of understanding ODRs. In order to make sure individuals to have 
sufficient knowledge about their organizations, the research restrict participants’ 
tenure being more than one-year. By doing this, it can avoid issues that respondents 
deliberately guessing answer (Saunders et al., 2012).  Considering organizations 
which have been operation for one years may not have established certain structure, 
they are also eliminated from the sample. The sample for each empirical study is 
comparably large. The details of the sample are described in the respective chapters 
accordingly. However, readers should interpret the findings with caution in terms of 
the generalizability.   
 
3.3.4 Pilot test  
 
Apart from the newly developed ODRs scale, the measures of this study are well 
tested by existing research.  The newly developed scale of ODRs has gone through 
various tests for checking reliability and validity before they are applied for 
empirical studies.  Hence, only small scale pilot tests are carried out before launching 
the main survey.  Because the purpose of pilot tests is to improve the version of final 
survey in terms of data-collecting routines, scoring techniques, deficiencies of the 
instrument (Bryman, 2012). It is also helpful to check how long it takes respondents 
to answer the questionnaires in order to avoid fatigue.  Hence, 15 respondents 
participated are randomly selected from a university. These samples are not used for 
the main studies. As a result of the pilot study, the research made some changes to 
make the questions more precise.  For example, originally job positions are only 
divided into two levels (supervisory level and non-supervisory level).  Following the 
comments received on the pilot tests, they are divided into five levels (general staff, 
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supervisory/first line manager, middle level management, senior level management). 
The questions about age and size of organizations originally require respondents to 
give an exact number, but pilot tests showed that people only roughly knew the 
information. Hence, these two questions were modified into categorical types.  
Additionally, one item of measuring organizational learning included an outdated 
technology (Lotus Notes) as an example, the researcher changed it into the more 
recent Microsoft SharePoint.  Apart from the changes related to item designs, the 
researcher also conducted some minor changes on wording and typo issues. After all 
the improvement based on feedback from pilot tests, the questionnaires are sent to 
Qualtrics which shared the links to potential respondents. 
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3.3.5 Sampling techniques and size of final samples 
 
The sampling techniques depend on research objectives. One objective of the study 
is to develop a scale before conducting empirical studies.  It requires larger and 
independent samples than single empirical studies.  The researcher contacted a few 
organizations and encouraged them to participate in the data collection.  However, all 
the effort ended up to be in vain.  Considering the timeline and possibility of 
obtaining multiple samples, the researcher decided to entrust Qualtrics to approach 
potential qualified respondents.   
 
Figure 2 streamlines the process of data collection. In terms of sample 1, the 
researcher managed to collect 106 samples contributing to the scale development.  
However, 106 samples are not large enough for conducting exploratory factor 
analysis (EFA). Then the researcher resorted to Qualtrics for help at data collection. 
The data is illustrated at Figure 2 named as sample 2.  With the given instruction on 
the characteristics of respondents from whom the researcher wished to collect data, 
the researcher has tried to improve the reliability of data.  Then respondents self-
administer questionnaires which is unlikely to cause social desirability (Dillman, 
2007).  In consideration of cost, the research required to collect 400 completed 
questionnaires.  Then the sample would be large enough be split into two parts for 
EFA and Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA).  This process of data collection 
resulted in 410 respondents.  The researcher drew 114 from the sample and 
combined those responses with the samples collected before.  As a result, the sample 
for conducting EFA was 220. Out of this sample, the final usable data was 207.  
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With the remaining sample of 296 collected via Qualtrics, the researcher carried out 
CFA.  Excluding outliers and unengaged respondents, the final usable data was 288.  
“Unengaged respondents” refers to those people who scored the same value for most 
items across the whole questionnaire. In these cases the assumption is made that they 
completed the survey without engaging with the questions. Including these samples 
in the study could have significant effect on the conclusions that can be drawn from 
the data.  After both EFA and CFA test, the research conducted another data 
collection is for convergent, discriminant, predictive validity and measurement in 
various tests. The researcher could feed in a few scales to the survey for another 
research project
3
 (carried out by some colleagues).  which generated 301 responses 
composed of 151 UK respondents and 150 US respondents.  The advantage of 
combining the scale with other different constructs on the questionnaire can reduce 
common method variance (Podsakoff et al., 2003).  The data collection and different 
samples are visualized in in Figure 2.  
                                                 
3 Another research project was about public motivation 
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Figure 2: An Overview of Data Collections for the Thesis 
 
 
 
The advantage of using a web-based survey provider is to get access to potential 
respondents in a quick, easy and inexpensive way (Goodman, Cryder & Cheema, 
2012). A web-based survey also allows researchers to obtain large samples which 
traditional techniques find challenging to collect (Gosling, Vazire, Srivastava & 
John, 2004).  The biggest disadvantage of using a web-based survey provider is that 
respondents are self-selected into the pool of respondents from the survey provider.  
These respondents get monetary compensation for completing the survey.  However, 
the quality of data is not affected (Buhrmester, Kwang & Gosling, 2011).  The 
research compares findings of studies based on both web-based data and traditional 
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techniques, and shows that reliability of data is similar to the traditional paper-and-
pencil methods (Goodman et al., 2012; Vazire et al., 2004).  
3.4 Data Analysis 
 
Before data analysis, the researcher has carried out a series of data screening checks 
to ensure that the data is clean.  First the researcher checked the missing data to see if 
there is systematic reason to cause some data to be more missing than others.  The 
amount of missing responses in each of the data sets are less than 10%. Hence 
missing data does not affect inference of the findings (Field, 2013).  Then, the 
researcher inputted the data and replaced missing data with mean (see details in 
Chapter 4, Chapter 5 and Chapter 6).  Outliers are also checked by using boxplots.  
Boxplots is a method to graphically display the behavior of the data. If a value of a 
variable is beyond the box, it is considered an outlier.  The researcher treated these 
variables as missing values.  After running all regression analyses, four assumptions 
related to linear regression are checked before the further data analysis, namely 
normality, linearity, homoscedasticity and multicollinearity.  
 
In terms of data analysis, various methods have been adopted to test hypotheses and 
verify the scale of ODRs.  For scale development, EFA was used to explore the 
underlying factors and SPSS Amos 22 was used for confirmatory factor analysis. 
When conducting the analyses, the researcher followed the recommendations 
provided in Byrne (2001).  SPSS was applied to test the relationships deduced from 
hypotheses.   The methods applied include Pearson Correlation and Multiple Linear 
Regression (MLR).  MLR is used because the study wants to understand the 
relationship between a number of independent variable and one dependent variable.  
Field (2013) was consulted for the application of MLR.  
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3.5 Conclusion 
 
This chapter first discussed the differences between the main three research 
paradigms, then provided the reasons why post-positivism is appropriate for this 
study.  Considering the research questions and the choice of research paradigm, a 
quantitative approach was adopted for this research.  
 
Variance statistics were used to establish the reliability and validity of the newly 
developed scale for measuring ODRs such as, EFA, CFA, discriminant and 
convergent validity test and measurement in various tests.  Multiple regression is 
applied to assess the relationship between different variables for predictive validity. 
CFA is used again for cross-cultural measurement invariance.  
 
As described above the researcher followed best practice recommended by Bryman 
(2012), Field (2013), and Byrne (2001) in order to meet standard levels of rigor in 
research design and analyses.  
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CHAPTER FOUR: ODRs-Scale Development
4
 
 
In order to test the theoretical models developed in Chapter 2, it is prerequisite to 
have a scale to measure ODRs. However, the existing literature does not reveal a 
reliable measurement of ODRs. This chapter is to explain the process of 
measurement development.  
As already stated at pervious chapters, ODRs are defined as any actions and policies 
that prevent employees and organizations from experiencing embarrassment and 
threat. ODRs research lacks in diagnostics, testing and generalizable results due to its 
heavy reliance on qualitative method.  This chapter aims at covering this gap by 
developing a scale to measure ODRs from individuals’ perceptions at both the 
organizational and the individual level.  After setting the theoretical framework, this 
chapter presents six phases that describe a scale development process. The final scale 
consists of 14 items meeting standard quality requirements.  The findings provide a 
valuable tool for future studies to explore relationships between ODRs and other 
aspects of organizational life.  
4.1 Introduction: Measuring ODRs  
 
Organizational routines facilitate coordination and work efficiency.  Researchers 
have described routines as the building blocks of competitiveness, and the repository 
of organizational capabilities (Nelson and Winter, 1982; Becker et al., 2005).  They 
are vital for all organizations to accomplish their tasks.  Chapter 2 has indicated that 
routines exist at both the organizational and individual level and they are defined as 
                                                 
4 A paper based on this chapter has been accepted at the Academy of Management 2017 
Annual Conference. 
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"a repetitive, recognizable pattern of interdependent actions, involving multiple 
actors" (Feldman & Pentland, 2003, p.96).  Routine at the individual level is often 
associated with “habit” (Hodgson, 2008).  Individual habitual behavior is defined as 
“a propensity to behave in a particular way in a particular class of situations” 
(Hodgson, 2008, p.16).  Organizational routines emerge from individual habitual 
behavior, and reciprocally organizational routines give guidance on individual 
habitual behavior in organizations (Knudsen, 2008).  Hence, both organizational 
routines and individual habits are repetitive responses to organizational realities 
reducing the cognitive load for employees. As a consequence, they provide shortcut 
solutions to recurring organizational problems (Knudsen, 2008). 
 
However, routines have also been criticized as being inert, automatic and resistant to 
change (Feldman & Pentland, 2003; Gersick & Hackman, 1990).  This is because 
individuals who perform routines feel secure in performing known daily tasks. 
Unknown and new routines make them feel anxious and insecure (Holmer, 2013).  
The fear of possible harmful effects and potential threats to individuals’ or groups’ 
interest caused by changes can elicit resistance and ODRs (Coghlan, 1993).  
 
ODRs are elicited under conditions when they are most likely to be 
counterproductive to learning, and performance (Noonan, 2011) and are ubiquitous 
in all organizations regardless of their age, size and culture.  However, so far 
research on ODRs remains in the static stage of replicating Argyris’ early work.  The 
latter is almost exclusively based on case studies and consulting.  Although this has 
been extremely useful in isolating the characteristics of ODRs and defining their 
theoretical framework (see Chapter 2: Section 2.3.2), it lacks operationalization.  
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Frequently, organizations rely on external consultants to diagnose problems resulting 
from ODRs.  However, when this happens, it may already be too late because the 
damage caused by ODRs may have gone too deep in the organization.  As a result, 
the use of Argyris’ prescriptions on ODRs has been limited.  Yet, ODRs are well 
acknowledged by a number of academics as barriers to organizational learning (e.g. 
Easterby-Smith, Snell & Gherardi, 1998; Euchner, 2011; Sales, Vogt, Singer & 
Cooper, 2013; Tsang, 1997).  For example, Sales et al. (2013) used a case study of a 
hospital to show how ODRs become prevalent in an organizational context 
discouraging people to speak up, resulting in incompetence disguise and, in turn, in 
putting patients’ safety at risk.   
 
If defensive routines are as pervasive as the existing qualitative studies suggest they 
are, then management in organizations would benefit from a tool that helps to 
recognize and isolate them more easily and in a timely fashion.  Thus, the purpose of 
this chapter is to develop and test a scale to measure ODRs.  The researcher claims 
such a measurement scale can be a tool enabling managers to identify the extent of 
ODRs present in their organizations.  Hence, the following sections describe the 
development of the Organizational Defensive Routines Scale. The definition of 
ODRs includes organizational-level factors (e.g. policies) and individual-level 
factors (e.g. feeling of embarrassment and threat).  Perceived ODRs at the 
organizational level serve as a context for ODRs which encourage individual level 
ODRs.  Individual level ODRs feed back into ODRs at the organizational level and 
reinforce defensive behavior.  
4.2 Theoretical Constituents of Organizational Defensive Routines 
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This section presents the conceptual framework under which ODRs are defined 
together with their constituencies at both organizational and individual levels.  
Though the definition of ODRs includes “actions” and “policies”, and other 
researchers identified types of ODRs such as mixed messages, blaming others
 
and 
protecting turf (Wilson, 2001), this study’s aim is different as it needs to identify 
common themes of ODRs in order to develop a measurement scale.  
 
4.2.1 ODRs: A theoretical framework of its constituents  
 
Based on Feldman and Pentland’s theoretical framework (see detail in Feldman and 
Pentland 2003) on routines, routines can be stable which mainly reflected on written 
procedures and intangible norms in organizations. This is coined as ostensive side of 
routines resulting in repetitive and recurrent patterns. This mainly reflected at 
organizational level of routines via tangible articulated standard operating procedure, 
or taken-for-granted norm.  Referring to this level of ODRs, some written rules and 
procedures are so coercive (Adler & Borys, 1996) that they constitute organizational 
level defensive routines in themselves (Argyris, 1990).  For example, some 
organizations require employees to follow written procedures conclusively in order 
to control employees’ behavior and avoid being blamed if something goes wrong.  
These kinds of routines are tools for managers to maintain their power, but constrain 
employees’ reaction on contingencies of work place.  As a result, these routines 
nourish covert and inefficient behavior in organizations (Adler & Borys, 1996).   
 
Simultaneously ODRs also trigger individual defensive behavior giving rise to 
individual level ODRs. This can be explained based on Feldman and Pentland’s 
  
 
97 
theoretical understanding of organizational routines at their performative aspect.  
Individuals are the agency of performative behavior at routines and determines 
actions based on situations. Hence, this contributes understandings of routines at 
individual level.   Therefore, organizations and individuals would not encourage this 
kind of behavior deliberately although too many rigid rules and procedures are one 
symptom of ODRs (Ashforth & Lee, 1990).  Most of the time people who contribute 
to ODRs are not aware of their counterproductive behavior (Tranfield et al., 2000).  
They think it is rational to avoid causing negative feelings to themselves or others.  
This insidious nature of ODRs makes them difficult to be detected.  Different from 
general organizational routines which have tangible rules or archived procedures to 
trace back, ODRs exist in a more intangible mode, with individuals being unaware of 
their existence and persistently following what appears to be a tacit rule (Argyris, 
1990).  
 
Similar to general organizational routines, certain rules guide this routine behavior. 
According to Argyris (2001, p.94), the “rules” about designing and implementing 
mixed messages are: “1) Design a message that is inconsistent; 2) Act as if the 
message is not inconsistent; 3) Make the inconsistency in the message and the act 
that there is no inconsistency undiscussable; 4) Make the undiscussability of the 
undiscussable also undiscussable”.  These ‘rules’ show that designers and receivers 
of mixed messages cover up each other’s feeling.  This double cover-up reinforces 
each other’s defensive behavior and creates an invisible and ritual organizational 
solution to embarrassment and threat.  
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The existing literature shows that ODRs are a highly powerful set of individual, and 
organizational phenomena that are connected and reinforce each other (Wilson, 
2001; Argyris, 2006; Noonan 2007).  More specifically, Argyris (1985) emphasizes 
individuals originate ODRs, however he also admits that it is organizational culture 
and system that reward and reinforce ODRs (Argyris, 1985). Hence, in this chapter, 
the researcher addresses these two dimensions of organizational defensive routines. 
The first dimension is about individuals’ perception of how the organization 
operates. In particular, ODRs are triggered by procedures and practices that generate 
embarrassment, threat and confusion. At this first level of analysis, the researcher 
attempts to understand the organizational context via social interactions in 
organizations.  Organizational context here means that it is independent from 
individual factors.  The second level of analysis deals with the study of individual 
psycho-cognitive dispositions to react to embarrassment and threat in a working 
environment. 
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4.2.2 The two sides of organizational defensive routines 
 
ODRs need interaction from both the organization and the individual to develop. The 
former provides the environment that is a vehicle for their diffusion and a repository. 
The latter offers the “raw materials” for routines to be understood and implemented. 
As the researcher has mentioned previously, ODRs have three loops from 
organizational level to individual level.  The defensive loop in the lower level is 
nested in the higher levels (see Chapter 2).  
 
4.2.3 Characterizing ODRs at the organizational level  
 
The definition of ODRs clearly illustrated that “policy” is part of what contributes to 
create defensive routines.  In an organizational environment, policies provide 
guidance for individual action, among other things.  For this reason, organizational 
constituents of ODRs should include some elements that capture aspects of policy 
that may favor their emergence. One such thing is the density of rules and 
procedures.  Argyris (1990) posited that too many rules and procedures are a 
symptom of ODRs. It is similar to red tape which exist as burdensome routines 
without effectiveness toward organizations’ goals (Bozeman & Feeney, 2011).  
Actions organizations undertake to avoid embarrassment and threat are camouflaged 
to create an image of being competitive, especially at handling negative information.  
Those actions, for instance, bypass, easing in, face-saving, fancy footwork and self-
censoring, are different in formats, but share the same purpose: avoidance of 
negative consequences by using ineffective or dysfunctional communication 
(Noonan, 2007).  Three themes emerge from those avoidance actions from the 
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existing literature of ODRs: dysfunctional communication, risk aversion and conflict 
avoidance.  
 
4.2.3.1 Dysfunctional communication.  
 
 From the definition of ODRs, “bypass” and “cover up” are identified as typical 
actions employees take to avoid embarrassment and threat.  The way of creating 
avoidance is to give inconsistent, illogical and ambiguous messages (Noonan, 2007).  
Such messages are called mixed messages as Chapter 2 pointed out (Argyris, 1990).  
Valid information gets diluted or ignored during the flux of delivering mixed 
messages.  Blames are shifted tactfully to somebody else.  Dysfunctional 
communication in ODRs means employees self-censor their feedbacks or advocate 
their opinions without explaining and exposing their inferences. Dysfunctional 
communication is used to disguise employees’ genuine thoughts which when being 
made public can make other people or themselves feel embarrassed.  Hence, 
criticism is masked with ambiguity.  In order to avoid threat and conflict, people in 
organizations adopt dysfunctional communication instead of open communication 
which allows for “varying perceptions and open discussions that challenge the 
viewpoints and traditional paradigms without threat, anger, resentments or 
retribution” (Ayoko & Pekerti, 2008, p.301).  Consequently, such dysfunctional 
communication creates only a temporary solution to the problem, but the core 
underlying problems are hidden away. “The ability to get along with others is always 
an asset, right? Wrong. By adeptly avoiding conflict with coworkers, some 
executives eventually wreak organizational havoc” (Argyris,1986, p.74).  
Dysfunctional communication is ineffective, but employees who create this kind of 
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communication assume it is rational to adopt it in order to avoid conflict with 
authorities (Peng & Tjosvold, 2011).  
 
As a consequence, ODRs make organizations places void of constructive dialogue 
for problem solving.  Noonan (2007) reviewed a number of consultancy cases 
showing that employees are aware of some value destroying decisions made by 
managers in organizations.  These cases showed that such lack of constructive 
dialogue leads individuals to refrain from voicing their true opinions as they could 
cause embarrassment to the managers or other colleagues, or they soften the extent of 
negative information resulting in misinterpretation and avoidance by receivers.  In 
this context organizational climate plays a crucial role.  For example, Morrison and 
Milliken (2000) posited that employees voice their opinion only if their opinion is 
expected to be valued, and only if there are no negative repercussions for speaking 
up.  Otherwise, employees tend to either keep silent or use soft approaches to present 
their criticism in order to save their own face and others (Riley, Cudney & Long, 
2013).  They assume that their managers can guess what their thoughts are without 
challenging them personally. Simultaneously, some managers are also not open to 
discussing their mistakes, fears and doubt to avoid being recognized as incompetent 
(Argyris, 1986).   
 
4.2.3.2 Risk aversion 
 
Apart from dysfunctional communication, employees subject to ODRs also try to 
avoid taking risks.  For example, they are reluctant to experiment novel ideas that 
might result in a failure. In organizations with defensive routines, failure is unlikely 
praised as a learning process, but rather considered an embarrassment for people 
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originating ideas. “Risk” is defined as “a characteristic of decisions that is the extent 
to which there is uncertainty about whether potentially significant and/or 
disappointing outcomes of decisions will be realized” (Sitkin & Pablo, 1992, p.10).  
“Risk aversion” in defensive routines means that organizations have a tendency of 
avoiding risk–taking in order to prevent potential negative outcomes such as 
embarrassment and threat.  One example of risk aversion in defensive routines is that 
organizations allocate resources to stable and mature business divisions rather than 
giving equal attention to develop a new business area.   
Individual attitudes towards risk are influenced by organizations’ varying preference 
for uncertainty (Sitkin & Pablo, 1992). Organizations treating uncertainty as threat 
suppress employees’ initiatives for proposing creative ideas and also restrict 
employees to simply follow rules and procedures.  Managers also play an important 
role on decisions of avoiding or taking risks (Sitkin & Pablo, 1992).  For example, 
when managers are afraid of negative feedbacks, they might end up encouraging 
silence from employees on organizational problems (Morrison & Milliken 2000).  In 
this case, employees are not encouraged to speak up because of potential 
repercussions their behavior may cause. Therefore, those most averse to taking the 
risk to speak up would reinforce the mechanisms toward ODRs (e.g. Ashforth & Lee, 
1990; Noonan, 2007; Tranfield et al., 2000).  Therefore, it shows that there is some 
overlap between risk aversion and dysfunctional communication. 
 
Tranfield et al. (2000) found that people in an organization with ODRs attempt to 
transfer responsibilities up or down hierarchies to avoid negative results.  Some 
organizations may adopt rigid rules and procedures to prevent employees from 
taking risks to experiment with innovative methods of completing their task. In turn, 
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employees refer to the rules to avoid taking risks and responsibility.  Hence, they 
discourage risk-taking which hinders change (Russ, 2012).  Putnam (1993) also 
mentioned that people in organizations distance themselves from responsibilities and 
undesired results.  People use ‘ease-in’ and ‘play down’ strategies to keep 
themselves from predicted awkward situations.  
 
Additionally, executives and other managers need to monitor changing environments 
of their business operations which can be perceived as either threats or opportunities 
(Chattopadhyay et al., 2001).  When they perceive the change as a threat, they tend 
to resort to internal directed actions to avoid possible risk of negative outcomes 
(Sitkin & Pablo, 1992). Thus, the perception on their organizations’ interactions of 
handling risks and uncertainty reflects the extent of organizations’ rigidity towards 
organizational changes.  
 
4.2.3.3 Conflict avoidance 
 
Conflict avoidance is found to be prevalent in organizations regardless of culture 
(Ting‐Toomey et al., 1991; Tjosvold, 2008).  Whether individuals decide to pursue 
or avoid conflict, depends on the gauged potential loss and gain from the conflict. 
The way people deal with conflict can take the form of avoiding disagreement (Ting-
Toomey et al., 1991).  Leung (1988) found that people tend to avoid conflict in an 
on-going relationship, because losses from a good relationship in the long term 
outweigh the gain from a conflict in the short term.  Delivering negative feedbacks 
and criticisms may become a tricky issue to handle.  Therefore, ambiguous sentences 
are used to soften issues.  Alternatively, individuals may choose to keep silent and 
distance themselves from organizational problems.  Noonan (2007) uses a case 
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showing conflict avoidance in a meeting: while two managers argued fiercely over 
an organizational problem on the stance of their own departments’ interest, other 
members maintain silent and withdrew from the conflict.  They are “playing safe” to 
protect themselves from risks of being criticized by choosing one side or the other.  
This conflict avoidance strategy leads to bad decision-making and it wastes time.  
 
Conflict is “a class of face-threatening situations, demands active facework 5 
management by both conflict parties” (Ting-Toomey et al., 1991, p. 280). Conflict, 
especially with authority, can put both parties under embarrassment. Though people 
from different cultures select different methods to manage conflict, avoiding 
disagreement could define ODRs. For example, in both cases there is an element of 
not raising genuine opinions in order to preserve face; this is an element of bypassing 
and easing-in uncomfortable information, or of censoring opinions (Riley et al., 
2013).  
 
In summary, dysfunctional communication, risk aversion and conflict avoidance 
have the potential to demonstrate that some organizations may have a culture to 
mask employee and management incompetence in order to avoid threat and 
embarrassment.  A computer simulation study has shown how organizational culture 
and defensive routines are intertwined, and significantly affect individual decision 
making (Secchi & Bardone, 2013).  Ashforth and Lee (1990, p. 631) suggest that 
“the organizational culture is a “meta-cause” of much defensive behavior.  
Specifically, the shared system of values, assumptions, and norms may well interact 
with individual characteristics and influence the tendency to avoid action, blames, 
                                                 
5 Facework here means strategies people use to mitigate face threatening or face losing. 
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and change, and this tendency may in turn reinforce the culture”.  If interactions in 
organizations show this tendency of encouraging employees to adopt dysfunctional 
communication, avoid risk and conflict, this will reinforce employees’ psycho-
cognitive disposition to employ routines to avoid embarrassment and change — i.e. 
ODRs.   
 
The following section discusses the potential constituents of ODRs at the individual 
level such as embarrassment avoidance and resistance to change.  
 
4.2.4 Constituents of ODRs at the individual level 
 
Argyris focuses on micro-level defensive routines producing unintended 
consequences in organizations, especially at the managerial level (Bokeno, 2003).  If 
managers’ defensive routines are eliminated, employees are less vigilant regarding 
their fear of giving negative feedback.  Another consequence of giving negative 
feedback may be alienation from the team (Argyris, 1993).  This is because ODRs at 
an individual level are elicited in the interaction between employees, and between 
employees and management (Noonan, 2007). The literature (e.g. Ashforth & Lee, 
1990; Holmer, 2013), emphasizes two characteristics of ODRs at the individual 
level: (1) resistance to change (RTC) and (2) embarrassment avoidance. Researchers 
posit that the main concern of people experiencing embarrassment is on what other 
people think of them, and whether their behavior is not what the others expect, 
according to social norms (Edelmann, 1985; Withers & Vernon, 2006).  
Additionally, it is contended that RTC happens during interactions between 
managers and employees (Ford et al., 2008; Thomas and Hardy, 2011).  
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4.2.4.1 Resistance to change 
 
Researchers studying defensiveness posited that it is more prevalent when 
organizations face change, because individuals tend to resist change (Diamond, 
1986). Organizational change creates uncertainties and stress for most employees, 
e.g. when jobs are at risk (Oreg, 2006).  Individuals who are reluctant to change are 
more likely to cover up the information which may stimulate changes (Bovey & 
Hede, 2001). Employees showing high degrees of cognitive rigidity are unlikely to 
appreciate other employees’ opinions and maintain the status quo (Friedman & 
Lipshitz, 1992).  For the purpose of keeping themselves from the changes, they 
would become defensive towards learning and new routines.  They do not have high 
initiative to seek new solutions to problems or voluntarily expose valuable 
information to push organizational changes forward.  Giangreco and Peccei (2005) 
posited that people with high levels of resistance to change tend to hold information 
when facing uncertainty and therefore they are more likely to conceal their genuine 
opinions in an embarrassing and threatening situation.  Although some researchers 
argue that resistance to change has a positive facet (e.g. Ford & Ford, 2010; Waddell 
& Sohal, 1998), RTC contributes to ODRs by maintaining old routines, withholding 
valuable information, and reluctant acceptance of new ideas. 
 
4.2.4.2 Embarrassment avoidance 
 
Another source of ODRs is embarrassment. It is conceptualized as “a self-
presentational difficulty resulting from a concern with our observable behavior and a 
desire to conform and to please others” (Edelmann, 1985, p.1).  This understanding 
of embarrassment aligns with Noonan’s (2011, p.43) reasoning on the role of 
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embarrassment in ODRs – “The experience of embarrassment does not depend on 
whether or not I care about what others think of me. Instead, the awkwardness of 
embarrassment comes when others see or hear what I would have preferred they did 
not”. Threat of embarrassment is the reason for causing ambiguity in a social 
relationship (Edelmann, 1985). This ambiguity is strategically adopted by people 
(Argyris, 1993).  It reflects on mixed messages in ODRs sent by organizations or 
employees to “save face” by minimizing or explaining away the embarrassing 
behavior (Noonan, 2007). Therefore, people would censor their feelings and follow 
social rules such as being polite, respecting others’ views, and avoiding making other 
people embarrassed (Riley et al., 2013). People performing defensive routines think 
they have been rational, as their motivation is to care and protect other people from 
embarrassment. One such example is that employees block or distort the unpleasant 
customers’ feedback from senior managers in order to protect their immediate 
managers (Homburg & Furst, 2007).  This behavior helps them avoid embarrassment 
for themselves and others, but thwarts organizational learning (Mazutis & 
Slaiwinski, 2008). Consequently, this embarrassment avoidance leads to self-
reinforcing defensive routines which insulate peoples’ assumptions from alternative 
outside views.  
 
The two dimensions of ODRs discussed above reinforce each other and create an 
adverse force against revealing causes of embarrassment and threat within 
organizations.  If organizations have intangible norms to encourage individuals to 
bypass embarrassment and threat by dysfunctional communication, risk aversion and 
conflict avoidance, people in organizations make the assumption that it is rational to 
filter valid information and soften negative messages.  In turn, if individuals in 
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organizations have a desire to avoid embarrassment and are likely to resist change, 
then they tend to bypass or cover up problems in order to maintain the status quo.  
Due to this loop, it can be stated that defensive routines at the individual level are 
embedded at the organizational level, and defensive routines at organizational level 
create such a defensive working environment that makes individuals performing 
defensiveness think their behavior is rational. 
 
To sum up the discussion from the previous sections, ODRs exist on both the 
individual and organizational level.  First, at the organizational level the dimension 
of ODRs consist of dysfunctional communication, risk avoidance, and conflict 
avoidance. Second, two dimensions of ODRs exist at the individual level which are 
related to individuals’ psycho-cognitive dispositions.  These two dimensions of 
individual level ODRs are embarrassment avoidance and resistance to change. The 
next sections report the scale development process.  
 
4.3 The Scale Development Process 
 
Table 3 shows the steps followed to develop the scale presented in this chapter 
(DeVellis, 2012; Hinkin, 1998).  DeVellis (2012) and Hinkin (1998) suggested a 
sequence of steps to follow for developing a measurement.  This study adopted this 
process with six steps.  The first four steps are mainly following the suggestions 
presented in DeVellis (2012).  Then the researcher also followed Hinkin’s (1998) 
suggestion and further conducted another two steps.  The first step is to generate 
initial item pools and determine the format for measurement.  The second step is to 
have subject experts review the items.  This step results in eliminating some 
irrelevant and problematic items.  The third step is to collect data to conduct a first 
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Exploratory Factor Analysis (EFA).  The result of EFA leads to elimination of some 
items which do not load on the primary factors.  The fourth step is to use 
Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA) for testing that the factors and items defined by 
the EFA are a good fit.  The fifth step, the researcher collected another sample of 
data from the UK and carried out convergent, discriminant validity, and predictive 
test. In the final step, the researcher checked measurement invariance. 
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Table 3: Overview of the Scale Development Process 
Study Steps of scale development Sample Results 
Phase 1 
Development of a preliminary pool of 
items, starting from the definition and 
supplemented by a literature review 
 
Discussion of retrieved items 
with 5 academics working in the 
area of   organizational behavior 
and 4 managers working in 
industry. 
Preliminary item 
pool (103 items) 
reduced to 40 
items 
Phase 2 Item generation and content validity 
N= 9 experts in the field of 
organizational behavior, 
managers and administrators 
Item pool defined 
and  consisting of 
30 items 
Phase 3 
Exploratory factor analysis (EFA), 
dimensionality and reliability 
N=207 respondents from both 
public and private sectors (UK); 
42% male; 64% public sector  
Reduce items to 14 
based on EFA 
Phase 4 Confirmatory factor analysis (CFA);  
N=288 respondents from both 
public and private sectors (UK); 
52% male; Average age: 38.5. 
78% full time employees; 30% 
worked more than 10 years. 43% 
public sector.  
Further validate 
the scales extracted 
from EFA 
Phase 5 
Discriminant, convergent and predictive 
validity 
 
N= 151 Respondents from  
variance industries. 52% men; 
76% full time employees; 48% 
public sector; Mean of 
organizational tenure: 11 years. 
ODRs scales 
further validated; 
ODRs discriminant 
from other similar 
concepts; ODRs 
predicts outcomes 
Phase 6  Measurement equivalence 
 
N= 150 employees (from United 
States); 53% men; 74% full time 
employees and, 41% public 
sector; Mean organizational 
tenure 11.5 years.  
People from UK 
and USA interpret 
the scale in the 
same way.  
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This study measures ODRs via individual perceptions. It defines the individual 
factors contributing to ODRs, also identifies factors outside of individual actors at 
the organizational level.  At the organizational level, the researcher identified 
“dysfunctional communication”, “risk aversion” and “conflict avoidance” as three 
collective organizational phenomena.  These three constructs explain why ODRs 
become prevalent in organizations.  In contrast, “embarrassment avoidance” and 
“resistance to change” operate at the individual level reflecting the individuals’ 
disposition towards ODRs.  The organizational level here is measured from 
individual perceptions of routine interactions within the organization.  It is common 
practice to use individuals’ perception to measure organizational phenomena (e.g. 
Schnake and Dumler, 2003).  
 
4.3.1 Phase 1: Item pool generation 
 
An initial item pool of 103 items is derived mainly based on the interviews, case 
studies and theoretical papers found in the literature (e.g. Argyris, 1990; Ashforth & 
Lee, 1990; Noonan, 2007).  An iterative process of discussing the items was carried 
out with a number of five experts in the field of organizational behavior.  The 
researcher also consulted with four people who hold positions as managers and 
administrators in some of the local companies (UK).  The definition of the construct 
and the constituents of ODRs are provided.  After about 10 iterations to check for 
relevance, clarity and conciseness, performed by academics who are active in the 
field of organizational behavior, the number of items was reduced to 40. The 
deduction on the number of items mainly due to two following reasons. First, limited 
existing quantitative studies on ODRs could not provide clear understanding on 
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constituents of ODRs. Hence, the researcher came out with many similar items to 
represent the concepts.  Additionally, the researcher’s limited experience at the 
beginning of the research project in scale development is accounted for such a big 
drop at number of items.  She designed many items with mixed perspectives from 
supervisors, colleagues and employees. This was confusing for readers. A seven-
point Likert scale was adopted to rate each item to access content adequacy, leading 
to discard the items less relevant to ODRs.  At the end of this process, each of the 
ODRs constituents has about eight items. Sample items include “My organization 
has an unspoken norm not to embarrass employees openly” for the dysfunctional 
communication factor; “Criticism in my organization is encouraged to be given in a 
subtle way” for the conflict avoidance factor; “I never dilute bad news to avoid 
embarrassment for myself or my colleagues” for the embarrassment avoidance 
factor; “I am open to challenges of my opinions from colleagues” for the resistance 
to change factor.  
 
4.3.2 Phase 2: Item reduction 
 
For the item generation and content validity step to be meaningful to the 
development of the scale, it is pivotal to select people who represent the main 
population of interest.  The researcher’s focus is on ODRs in the workplace.  Hence, 
it is appropriate to aim at people who are currently working in organizations as our 
target participants.  Nine people examined the initial item pool to identify ambiguous 
wording, double-barreled and redundant items.  As a result, eight items were 
discarded and five items were reworded.  The item pool is reduced to 30 (see 
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Appendix 1. All the items are formatted as 7-point Likert scales, which ranged from 
1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). Some items are reverse coded.  
 
4.3.3 Phase 3: Exploratory factor analysis 
 
In order to perform the first statistical tests a survey is distributed using a traditional 
paper-and-pencil collection strategy and an online survey (using Qualtrics).  A 
sample of 220 respondents took part in the study, but the final usable data were 
N=207.  Respondents work in the private and public sector with a minimum of one-
year work experience.  Exploratory Factor Analysis (EFA) is adopted to identify the 
underlying constructs for ODRs.  
 
EFA can be used to identify latent constructs underlying a set of manifest variables 
(Kim and Mueller, 1978; Norris and Lecavalier, 2010).  In EFA, principal axis
6
 
factoring and direct oblimin rotation is employed for this study because it seeks the 
least number of factors and only considers common variance (Kim & Mueller, 1978).  
Prior to EFA, the researcher carried out analysis on correlation among the items.  
Any item that correlates less than .40 with all other items was eliminated from the 
analysis (Hinkin, 1998).  Seven items were excluded as the result of the correlation 
analysis.  
 
4.3.3.1 Findings 
 
                                                 
6
 Despite the fact that EFA should be the technique for defining latent variables (DeVellis, 2012), a 
large number of studies have adopted PCA (Norris and Lecavalier, 2009) for psychological research. 
For comparison, PCA with promax rotation was conducted. The structure of factors is the same as the 
one from EFA.  
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After the researcher deleted items which did not load on factors with eigenvalue over 
one, the EFA from individuals’ perception at the organizational level of ODRs 
results in two factors (Table 4).  The latter result is slightly different from the 
theoretical model, that contained three factors (dysfunctional communication, risk 
aversion and conflict avoidance).  However, the final scale results into two 
dimensions.  The reason for this result is that the three factors share some common 
elements which already reflected in the literature.  The two factors resulting of EFA 
represent the commonality of the three dimensions from different angles.  For 
example, “my organization has too many rigid rules and regulations” and “playing it 
safe seems to be a common activity in my organization” are both about risk aversion.  
However, they are different in that the first item is about using authority to suppress 
the emerge of different opinions and the second item is about masking the capability 
via keeping status quo.  The item, “The majority of our meetings last a long time and 
deal with trivial issues” is about conflict avoidance, and the item, “my organization 
gives mixed messages” is about dysfunctional communication. Nevertheless, these 
two items have a common element of covering up the underlying core issues by two 
seemingly different tactics.  Hence, the researcher decided to label the factors 
differently.  The first factor, named organizational cover-up, is composed of four 
items.  It means organizations cover-up the existing organizational issues whose 
exposure could cause embarrassment or threat.  The second factor named 
organizational pretense contains four items.  Organizational pretense here means 
that organizations disguise themselves being competent by avoiding taking risk and 
suppressing employees to express different opinions.  The first factor had eigenvalue 
2.4, and the second factor had eigenvalue 1.6.  They both together explain 52.29% 
variance of the common construct. The correlation of these two factors is 0.25.  
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Cronbach alpha for organizational cover-up is 0.72.  Cronbach alpha for 
organizational pretense is 0.67.  The cumulative Cronbach alpha for the 
organizational dimension of ODRs is 0.69, cumulative variance is 52.29%. This is 
slightly lower than the most referenced threshold 0.7.  
 
At the individual level (Table 5), the researcher used principal axis factoring and 
direct oblique rotation for EFA.  Based on theory, these two constituents of ODRs at 
individual level have clearly different dimensions.  The eigenvalues from the scree 
plot match with the theoretical framework with 2.68 for the first factor and 1.30 for 
the second factor.  After deleting nine items with the highly cross-loaded items and 
items had low factor loadings, this results in six items measuring ODRs at individual 
level.  The first factor with three items reflects rigidity at work (RG) and represent a 
particular dimension of resistance to change (RTC) that suits ODRs.  RG here 
represents individuals playing safe to avoid changes and showing insecure feelings 
under the support of organizational defensive context. RG does not measure 
personality, but a repetitive action employees and managers tend to resort to. After 
deleting the highly cross loaded items, the second factor contains three items 
reflecting embarrassment avoidance.  This refers to individuals who avoid 
challenges from other people or challenges to other people in order to prevent 
embarrassment.  Theoretically, these two factors should be correlated considering 
that one reason as of why people resist to changes is embarrassment prevention.  The 
factor correlation matrix shows that the two factors are correlated by 0.40, which 
matches the theoretical inference.  Additionally, Cronbach’s alpha for RG is 0.66. 
Cronbach alpha for embarrassment avoidance is 0.80.  The cumulative Cronbach 
alpha for individual dimension of ODRs is 0.74.  Cumulative variance is 70.11%. 
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Table 4: Organizational Defensive Routine Factor Loading  
(Organizational level) 
  
Factor 
Organizational 
Cover-up 
Organizational 
pretense 
ODRs13: When things go wrong in my organization, 
nobody stands up to take responsibility. 
0.79   
ODRs15: My organization gives mixed messages. 0.74  
ODRs14: My organization has too many rigid rules 
and regulations 
0.54   
ODRs3: The majority of our meetings last a long time 
and deal with trivial issues 
0.44   
ODRs7: Playing it safe seems to be a common activity 
in my organization 
  0.68 
ODRs4: Most of my organization’s decisions are not 
influenced by the discussion during meetings 
  0.59 
ODRs1: Most of the time the major decisions in my 
organization are already made before a meeting 
actually takes place 
  0.53 
ODRs9: Subtle and covert controlling actions are 
typically taken in my organization 
  0.47 
Cumulative variance: 52.29%     
Cronbach alpha for Organizational cover-up: 0.72  
Cronbach alpha for organizational pretense: 0.67 
Cumulative Cronbach alpha for ODRs: 0.69 
Note: n= 207. Principle Axis Factor and Oblimin rotation were used. Loadings lower than 0.40 were 
omitted.  
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Table 5: Organizational Defensive Routines Factor Loading (Individual level) 
  
Factor 
Rigidity 
at work 
Embarrassment 
Avoidance 
RG4:I only change the way of doing things under 
pressure from the organization 
0.85   
RG2:When dealing with work-related procedures 
and processes, I do not like changes 
0.70   
RG3: In my job, I usually do not change the way I 
do things 
0.65   
EMBA4: I feel embarrassed if my opinions are 
challenged by my colleagues 
  0.74 
EMBA5: I feel embarrassed to challenge my 
superiors’ opinions 
  0.71 
EMBA3: I avoid speaking to the point if this would 
embarrass my colleagues 
  0.44 
Cumulative variance: 70.11% 
Cronbach alpha for rigidity at work: 0.66                      
Cronbach alpha for embarrassment avoidance : 0.80 
Cumulative Cronbach's alpha is : 0.74 
 
Note: n= 207. Principle Axis Factor and Oblimin rotation were used. Loadings lower than 0.40 were 
omitted.  
 
4.3.4 Phase 4: Confirmatory factor analysis 
 
4.3.4.1 Methods 
 
In order to validate the scale structure obtained from EFA, a Confirmatory Factor 
Analysis (CFA) is applied to a different sample with 288 usable responses.  Data was 
collected by a US company specializing in survey research (Qualtrics) according to 
the demographics the researcher specified: UK workers from private, public and not-
for-profit sectors.  The data was subjected to a CFA which is used to assess its fit to 
the hypothesized factor structure (Kline, 1994).  Maximum likelihood estimations 
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with SPSS-AMOS 23 are adopted to analyze data.  Large samples could lead to high 
values of chi-square, which may suggest rejecting a model with a good fit. Therefore, 
χ
2
 is adjusted by its degrees of freedom (df); χ
2
/df should be in the range of 1.0 to 3.0 
(Hu and Bentler, 1999).  Sometimes it is also acceptable to have relative chi-square 
(X
2
/df) less than 0.5 (e.g. Schumacker & Lomax, 2004; Wheaton, Muthen, Alwin & 
Summers, 1977).  A mix of absolute and relative goodness-of-fit indexes is also 
adopted to assess the model fit including comparative fit index (CFI), the root mean 
square error of approximation (RMSEA) and standardized root mean square residual 
(SRMR) (Kline, 2005).  Cut-off criteria for model fit indexes are as follows: CFI 
should be equal to or greater than .95; RMSEA should be equal or less than .08; 
SRMR should be equal to or less than .08 (e.g. Byrne, 2001; Hu & Bentler, 1999; 
Kline, 2005).  The reliability of the final construct is measured by composite 
reliability (CR) and average variance extracted (AVE).  Constructs with CR equal to 
or greater than .70 show there is high degree of internal consistency; AVE higher 
than or equal to .50 indicate the items can explain the latent construct at a 
satisfactory level (Hair, Black, Babin and Anderson, 2010).  
4.3.4.1 Findings 
 
EFA of ODRs at organizational level suggested a two sub-factor construct to 
measure ODRs.  Results are χ2/df =2.45; CFI=0.96, RMSEA=0.07; SRMR=0.05. 
These model fit indexes meet the most referenced cut-off criteria suggested by Hu 
and Bentler (1999) and Hair et al. (2010).  Hence, the model suggested by EFA is 
confirmed by CFA (See Figure 3). That means the organizational dimension of 
ODRs can be measured by two sub-constructs, organizational cover-up and 
organizational pretense.  AVE for organizational cover-up is 0.50 and AVE for 
organizational pretense is 0.51. The cumulative AVE: 0.50. CR for organizational 
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cover-up is 0.79 and it is 0.81 for organizational pretense.  The cumulative CR for 
ODRs at organizational level is 0.80. 
  
  
 
120 
 
 
 Figure 3: CFA of Organizational defensive routines at Organizational Level 
 
 
 
At the individual level, CFA is applied to analyze the model extracted from the EFA. 
CFA showed that χ2/df = 3.68; CFI=0.96; RMSEA=0.09 SRMR=.04.  AVE for the 
factor rigidity is 0.49; AVE for embarrassment avoidance is 0.54. CR for rigidity is 
0.74, and it is 0.78 for embarrassment avoidance. Though AVE for rigidity is 
minimally lower than the benchmark of 0.5, the researcher thinks this factor is still 
measuring ODRs, in consideration of its composite reliability.  Hence, the factor is 
retained in the measurement.  This result supports the model suggested by EFA in 
the first instance.  The final scale for ODRs at individual level is six items (Figure 4).   
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Figure 4: Organizational Defensive Routines at individual level
 
Note:  EMBA= Embarrassment Avoidance; RG = Rigidity at work 
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4.3.5 Phase 5: Convergent, discriminant validity and predictive validity 
 
Convergent validity assesses the degree to which the construct is similar to other 
constructs that are supposed to be highly correlated; discriminant validity is to show 
the construct is distinct from other constructs (Kline, 1993).  Predictable validity 
(Criterion-related validity) is to examine ‘relationship between the new measure and 
other variables which can be hypothesized to relate to develop a nomological 
network’ (Hinkin, 1998, p.117).  
For ODRs at the organizational level, the researcher expected ODRs are positively 
related to organizational silence and red tape. In this study, a sample of 150 UK 
employees from a variety of industries was used.  Confirmatory factor analysis is 
used to test convergent and discriminant validity (Hair et al., 2010).  
 
4.3.5.1 Organizational silence.  
 
The literature review on ODRs at the organizational level reveals that organizational 
silence shares certain elements of ODRs. Most organizational silence focuses on 
employees’ silence with problems in organizations (e.g. Pinder & Harlos, 2001; 
Vakola & Bouradas, 2005; Van Dyne, Ang, Botero & Dyne, 2003).  Organizational 
silence is referred to as a collective phenomenon in organizations which treat the 
speaking-up of problems as a dangerous thing to do or as a waste of effort (Morrison 
& Milliken, 2000) and thus is a form of self-protection from external threats (Van 
Dyne et al., 2003) that encourages people to suppress their negative feedback 
(Morrison & Milliken 2000). While Morrison and Milliken (2000) discuss 
organizational silence, they applied ODRs to explain the reason why some managers 
avoid information which might cause embarrassment to them. Hence, this shows that 
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organizational silence shares certain elements of ODRs.  Organizations with ODRs 
often have a norm which encourage individuals collectively adopting various 
methods, such as self-censoring and by passing problems, in organizations to avoid 
embarrassing themselves or others (Riley et al. 2013).  The literature depicts that 
there are overlaps of these two concepts with the same element of covering up issues 
and is suitable to assess discriminant validity.  However, organizational silence is 
mainly about employees’ voice on organizational issues, but ODRs have more facets 
than voice measure. Therefore, the researcher predicts organizational silence will be 
related to but empirically distinct from ODRs.  Organizational silence is measured by 
a subset of three items form Vakola and  Bouradas (2005).  The Cronbach alpha is 
0.92.  
 
4.3.5.1 Red tape 
 
 Red tape is conceptualized as “burdensome administrative rules and procedures that 
have negative effects on the organizations’ effectiveness” (Bozeman & Feeney, 
2011, p.84).  Based on this definition, red tape can be perceived by individuals as 
burdensome rules and procedures without legitimate purpose (Kuafmann and 
Feeney, 2014).  Hence, Red tape carries a negative connotation. It is inherently 
regarded being too slow to react to changes (Saldivar, 2015).  Like ODRs which 
exist in organizations as a form of rules guiding people to avoid a candor discussion 
at negative organizational issues, and they are also barriers to organizations’ 
effectiveness. Organizations with high ODRs tend to have more rules and regulations 
to restrict people’ behavior. Individuals at organizations are also more likely to rely 
on those rules to protect themselves from any negative consequences (Argyris 2000).   
However, these two concepts are different. The manifestation of red tape is written 
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or articulated in organizations, which is explicit. Though too many rules and 
procedures are one manifestation of the ODRs, yet ODRs are often implicit.  The 
researcher used two sub-scales of red tape measure from Bozeman and Feeney 
(2011). The Cronbach alpha is 0.94. 
  
Table 6 shows that composite reliability of ODRs is greater than 0.7, therefore, the 
construct is reliable. For testing convergent and discriminant validity, the study 
followed Hair, Black, Babin, and Anderson's (2010) procedure.  To demonstrate the 
discriminant validity and to show the distinction among ODRs, organizational 
silence and red tape, the researcher first checks if maximum shared variance (MSV) 
is less than AVE (Hair et al. 2010). The MSV for ODRs is 0.64, and the AVE for 
ODRs is 0.81. Second, average shared variance (ASV) should be less than AVE. The 
ASV for ODRs is 0.56, and the AVE is 0.81. Third, square root of AVE (on 
diagonals) are greater than inter-construct correlations (off diagonals) between ODRs 
and red tape (0.90 > 0.70) and organizational silence (0.90 > 0.80).  
 
For convergent validity, AVE of ODRs (AVE = 0.81) should be larger than the 
threshold of 0.5. The correlation analysis among these three constructs shows that 
ODRs is significantly correlated with organizational silence (r = 0.80; p < 0.01) and 
red tape (r = 0.70; p < 0.01). In summary, this confirms that all the three constructs 
have good reliability, convergent validity and discriminant validity. The model also 
had good fit, which is shown in Figure 5. 
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Table 6: Factor Correlation Matrix with Square root of the AVE on the 
diagonal (organizational level) 
 CR AVE MSV ASV ODR 
Red 
tape Orgsi 
ODR 0.89 0.81 0.64 0.56 0.90     
Red tape 0.95 0.90 0.48 0.46 0.70 0.95   
Orgsi 0.92 0.71 0.64 0.53 0.80 0.66 0.84 
Note: n=151,  
1. Psy=psychological safety; ODRs= organizational defensive routines; 
Orgsi=organizational silence;  
2. Square root of the AVE on the Diagonal 
3. MSV= maximum shared variance; ASV= average shared variance  
 
 
Figure 5:Structural Equation Modeling of Discriminant and Convergent Validity Test 
 
Note: rert= red tape; sil_org= organizational silence.  
  
  
 
126 
 
4.3.5.3 Employee silence and defensive silence 
 
For ODRs at individual level, the researcher expects ODRs positively related to 
defensive silence and related to employee silence behavior, yet they should be 
empirically different. The researcher used the sample collected at the same time for 
testing discriminant and convergent validity of ODRs at the organizational level.  
 
Individual defensive silence is measured by a subset of six items developed by 
Brinsfield, (2013).  Its Cronbach alpha is 0.96.  Employee silence behavior is 
measured by a subset of three items from Vakola and Bouradas (2005).  Its Cronbach 
alpha is 0.94. These two constructs are used to test discriminant validity (see Table 
7).  CR of ODR is 0.81 which is larger than 0.7.  Thus, it tells that the construct of 
ODR is reliable.  The discriminant validity was assessed using three criteria, first 
MSV <AVE (0.41< 0.68 ); second, ASV < AVE ( 0.37 < 0.68 ); third, square root of 
the AVE should be larger than inter-construct correlation between ODRs and 
employee silence behavior ( 0.82> 0.58 ) and defensive silence (0.82 > 0.64).  
 
For convergent validity (see table 7), AVE of ODR is 0.68 which is higher than the 
threshold of 0.5 (Hair et al. 2010).  The correlation analysis among the three 
variables shows that ODRs is significantly correlated with individual defensive 
silence ( r = 0.64 , p < 0.01 ) and employees silence behavior ( r = 0.58, p < 0.01).  
Taken together, ODRs at individual level have good reliability, discriminant and 
convergent validity. The model also had good model fit, which shows at Figure 6.  
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Table 7: Factor Correlation Matrix with Square Root of the AVE on the 
Diagonal ( Individual Level) 
 CR AVE MSV ASV ODR_i 
Defensive 
Silence 
Silence 
Behavior 
ODR_i 0.81 0.68 0.41 0.37 0.82     
Defensive 
Silence 0.96 0.81 0.41 0.34 0.64 0.90   
Silence 
Behavior 0.95 0.85 0.34 0.31 0.58 0.52 0.92 
Note: n=151,  
1.ODR_i= organizational defensive routines at individual level 
2. Square root of the AVE on the Diagonal  
3. MSV= maximum shared variance; ASV= average shared variance 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
 
128 
Figure 6: Structural equation modeling for discriminant and convergent 
validity test at individual level. 
 
 
Note: indsil = Individual defensive silence; sil_eas = employee silence 
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Finally, the researcher addressed the predictive validity of ODR.  At organizational 
level, psychological safety is used as an outcome variable.  Edmondson (1999) 
proposed that psychological safety is a shared belief in a team that members feel safe 
to take interpersonal risk to share critical issues in organizations.  If ODRs exist in 
organizations, people tend to feel insecure to discuss negative issues with their 
colleagues.  This is because they will be perceived as “trouble makers”.  The 
researcher stipulates that ODRs have negative effect on psychological safety.  The 
researcher used four items from the scale developed by Baer and Frese (2003) to 
measure psychological safety at organizational level.  The Cronbach alpha is 0.85. 
The correlation analysis shows that ODRs is negative and significant related to 
psychological safety (r = -0.58, p < 0.01).  Moreover, Table 8 shows that ODRs still 
negatively predict psychological safety (  = -0.55, p < 0.01).  Hence, the findings 
support ODRs at organizational level have predictive validity.  
 
Table 8: Regression analysis of ODRs on psychological safety 
DV= 
Psychological 
Safety Step 1   Step 2   
  value  p value    value p value 
Constant 4.51 0.00** 6.82 0.00** 
Gender 0.34 0.14 0.22 0.24 
Tenure 0.01 0.50 0.04 0.66 
Employ Status -0.22 0.41 -0.27 0.23 
Sector 0.39 0.06 0.15 0.37 
OrgODRs     -0.55 0.00** 
Adjusted R
2
 0.01 0.35 
F F(4), 1.47; p = 0.21 F (5), 15.57; p < 0.001 
Note: n = 151. OrgODR= organizational defensive routines at organizational level;  
** p < 0.01; * p < 0.05 
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At the individual level, the researcher uses job satisfaction to assess predictive 
validity of ODRs.  Previous studies have found that employees’ silence is negatively 
related to job satisfaction (Vakola & Bouradas, 2005; Knoll & van Dick, 2013).  
Thus, the researcher predicts that ODRs would negatively related to job satisfaction.  
Job satisfaction is measured by one item.  Using single-item measures of job 
satisfaction is an acceptable practice (Wanous, Reichers & Hudy, 1997).  Here the 
researcher uses a global measure of job satisfaction that is a standard on large scale 
panel datasets, such as the British Household Survey Panel.  The item asks 
respondents “overall, how satisfied or unsatisfied are you with your current job”.  
The correlation analysis shows that ODRs is negatively and significantly correlated 
with job satisfaction (r = -0.35, p < 0.01).  Furthermore, after controlling gender, 
tenure and employ status and sector, ODRs still negatively predict job satisfaction ( 
= -0.49, p < 0.01) (see table 9).  therefore, the findings show that ODRs at individual 
level has predictive validity.  
Overall, empirically studies support the predictive validity of organizational 
defensive routines at both organizational level and individual level.  
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Table 9: Regression Analysis of ODRs on Job Satisfaction at Individual Level 
DV=job 
satisfaction Step 1   Step 2   
  value P value  value p value 
Constant 4.27 0.00** 5.90 0.00** 
Gender -0.36 0.24 -0.25 0.39 
Tenure 0.01 0.62 0.00 0.98 
Employ Status 0.45 0.22 0.60 0.08 
Sector 0.26 0.36 0.27 0.31 
iODR     -0.49 0.00** 
Adjusted R
2 
 0.02 0.15 
F F(4), 1.47; p=0.53 F (5), 4.96; p < 0.001 
Note: n = 151. iODR= organizational defensive routines at individual level; ** p< 0.01 
 
4.3.6 Phase 6: Cross-cultural measurement equivalence of ODRs 
 
It is important to establish measurement invariance in order to have meaningful 
interpretations of research across groups.  Measurement equivalence means that 
different groups (e.g. gender, culture and ethnicity) ascribe the same meanings to the 
construct (Byrne et al., 2009; Milfont & Fischer, 2010).    
 
Cultural differences often contribute to measurement nonequivalence and make the 
comparison between different cultural groups meaningless (Byrne et al., 2009).  For 
example, people in the UK tend to be less confrontational and emotionally 
unexpressive than their American counterparts (Meyer, 2015).  In other words, they 
are more likely to avoid discussing issues which could cause embarrassment.  This 
study endeavors to examine invariance of ODRs measurement across British and 
American contexts. Though the culture difference between UK and US cultural 
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context is not extremely distinct, but empirically it is found that these two cultures 
are still different (Robert & Hanges, 2004).  Two primary levels of potential 
invariance are examined in this study: configural and metric (Milfont & Fischer, 
2010; Vandenberg & Lance, 2000).  
 
To assess measurement invariance across UK, the data for conducting discriminant 
and convergent validity is used.  For the American sample, the researcher entrusted 
Qualtrics, a research company, to send the survey to potential participants.  The 
usable American sample is 150. The descriptive information about the sample is 
presented in Table3.  
 
Configural invariance is the first step to establish measurement invariance.  If the 
same pattern of constrained and free elements in the construct can be held across 
groups, configural invariance is supported (Widaman & Reise, 1997).  In the current 
study, configural invariance would confirm that the latent constructs associated with 
the concept of ODRs (the first order constructs and the second-order latent construct) 
were similarly reflected in both cultures because manifest items would load on the 
latent variables as hypothesized.  Metric invariance confirms that the strengths of the 
relationship between specific items and their underlying construct are similar across 
groups (Milfont & Fischer, 2010). Multi-group CFA techniques are often applied to 
perform measurement invariance (e.g. Byrne &Watkins, 2003; Cheung & Rensvold, 
2002).  
 
Following the steps suggest by Widaman & Reise (1997) and Vandenberg & Lance 
(2000), an analysis of configural invariance is carried out across two cultures.  The 
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second order hierarchical factor structures for ODRs are specified and tested 
respectively.  At the organizational level, the fitness indexes for both the UK sample 
( X
2
 = 29.19; df = 14; CFI = 0.97; RMSEA = 0.08; SRMR = 0.04) and the USA 
sample (X
2
 = 19.50; df = 14; CFI = 0.99; RMSEA = 0.05; SRMR = 0.03) all meet the 
minimum criteria for the model fit (Hu and Bentler, 1999; Hair et al., 2010).  At the 
individual level, the fitness indexes for both the UK sample (X
2
 = 2.01; df = 8; CFI = 
0.99; RMSEA = 0.01; SRMR = 0.01 ) and the USA sample (X
2
 = 5.31; df = 7; CFI = 
0.99; RMSEA = 0.01; SRMR = 0.03) are also higher than the minimum requirements 
for model fit indexes.  Overall, the form of the latent construct of ODRs at both 
organizational level and individual level seemed to hold across two cultures.  
 
Then, two-group CFAs to examine the measurement invariance for configural 
invariance is carried out. At the organizational level, the result for this analysis is 
shown in model 1 of table 10 and confirmed as an acceptable fit (X
2
 = 58.7; df = 32; 
CFI = 0.98; RMSEA = 0.05; TLI = 0.96; SRMR = 0.04).  At the individual level, the 
result in Model 1 of Table 11 also showed a good model fit (X
2
 = 22.1; df = 16; CFI 
= 0.99; RMSEA = 0.04; TLI = 0.98; SRMR = 0.01).  Hence, the second-order factor 
structure for ODRs at both the organizational and the individual level holds across 
the UK and US contexts.  
 
After testing configural invariance, the analysis for metric invariance is examined by 
constraining all the factor loadings to be the same across groups (Milfont & Fischer, 
2010).  At the organizational level, results shown in Model 2 of Table 10 
demonstrate that constraining invariance across groups model fix indexes did not 
change much (∆χ2= 10.4; df = 8) and p > 0.05.  At individual level, the model fit 
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showing at model 2 of Table 11 also did not vary significantly ((∆χ2 = 2.6; df = 6) 
and p > 0.05.  Thus, the loading values of all items at both organizational and 
individual level were invariant across these two samples.  
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Table 10:Summary of Fit Statistic for Testing Measurement Invariance of ODRs at Organizational Level Across UK and the 
United States 
Model X
2
 df X
2
/df CFI RMSEA SRMR 
Model 
comparison X2 df p-value Invariant? 
Model 1: 
Configural 
Invariance 58.7 32 1.83 0.98 0.05 0.04      
Model2: 
Metric 
Invariance 69.1 40 1.73 0.98 0.05 0.05 2 vs. 1 10.4 8 0.24 Yes 
Note: n (UK)= 151; n (USA) = 150 
X2: change in X2  is based on the difference between a model in which factor loadings are constrained to be equal in both survey waves 
with one in which they are free to vary. 
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Table 11: Summary of Fit Statistic for Testing Measurement Invariance of ODRs at Individual Level Across UK and the United 
States 
Model X
2
 df X
2
/df CFI RMSEA SRMR 
Model  
X
2
 df 
p-
value 
Invariant? 
comparison 
Model 1: 
configural 
invariance 
22.1 16 1.38 0.99 0.04 0.01           
Model2: 
Metric 
invariance 
24.7 22 1.12 0.99 0.02 0.02 2 vs. 1 2.6 6 0.86 Yes 
Note: n (Uk)= 151; n (USA) = 150 
X2: change in X2  is based on the difference between a model in which factor loadings are constrained to be equal in both survey waves 
with one in which they are free to vary. 
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4.4 Discussion 
 
Most studies on ODRs are based on consultancy experience (e.g. Argyris, 1990; 
Noonan, 2007).  The prevalence of ODRs in organizations and the damage ODRs 
can cause to organizations have been well acknowledged and accepted by academics. 
However, there is lack of measurement of ODRs for organizations and academics to 
identify this negative behavior.  To fill this theoretical gap, the researcher identified a 
theoretical structure from literature, which includes dysfunctional communication, 
risk aversion and conflict avoidance at organizational level, and embarrassment 
avoidance and resistance to change at individual level. Furthermore, through a series 
of quantitative studies, three theoretical components at organizational level merged 
into two sub-constructs of ODRs with eight items, namely organizational cover-up 
and organizational pretense.  Although Cronbach’s alpha for organizational pretense 
is 0.67 which is slightly lower than the often referenced benchmark 0.7, but its 95% 
confidence interval included .70. This may be acceptable for the early stage of 
instrument development (Nunnally, 1978; DeVellis, 2012). This is often seen in the 
newly developed scale (e.g. Flores, Zheng, Rau & Thomas, 2012; Putz, Schilling, 
Kluge & Stangenberg, 2012).  Additionally, the newly developed scale has been 
confirmed by both EFA and CFA. This gives enough confidence to support the 
scale’s internal consistency.   
 
At the individual level, two theoretical components remain separated with six items. 
Resistance to change is renamed into rigidity at work to be more relevant to ODRs. 
The study also established the initial reliability and validity of the constructs. Using 
data collected in the UK and USA, the measurement invariance is confirmed.   
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Argyris focused on ODRs at individual level and posited that ODRs often starts from 
individuals (1990).  This study identified two dimensions of ODRs at individual 
level, namely embarrassment avoidance and resistance to change.  Both EFA and 
CFA confirmed the two sub-construct measure.  Overall, it can be concluded that 
ODRs are multi-dimensional.   
 
4.5 Implications 
 
 
This study makes four important contributions to the ODRs field. First, to the 
researcher’s knowledge, there are no other studies that identify the components of 
ODRs at both the organizational and the individual level.  Most of the studies on 
ODRs focus on demonstrating the consequences of having ODRs in organizations.  
There is no clear and systematic identification on components of ODRs.  By 
proposing theoretical models of ODRs at both levels, this study enriches 
organizational routine theories.  This study shows that organizational routines are 
repetitive actions individuals interact with other members at an organizational 
setting.  These actions are affected by both individuals’ cognition and social 
environment at organizations.  The study also indicates that not all the routines are 
building blocks of organizational capabilities.  Instead, they can be impediment of 
organizational progress.   
 
As far as the researcher’s knowledge is concerned, this is the first time that a 
rigorous process is followed to develop a scale measurement for ODRs.  The study 
also attempts to make the theoretical argument on ODRs more convincing to 
organizations by highlighting the multi-dimensional nature of ODRs.  The multi-
dimensional nature of ODRs shows that eliminating ODRs requires organizations’ 
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effort on changing their defensive working climate.  It also demands all the 
employees to reduce their own defensiveness on self-censoring important 
information without worrying about repercussions.  If organizations only focus on 
one of the dimensions, it will not be sufficient to reduce ODRs.  
 
Second, Argyris (2001) theoretically proposed that ODRs exist in all cultures, but 
this claim is not tested empirically.  Configural invariance test have been confirmed 
the hierarchical second-order structure of ODRs in both UK and US cultural context.  
It made the researcher believe that ODRs could be measured from two dimensions at 
organizational and individual level independently.  Though the differences between 
UK and USA cultures are not as significant as comparing western cultures and Asian 
cultures, yet this is first step to establish whether culture affects peoples’ 
interpretation on the scale.  It provides a new reliable and valid scale for identifying 
ODRs across cultures, which enriches the existing ODRs theories and extends the 
applicability of the scale for empirical studies.   
 
Additionally, the study contributes to bringing in a new perspective to understand the 
reason why organizational routines are inert and automatic.  Although Feldman 
(2000) suggested that organizational routines are the source of stability and change, 
ODRs make organizations a place of preferring to maintain old routines, at most, 
temporary changes (Argyris, 1990).  Hence, the inert nature of routines becomes 
more apparent in organizations with ODRs than without ODRs.  Routines are carried 
out by a system of individuals who interactively work together, so an emergence of 
new routines requires to solve conflicts between individuals before reaching a new 
truce (Nelson & Winter, 1990; Cacciatori, 2012). When ODRs are prevalent in 
  
140 
organizations, the dominant way of solving conflict is bypassing and covering up 
organizational issues (Noonan, 2000).  Without a clear communication on the issues, 
the intermediaries are not able to transfer the correct intention of one actor to another 
resulting in maintaining old routines (Bapuji et al., 2012).  Additionally, 
organizations with ODRs tend to encourage people to exploit incumbent routines and 
avoid exploring new routines, because a new routine is exposed to more risk of 
resistance and criticism than an unknown routine (Argyris, 1990).  This results in 
organizations investing more on an exploitation process instead of an exploration 
process (Gilbert, 2005).  Altogether, it means that the existence of ODRs could 
contribute to the limited dynamic of organizational capability to change at macro-
level of organizational routines.  
 
The study also brings individuals psycho-cognitive tendency into consideration of 
micro level of organizational routines. Routines at individual levels are understood 
from individuals’ actions in organizations (Cohen, 2012) together with materials 
such as computers and technological tools (Pentland et al., 2012).  Organizational 
routines involve multiple actors whose actions are interdependent (Feldman, 2000).  
Hence, it is essential to have shared cognitive frameworks among these actors in 
order to reduce the cognitive distance between them (Witt, 2011).  While ODRs exist 
in organizations, individuals are prone to make assumptions on the rationality of 
disguising their candor opinion toward negative issues (Noonan, 2011).  The 
unexposed cognition framework on the causes of embarrassment and threat in 
organizations increased the cognitive distance between employees.  As a result, the 
opportunity of designing new routines for solving the negative issues would not be 
identified and the old routines stay effective.  This reflects Simon’s (1974) theory 
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that individuals’ cognition is at the top of the pyramid to determine individuals’ 
habitual behavior and emotion.  It also brings a novel perspective on how individuals 
can contribute to the emergence of new routines by reducing ODRs.  
 
The researcher also would like to note the practical implication of this study. First, 
the scales can serve as diagnostic tools for consultants and organizations to identify 
ODRs.  Measuring ODRs is valuable for organizations to identify ODRs at any stage 
of their development, especially when organizations are going through changes 
(Argyris, 1990). At the individual level, it is important for individuals as well to be 
aware of their own contribution to ODRs, as ODRs relate to their own job 
performance. Additionally, regular assessment of ODRs at both the organizational 
and the individual level could contribute to the assessment of whether organizations 
have formed a culture unconsciously to encourage employees to by-pass or cover up 
negative issues.  This could create barriers for organizational learning.  As Tranfield 
et al. (2000) pointed out organizations who want to be learning organizations need to 
reduce or eliminate ODRs in order to unlearn old routines. Furthermore, the ODRs 
instrument can be used as a tool for consultants to define ODRs at the early stage of 
examining organizational problems or confirming their findings from case studies.  
Previous case studies conducted by Argyris (1990) and Noonan (2007) showed that 
identifying ODRs is time consuming.  These instruments could be beneficial for 
them to recognize ODRs more efficiently. 
 
Secondly, from the societal perspective, the results of this study can facilitate people 
to have a different perspective on understanding certain social virtues such as 
suppress negative feelings and respect other people in order to avoid embarrassment 
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and conflict (Argyris, 2001).  Those social virtues simply confine people to have 
open discussion on negative issues (Noonan, 2007).  However, this study shows that 
constructively revealing genuine feelings toward negative issues can enable people to 
identify the causes of the embarrassment and threat at the first place, so that the 
problems can be solved at the initial stage.  Changing peoples’ perspectives on social 
virtues related to dealing with embarrassment and threat will benefit organizations to 
have a healthy environment to decrease ODRs.  
 
4.6 Limitation and Outline of Future Research Recommendations 
 
Nonetheless, the study also is inevitable to have some limitations.  First, focus 
groups are an alternative way to generate items in the initial stage of scale 
development.  As the use of focus groups is a good method to generate rich 
information and assess initial ideas about items (Kline, 1993).  This might have 
limited the researcher’s understanding of the concept. Learning from this, the 
researcher can match focus group with expert panels in a future study. However, this 
study added an iteration of consulting with people from both academic and practical 
fields. The advice received from these groups could have increase the robustness of 
item generation.  
 
Second, the studies for item generation and validation were conducted to avoid 
common method bias.  However, the researcher tested predictive validity using a 
sample collected from the same respondents. This could cause a problem of common 
method variance (Podsakoff et al., 2003).  This method bias should not affect the 
validity of the new scale measuring ODRs, but their predictive validity. A future 
study should retest the predictive validity. 
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Third, this study only used psychological safety as a criterion variable at 
organizational level.  Future studies could include some other important outcome 
variables, such as organizational communication.  Job satisfaction is the only 
criterion variable at individual level.  Future studies could other organizational 
concepts such as job performance and trust. 
 
 
Future work could further test the measurement this study developed in an Asian 
cultural setting. Though this study tested measurement invariance between UK and 
USA, these two cultures of these two countries are not very distinct.  Tsang (1997) 
postulates that ODRs could be more prevalent in Chinese organizations than they are 
in western ones, because the Chinese culture does not encourage individuals in 
organizations to criticize other people openly, especially to managers.  Chinese 
people are more likely to avoid confrontation and expressing their own feelings in 
comparison with people from UK (Meyer, 2015).  Thus, it would be interesting to 
see if the measure presented here is reliable in a Chinese context.  
 
Another suggestion for future research is to apply the scale to test some theoretical 
ideas about ODRs and other organizational variables such as organizational learning. 
It is well acknowledged by researchers that ODRs hinder organizational learning 
(e.g. Argyris, 2001; Easterby-Smith et al., 2004; Tranfield et al., 2000). This is 
because ODRs constitute an impediment to valid information (Miner and Mezias, 
1996). However, very few studies have been conducted to test this theoretical 
argument empirically due to a lack of valid measurement for ODRs. Thus, the 
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measure presented in this chapter provides a tool that enables applied empirical 
research. Furthermore, except that future research can test the immediate relationship 
between ODRs and other organizational variables, studies can also identify other 
potential mediating or moderating roles ODRs play.   
 
4.7 Conclusions   
 
As future research recommendation outlines, there is a need to expand the current 
understanding of ODRs.  This newly developed scale of ODRs provides the 
researcher an opportunity to empirically test the theoretically proposed relationships 
in Chapter 2 via two empirical studies.  One tests the effect of ODRs on relationship 
between organizational characteristics and organizational learning and is presented in 
the next chapter.  The other tests the effect of ODRs on the relationship between 
individuals’ personality traits and organizational learning and is presented in Chapter 
6.  
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CHAPTER FIVE: ODRs , Organizational Factor and Organizational Learning
7
 
 
 Previous chapters have already pointed out that organizational learning is 
fundamentally important for organizations to stay competitive in the current dynamic 
environment.  However, organizations regardless age, size and structure often failed 
to reach their learning goals.  The literature reviewed in Chapter 2 shows that ODRs 
could be one reason to explain this outcome.  The researcher applies the newly 
developed scale of ODRs in this chapter to test whether organizational level ODRs 
moderate the relationship between organizational characteristics such as size, age 
and structure and organizational learning. 
 
 
  
                                                 
7 A paper based on this chapter has been presented at the Academy of Management 
2016 Annual Conference.  
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5.1 Introduction  
 
As already noted in Chapter 2, organizational learning has attracted abundant 
interests from academics and practitioners (e.g. Argote & Miron-Spektor, 2011; 
Cohen, 1991; Easterby-Smith, Snell &  Gherardi, 1998).  However, most studies on 
organizational learning focus on conceptualizing learning and defining components 
of organizational learning (e.g. Huber, 1991; March, 1991; Miner and Mezias, 1996).  
Researchers approached learning from different disciplines (Easterby-Smith et al., 
1998) (see Chapter 2, p.40 ).  The core of most definitions is that learning can elicit 
potential change in cognition and behavior (e.g. Argote & Miron-Spektor, 2011; 
Huber, 1991). However, identifying the determinants of organizational learning 
(Martínez-León & Martínez-García, 2011) has been neglected even though some of 
their effects have been theoretically isolated.  Chapter 2 has posited that 
organizational structures seem to play a crucial role in shaping organizational 
learning.  Nevertheless, very limited empirical research has been carried out to 
explore this important theoretical insight.    
Additionally, size and age are also assumed to be important determinants of 
organizational learning. Organizational size reflects organizational resources in that 
larger firms tend to dispose of wider cash flows, better trained human resources, and 
can afford to take more risks than small firms (Rogers, 2004). These resources could 
facilitate learning. Organizational age reflects experience and this is the foundation 
of learning (Levitt and March, 1988). However, existing research on organizational 
age and size failed to produce consistent results as to whether age and size have 
negative or positive effects on organizational functioning (e.g. Camisón-Zornoza, 
Lapiedra-Alcamí, Segarra-Ciprés, & Boronat-Navarro, 2004; Rogers, 2004; 
Sorensen & Stuart, 2000). Empirically identifying the relationships between these 
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variables (structure, size and age) and organizational learning can shed light on how 
managers can enhance their organization’s learning capabilities.   
As Chapter 2 suggests, ODRs are one reason why some organizations fail to learn 
despite having appropriate structures and resources, the researcher would like now to 
reflect again on some characteristics of ODRs so that the effect of ODRs can be 
better understood. ODRs distort the validity of information and cover up issues 
resulting in anti-learning attitudes (Wilson, 2001).  Research suggests that learning 
depends on the level of ODRs (Noonan, 2007).  When ODRs are strong, people in 
organizations tend to maintain a status quo and avoid taking risks to change their 
current way of work (Argyris, 1990).  This bypassing and avoidable routine behavior 
constitutes an obstacle to organizational learning.   
 The purpose of this study is to test the relationships between organizational learning 
and organizational structure, age and size under the presence of ODRs.  Drawing on 
the theoretical effect of ODRs, the researcher argues that ODRs have a negative 
impact in moderating the relationship between organizational learning and the 
aforementioned organizational factors (i.e. structure, age and size).  
The study in this chapter makes three contributions to the literature. First, the 
researcher extends the literature on ODRs. This study produces new empirical 
evidence which helps us to refine and challenge current thinking on ODRs and 
organizational learning.  This study considers ODRs as a potential moderator which 
brings organizational factors such as structure, size and age into the discussion.  
Second, the results have implications for practitioners who wish to enhance the 
learning capabilities of their organizations. Most importantly, organizations need to 
have a culture that encourages people to openly discuss negative issues to avoid 
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embarrassment and threat.  Finally, to the researcher’s knowledge, no previous study 
has simultaneously examined the relationship of organizational size, age and 
structure and ODRs in the context of organizational learning. 
5.2 Literature Review and Hypotheses 
 
This section develops hypotheses on the relationships between variables, which 
Chapter 2 has theoretically proposed.  Certain points made earlier in Chapter 2 are 
raised again for two reasons. First, these arguments are the ground from which more 
refined arguments can be built in relation to the dimensions of the ODRs scale.  
Second, it helps to increase the readability of this specific chapter.   
 
5.2.1 Organizational learning 
 
Chapter 2 outlined the meaning of organizational learning, the three perspectives of 
organizational learning and the levels of organizational learning.  This chapter adopts 
a traditional cognitive perspective which treats organizational learning as an 
information process and helps with the operationalization of the concept.   
The diverse ways of interpreting organizational learning creates a challenge to 
generalize the results and select the “appropriate” method - qualitative, quantitative, 
or both - that the study should adopt in studying organizational learning (Miner & 
Mezias, 1996).  Over the past decade, one of the models that has been empirically 
tested frequently is Huber's (1991) perspective (e.g. Jiménez-Jiménez & Sanz-Valle, 
2011; Pérez López, Peón, & Ordás, 2005; Pérez López, Peón, & Ordás, 2004). The 
model also maintains a broad view of organizational learning that is capable of 
capturing the multifaceted characteristics and inter-linked processes across levels.  
Huber (1991) approaches learning from a cognitive perspective and suggests that an 
organization learns “through its processing of information” and, for this reason, “the 
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range of its potential behaviors has changed” (Huber, 1991, p.89).   Huber perceived 
organizational learning as an information generating process that happens among 
individuals, groups and organizations as a whole.  Four components are used to 
describe the learning process: knowledge acquisition, information distribution, 
information interpretation and organizational memory.   
Knowledge acquisition is the first step towards organizational learning.  In order to 
serve organizational development needs knowledge needs to be acquired.  Sources of 
knowledge can come from inside and outside the organization. For example, 
internally, some of the knowledge is inherited from those already working in the 
organization at the time of the assessment.  Additionally, some knowledge can be 
created by research and development and some knowledge is accumulated from 
experience during the organizational production process (Huber, 1991).  One 
example for gaining knowledge externally is to hire new employees with the 
knowledge in demand. Knowledge can also be acquired through mergers and 
acquisitions.  More recent views on learning based on cognition consider these clear-
cut distinctions is challenging to divide when explaining how knowledge works in 
practice (Clark, 2008).  In fact, any distinction between internal and external is 
arbitrary and the knowledge acquisition process is more a cognitive exchange where 
internal and external resources ‘interplay’ (e.g. Clark & Chalmers, 1998). Despite the 
way ‘acquisition’ is intended, this aspect can be considered a key of learning. 
 
Information distribution concerns how to spread information among individuals and 
departments in organizations. Information distribution leads to “more broadly based 
organizational learning” (Huber, 1991, p. 101).  Good information dissemination 
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among departments helps organizational members to understand needs of other 
departments (Huber, 1991). It also improves organizational efficiency when projects 
require coordination among multiple departments (Hansen, 2002).  Tacit and explicit 
knowledge has been reviewed extensively in the literature of knowledge 
management (Matzler et al., 2011a).  Explicit knowledge is about rules and 
procedures that can be documented in organizations to guide employees’ behavior. 
This kind of knowledge is easily replicated and distributed in organizations. 
However, according to the proponents of this approach, the majority of the 
organizations’ knowledge is ‘stored’ in individuals’ heads and it is tacit (Kim, 1993). 
Tacit knowledge is challenging for organizations because it is difficult to locate its 
source and to initiate knowledge sharing.  This is because, in a very traditional view 
based on neoclassic economics, people who share knowledge could face the risk of 
losing their competitive advantage over other people (Borges, 2013).  Instead, a more 
prosocial view of individual knowledge sharing can be based on a more distributed 
or systemic view of cognition (e.g. Hutchins, 1995).  Individuals in an organization 
share ‘information’ because they treat each other and the external artifacts as external 
cognitive resources (Hutchins, 1995). This leads them to behave prosocially when 
leaning on each other’s information; in short cooperation and altruistic behavior are 
more likely to emerge (Secchi, 2011) provided the appropriate cognitive abilities 
develop (Hutchins, 2014). 
 
Information interpretation concerns people in organizations giving one or more 
commonly understood meanings to information.  Reaching a certain extent of 
common interpretation on information is necessary for organizations to make the 
right strategic decisions (Sinkula, Baker, & Noordewier, 1997) and achieve efficient 
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cooperation between departments (Huber, 1991).  Knowledge interpretation mostly 
depends on a series of factors in between organizational and individual 
characteristics. An example of how interpretation of ideas, thinking, behavior, 
practices, processes or anything else occurs is given by studies of intra-
organizational diffusion processes. These studies point out how organizational 
routines, culture, peer social identity, individual attitudes and cognition are 
particularly relevant for information interpretation to emerge (e.g. Abrahamson & 
Rosenkopf, 1997; Fiol & O’Connor, 2003; Secchi & Gullekson, 2015).  
 
Organizational memory is about retaining information in organizations in forms of 
standard operating procedures, structural artefacts and mental models (Walsh & 
Ungson, 1991).  Not all memory is explicit; instead, some memory is covert, tacit, 
and difficult to observe (Becker, 2004).  This nature of being unobservable creates 
difficulties to interpret information (Sinkula et al., 1997).  The effect of 
organizational memory can be understood from two dimensions.  On the one hand, it 
increases organizational efficiency by automatically retrieving past successful 
experience and conducting behavior repetitively when a known situation triggers a 
standard response.  Routines as organizational memory have been studied 
substantially and are credited as a source of stability and change (e.g. Nelson & 
Winter, 1982; Feldman, 2000; Feldman and Pentland, 2008). On the other hand, 
organizational memories are often ‘condemned’ as being an enemy to organizational 
development, especially when routines become incompatible with a changed 
environment (Walsh & Ungson, 1991) or like organizational defensive routines, 
become regular behavior to avoid organizational issues which may elicit 
embarrassment and threat. This avoidance behavior is considered to have negative 
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effects on organizational learning (Argyirs, 1990). 
5.2.2 Integrating ODRs at organizational level and individual level  
 
Though Chapter 2 has discussed the characteristics of ODRs, this section highlights 
some of these characteristics again in order to remind the logic of these hypotheses. 
This section also explains how ODRs at individual level integrate to ODRs at 
organizational level and how ODRs at these two levels reinforce each other.   
Chapter 2 have comprehensively generalized the determinant elements of ODRs 
from four facets including social influences at young age, organizational context, 
individuals’ tolerance on embarrassment and individuals’ cognitive rigidity. All of 
these elements together indicate that ODRs are a product of individuals and 
organizations.  Individuals in organizations mindlessly follow four governing 
principles (see Chapter 2, p. 35) and automatically adopt skills to avoid 
embarrassment and threat.  As a result, individuals’ defensive routines become 
prevalent resulting in organizational defensive routines (Riley & Cudney, 2015).  
Therefore, Argyris, (1996) argued that individual defensiveness is the origin of 
ODRs, but ODRs are like a fertilizer nurturing individual defensiveness and making 
it more acceptable in organizations.   
Employees’ assumptions on managers are shaped by the organizational culture, or 
their assumptions are a generalization from their previous experience in the 
organization.  Their defensiveness is not accounted for individual’s personality, but a 
symptom of regular solutions to handle negative issues. For example, researchers 
found that fewer than 15% of executives appreciate receiving contradictory advice 
(Taylor & Bright, 2011).  Other executives are more likely to become defensive 
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towards negative feedback. Management’s unwillingness to open communication 
about negative issues encourages employees to cover up their genuine opinions about 
the causes of the issues since raising negative issues to managers could cause 
embarrassment to them or be a threat to their position in the company.  Hence, both 
managers and employees lose opportunities to discuss solutions to deal with the 
issues in time. This double-bound between managers and employees creates a self-
reinforcing loop suppressing communication either top-down or bottom-up, enabling 
cover-ups, conflict avoidance, and embarrassment-free climates. Consequently, 
organizations with defensive routines are like a beautiful apple with rotten parts 
growing inside – problems aggravate without notice.   
5.2.3 Organizational structure  
 
Centralization refers to whether the locus of decision making power is dispersed 
throughout the organization or limited to the top management team (Dalton and 
Tudor, 1980).  Chapter 2 mostly discussed the relationship between centralization 
and organizational learning from a perspective of employees’ involvement in 
decision-making.  This section focuses more on how centralization affects some 
components of organizational learning, such as knowledge sharing and knowledge 
acquisition.  Organizations with a less centralized structure instill more social 
interaction resulting in higher levels of knowledge sharing (Chen & Huang, 2007). 
Bisel, Messersmith, and Kelley (2012) argued that command structures in 
organizations could cause incompetent communication between supervisors and 
subordinates resulting in organizational ignorance on organizational problems.  
Frost, Osterloh, and Weibel (2010) used the example of American Airlines dealing 
with flight delays to illustrate that organizational hierarchical control creates a 
‘culture of fear.’  This results in individuals in organizations directing blame to other 
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people instead of learning from failures.  Therefore, too much control caused by 
centralized organizational decision making can negatively affect knowledge sharing 
of organizational learning.  Additionally, high centralization can force decisions into 
actions by bureaucratic power.  This reduces employees’ motivation to interact with 
other people and rationalize decisions through discussion (Miller, 1987).   
In contrast, decentralization encourages coordination among team members, when 
decisions have to be made by persuading other members to understand the logic of 
ideas instead of passively transfer ideas down.  Low centralization results in better 
information sharing and communication (Willem & Buelens, 2009).  With wide 
resources of information and diverse views on problems, organizations can minimize 
irrationality of decision-making and enlarge the possibility of identifying core errors.  
Willem and Buelens (2009) found that decentralization is significantly and positively 
related to knowledge sharing.   
High centralization gives executives a lot of power to rights and authority of 
decision-making.  This can widen the social distance between executives and regular 
employees. As regular employees’ task is to execute the decisions instead of 
participating in decision-making, valid information that employees collect from work 
processes might be missed result in poor knowledge acquisition of organizational 
learning.  Consequently, organizations miss learning opportunities.  Hence, high 
centralization is often negatively related to organizational performance, knowledge 
management, and innovation both theoretically and empirically (Damanpour, 1991; 
Pertusa-Ortega, Zaragoza-Sáez, & Claver-Cortés, 2010). Hence, the researcher 
hypothesizes: 
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Hypothesis 1a: A centralized organizational structure is negatively related to 
organizational learning.   
Centralized organizational structures do not encourage interactions between 
supervisors and their subordinates (Damanpour, 1991). Therefore, subordinates tend 
not to share their opinions on problem solving.  This structure would make 
employees assume that opposing ideas are not welcomed, and they will be treated as 
“evil” among the group if they put unconventional ideas forward. Without open 
discussion of the problem, organizations cannot develop a realistic and 
implementable learning plan. Organizations with decentralized structures are more 
likely to have better communication toward problems than command structure.  Top 
management teams can examine problems taking holistic perspectives via effective 
discussion with other members, which results in identifying the root causes and 
develops fundamental systemic solutions to changes (Beer & Eisenstat, 1996; 
Siggelkow & Levinthal, 2005).  If ODRs exist in centralized organizations, they 
would aggravate the already limited information flow between different hierarchical 
levels. If ODRs emerge in decentralized organizations, they would interfere with the 
healthy feedback channel.  This is because ODRs have the feature of giving mixed 
messages. When this happens, more useful information will take more time to 
emerge from the deceived conversation between members.   
 
Hypothesis 1b: Organizational defensive routines moderate the negative relation 
between organizational learning and centralized organizational structure, such that 
the relationship is stronger when organizations have high organizational defensive 
routines. 
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Formalization. Chapter 2 mostly focuses on the effect of rigid rules and routines on 
organizational learning.  This section discusses how formalization affects four 
components of organizational learning such as knowledge creation and knowledge 
sharing.  Low formalization gives employees’ flexibility to experiment with new 
ways of completing tasks instead of following rules (Damanpour, 1991).  Testing 
alternative ways provides more opportunities to identify errors in old rules or 
procedures.  Consequently, low formalization benefits knowledge creation (Wang & 
Ahmed, 2003).  High formalization reinforces routine behavior by established 
organizational rules.  This could diminish the employees’ drive to initiate new 
knowledge or to share information (Fredrickson, 1986).  Under highly-formalized 
structures, changes will most likely be minor adjustments around existing rules 
(Fredrickson, 1986). If organizations are in a turbulent market, quick and effective 
interdepartmental communication with a flexible and less formalized structure is 
more suitable (Burns & Stalker, 1961).  It reinforces established knowledge in 
organizations but also restricts people creating knowledge which is crucial for 
organizational learning (Willem & Buelens, 2009).  Therefore, formalization has 
been empirically and theoretically argued to be negatively related to knowledge 
management (Chen & Huang, 2006).  This negative relation hinders the development 
of organizational learning (Martínez-León & Martínez-García, 2011). However, 
certain advantages of formalization should not be neglected.  For example, it can be 
assimilated to routines and serve as reservoir of organizational knowledge (i.e., 
memory; Feldman & Pentland, 2003).  To some extent, formalization provides 
sources of basic learning in organizations.  Nonetheless, rules and procedures tend to 
become obsolete over time due to the constantly changing environment. Thus, the 
researcher hypothesizes: 
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Hypothesis 2a: A formalized structure in organizations is negatively related to 
organizational learning. 
Whilst organizational defensive routines are prevalent in most organizations, people 
prone to rigidly follow rules and procedures in order to avoid being blamed for 
mistakes (Ashforth & Lee, 1990).  Rule designers in organizations with ODRs also 
prefer to compose red-tape to serve their own interest in order to stay in control 
(Argyris, 1990).  This will strengthen the negative effect of formalization on 
organizational learning, as people in formalized organizations restrict their behavior 
to rules and procedures rather than flexibly adjusting their behavior in accordance to 
situational needs. Thus the researcher hypothesizes: 
Hypothesis2b: Organizational defensive routines moderate the negative relation 
between organizational learning and formalized organizational structure such that 
the relationship is stronger when organizations have high organizational defensive 
routines. 
5.2.4 Size effects 
 
The importance of organizational size for organizational learning can be understood 
from two perspectives.  The first perspective is that size is closely related to 
organizational routines, and these (organizational memory) are part of organizational 
learning (Pérez López et al. 2004).  According to Mintzberg (1983), employees’ 
behavior in large organizations is guided by more rules and procedures than small 
organizations. Therefore, large organizations are good at storing and 
institutionalizing knowledge through rules and procedures.  However, Chapter two 
indicated that large organizations also tend to have more red tapes and rigid 
structures which could impede organizations making changes.  
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The second perspective is from a resource point of view which has been lightly 
discussed in Chapter 2. Here the researcher expands the discussion about the effect 
of size on organizational learning.  Large organizations normally have more 
disposable resources to facilitate the development of new ideas than small 
organizations (Hurley & Hult, 1998). The advantage of possessing ample resources 
benefits large organizations when recruiting well-trained employees with the specific 
knowledge and skills organizations need for new knowledge development.  
Additionally, large investments in advanced technologies facilitate learning 
(Damanpour, 1992).  However, it is worth noting that small organizations normally 
employ flat structures that create better environments for informal communication 
and shared experiences (Mintzberg, 1983). Since small organizations have the 
flexibility to adapt; this flexibility also gives larger leeway of maneuvering so that 
change and learning can occur. Instead, large organizations, with their set of rules 
and bureaucracy also can learn, but their learning is more institutionalized and more 
likely to be relatively minor.  So, the line of argument is that SMEs are good at non-
repetitive and change-based learning while large firms are good at routine-based 
learning. The former is more apparent than the latter because it happens outside of 
organizational structures; it is more likely to be unexpected. Hence the researcher 
hypothesizes: 
Hypothesis 3a: Size is negatively related to organizational learning. 
Companies being small have advantages in conducting informal communication and 
dispersing knowledge efficiently, but the existence of organizational defensive 
routines makes people feel uncomfortable at discussing negative information (Yau & 
Cheng, 2011).  Negative information is often dispersed in an ambiguous way in order 
to avoid conflict with people who are involved. Hence, organizational defensive 
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routines weaken the advantage small organizations have over large organizations 
when communication is considered. When defensive routines exist in large 
organizations, people tend to maintain a status quo instead of making use of 
abundant resources to explore learning opportunities.  This is because learning is a 
process of identifying and correcting errors. Organizations with defensive routines 
tend to have less error tolerant cultures and make people believe finding errors in the 
work could embarrass other people.  Hence, the researcher hypothesizes: 
Hypothesis 3b:  Organizational defensive routines moderate the negative relation 
between organizational learning and size, such that the relationship is stronger when 
organizations have high organizational defensive routines. 
 
5.2.4 Age effects 
 
Chapter 2 has argued that there might be an effect of age on organizational learning. 
Starting from there this section refines the argument in a way that enables the 
researcher to derive a clear cut hypothesis.  Old organizations surviving from long 
time competition in the market have accumulated vast previous experiences to face 
volatile markets.  The same reason that confers competitive advantage for old 
organization can instill organizational inertia and impede organizational learning.  
Experience is coded into organizational routines and becomes a part of 
organizational repertoire (Cohen, 1991).  Stored experience becomes automatic and a 
mindless reaction to familiar situational stimuli.  This results in employees trying to 
improve their efficiency in dealing with similar problems, but fails in recognizing an 
already changed environment (Gersick & Hackman, 1990).  Successful experience 
emerges from failures and investment, so it is a cost for organizations to abandon 
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already well-established routines to experiment with uncertain solutions.  Employees 
also feel psychologically insecure towards new routines, because “novelty can lead 
to anxiety and loss of security” (Feldman & Pentland, 2003, p. 98).  It might be more 
challenging for people in old organizations to change their behavior radically.  
Hypothesis 4a. The age of organizations is negatively related to organizational 
learning 
 
One advantage of being an old organization is having more experience to deal with 
unpredictable situations (Thornhill & Amit, 2003).  However, experience needs to be 
adjusted to suit current situations.  If organizational defensive routines exist in old 
organizations, questioning the old successful experience could be perceived as a 
danger which causes embarrassment to people who generalized the experience.  
Because of the fear of challenging the old way of doing things, individuals tend to 
stay in their comfort-zone and cover up information which could trigger changes. 
Hence the researcher stipulates a hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 4b: Organizational defensive routines moderate the relation between age 
of organizations and organizational learning, increasing the negative impact that the 
former has on the latter. 
5.3 Method 
 
5.3.1 Data and sample 
 
The researcher combined the survey for scale development of ODRs with the 
survey of testing hypotheses.  The total number of respondents is 440 employees 
working in the UK from a broad variety of industries.  All respondents have been 
working with their employer for more than one year.  This was required because 
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people with less than one-year experience may not be familiar with organizational 
learning strategies.  The restriction on respondents’ tenure improves the validity of 
information in the data.  
 
The study adopts two methods recommended by Podsakoff et al. (2003) to reduce 
common method bias. First, the order of questions is randomized through the settings 
of the survey software. Second, the items measuring dependent variables are placed 
at a different page from items measuring independent variables. This could reduce 
priming effect.  Additionally, researcher adopted Harman’s method of testing 
common method bias by forcing all the predictors and outcome variables to load on 
one factor (Harman, 1967).  The result shows that one factor only explains 26.31% 
of total variance (64.19). Statistically this suggests that common method bias is not a 
concern for the study.  
 
After deleting unengaged respondents and outliers, the usable data contains N = 358 
observations. The study had slightly more male respondents than female (51.4% vs. 
48.6%).  The majority of respondents work full time (79%).  41.3% of respondents 
work in the public sector, and 52% of them work in the private sector.  Only 6.7% of 
them work in non-profit sector.  The average age was 38, and its standard deviation 
is 11.66.  Missing values only take 0.18% of our data and they did not display a 
systematic pattern.  Hence the researcher imputed the data and replaced the missing 
values with mean of the respective variables. (means for the different variables are: 
ODR14 = 4.5; EMBA 5 = 3.7; RG 4 = 3.8; KA 3 = 4.7; OM 2= 4.9; Centralization 1 
= 4.7.) 
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5.3.2 Measures 
 
5.3.2.1 Dependent variables 
 
Organizational learning. There are very few available scales for measuring 
organizational learning.  This study used the scale developed by Pérez López et al. 
(2004) and applied by Jiménez-Jiménez and Sanz-Valle (2011) and Pérez López, 
Manuel Montes Peón, and José Vazquez Ordás (2005).  Thirteen items measure 
organizational learning on a 7-point point scale.  Three items each for knowledge 
acquisition, knowledge distribution and knowledge interpretation.  Four items are for 
organizational memory.   The overall scale has a reliability of alpha = 0.91.  
Knowledge acquisition is measured by three items Knowledge distribution is 
measured by three items, knowledge interpretation, organizational memory is 
measured by four items. 
5.3.2.2 Independent variables 
 
Organizational structure. Centralization and formalization are measured by Ferrell 
and Skinner's (1988) scale.  Participants indicate their perceptions on a 7-point scale. 
The higher the value selected, the more their organizations are centralized or 
formalized.  Centralization is measured by five items with Cronbach alpha of 0.88.  
Formalization is originally measured by six items, but the scale for this study results 
in a very low Cronbach alpha.  After deleting the items contributing to low 
reliability, the scale is reduced to two items with Cronbach alpha 0.63. While this is 
not an ideal measure, low alphas appear to be common with the formalization scale 
(see John, 1984). Thus, the researcher decided to take the measure forward to the 
analyses.  “Many major decision that I make has to have this company’s approval” 
and “my dealings with this company, even quite small matters have to be referred to 
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someone higher up for a final answer” are representative items for centralization.  
“There are many things in my business that are not covered by some formal 
procedure for doing it” and “I ignore the rules and reach informal agreements to 
handle some situations” are representative items for formalization. 
Organizational age. The number of years since organizations are in operation is 
often used to measure organizational age (e.g. Sorensen & Stuart, 2000).  
Respondents indicated the age of their organizations from six groups, namely 0-1; 2-
5; 6-10; 11-20; 21-50 and more than 50.   
Organizational size. The number of employees in organizations is often used to 
measure organizational size (Camisón-Zornoza et al., 2004).  The researcher used the 
following answer options for size: up to 10 (micro company, coded ‘1’); 11-50 
(small company, ‘2’); 51-500 (Medium company, ‘3’) and more than 500 (large 
company, ‘4’). A preliminary analysis showed no significant difference in treating 
this variable as a continuum or categorical. Hence, the researcher here treats the 
variables as categorical variable and creates dummy variables.  
Organizational defensive routines the researcher used the scale developed in Chapter 
4. The construct is measured by two sub-factors.  First, organizational cover-up 
measured with four items (Cronbach alpha=0.76) and second, organizational 
pretense measured with four items (Cronbach alpha=0.80).  Cronbach alpha for the 
aggregated organizational defensive routines scale is 0.76. Exam items are “when 
things go wrong in my organization, nobody stands up to take responsibility” for 
measuring organizational cover-up; and the item “most of the time the major 
decisions in my organization are already made before a meeting actually takes place” 
measuring organizational pretense.  
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5.3.2.3 Control variables 
 
Previous studies show that job level, job status and organizational tenure could affect 
people’s perception of organizational learning (Yau & Cheng, 2010). Therefore, this 
study controlled for these variables using a dummy variable for job status (1 = full-
time). Additionally, categorical indicators were used for job level (1 = general 
employees; 2 = supervisory; 3 = middle manager; 4 = senior manager; 5 = 
executive), and tenure (1= less than a year; 2 = 1-2 years; 3 = 3-5 years; 4 = 6-10 
years; 5 = 11-15 years; 6 = 16-20 years; 7 = more than 20 years). Ultimately the 
researcher controlled for sector affiliation, i.e., public, private and non-profit.  
5.4 Results 
 
5.4.1 Descriptive statistics 
 
Table 12 displays the means, standard deviations, and correlations of the variables.  
According to these results centralization is strongly, negatively correlated with 
formalization (r = -0.62, p < 0.01).  Formalization is negatively correlated with 
organizational learning (r = -0.23, p < 0.01). Organizational defensive routines are 
negatively associated with organizational learning (r = -0.39, p < 0.01).  
Organizational defensive routines are positively correlated with centralization (r 
=0.41, p < 0.01), but negatively correlated with formalization (r =-0.23, p < 0.01).  
Organizational age and size are not correlated with organizational learning, but they 
are negatively correlated with organizational defensive routines, young organization 
(r =-0.14, p <  0.01) and SME (r  =-0.21, p < 0.01) 
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Table 12: Means, standard deviations, and correlations (N=358) 
Note: *p<0.05 **p<0.01; 
 
N=358 (two-tailed test); ODRs= Organizational defensive routines; OL= Organizational learning. 
1.Firm age (<21 years) is coded as “1” ; others are coded as “0”.  2 Firm Size (<500) is coded as “1”; others are coded as “0”. 3 Full time is coded as 
“1”; others are coded as “0”. 4 Tenure (2-5) is coded as “1”; others are coded as “0”. 5 Private companies are coded as “0”. 6 Supervisors is coded 
“1”, others are coded as “0”; Cronbach alpha for the variables are in diagonal.
  Variables Mean S.D. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1 OL 4.68 1.04 0.91          
2 Centralization 4.15 1.38 0.05 0.88         
3 Formalization 3.44 1.3 -0.23** -0.62** 0.63        
4 ODRs 3.99 0.93 -0.39** 0.41** -0.23** 0.76       
5 Young_OG 0.37 0.48 -0.01 -0.1 0.1 -0.14**       
6 Small_OG 0.57 0.5 -0.08 -0.31** 0.33** -0.21** 0.30**      
7 Full time 0.79 0.41 0.04 0.05 -0.02 0.01 0 -0.01     
8 Tenure 0.44 0.5 -0.06 0.04 -0.01 -0.01 0.32** 0.18** -0.09    
9 Public 0.41 0.49 0.03 0.1 -0.16** 0.11* -0.05 -0.18** -0.05 0.06   
10 not for profit 0.07 0.25 0.08 -0.04 0.04 -0.01 -0.07 0.05 -0.08 0.05 -0.23** 
11 general staff 0.5 0.5 -0.04 0.16** -0.05 0.11* -0.06 -0.14** -0.18** 0.06 0.1 0 
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5.4.2 Organizational defensive routines and organizational learning 
 
Table 12 shows that ODRs are negatively and significantly related to organizational 
learning (r = -0.39, p < 0.01).  This provides preliminary support for the claim that 
ODRs are detrimental to learning. A correlation analysis also reveals the association 
between ODRs and sub-factors of organizational learning.  ODRs are negatively and 
significantly associated with the four sub-factors: knowledge acquisition (r = -0.38, p 
<0.01), knowledge distribution (r = -0.21, p <0.01), knowledge interpretation (r = -
0.47, p <0.01), organizational memory (r =-0.31, p <0.01). Among these four sub-
factors, ODRs have the highest correlation with knowledge interpretation.  
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5.4.3 Testing the hypotheses 
 
The researcher used multiple regression analysis to examine the relationships 
between variables. ODRs and variables for centralization and formalization are 
centered.  The researcher uses VIF to check for multicollinearity.  VIF measures the 
extent to which collinearity among the predictors affects the precision of a regression 
model. The literature suggested that VIF scores less than 10 are considered 
acceptable (Hair et al. 2010, Field 2013). The average VIF of this study is 1.85 and 
the single highest VIF is 2.64.  Therefore, the study does not have multicollinearity 
issues.  
Table 13 displays the main results. Model 1 includes all the control variables. The 
result shows that none of the control variables has a statistically significant influence 
on organizational learning and, in fact, the regression model shows a poor fit.  The 
result shows that most of the control variables has no statistically significant 
influence on organizational learning apart from not for profit organizations (p < 0.1). 
and, in fact, the regression model shows a poor fit.   One possible reason why 
employees with part-time or full-time have no different impact on organizational 
learning is that organizations may provide the same learning opportunities to both 
groups, such as training and sharing information.   In terms of tenure, the sample 
only included employees who have been working in their current organizations more 
than one year.  This restriction at sampling was to improve reliability of respondents’ 
knowledge at organizational learning.  However, employees after a year working at 
organizations tend to be assimilated with organizational culture and get familiar with 
organizational routine practice. This may contribute to the result that tenure did not 
have significant influence on organizational learning.  Regarding to job positons, as 
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most senior managers at the sample from organizations with less than 50 employees.  
Due to the small size of organizations, information can be easier to equal 
dissimilated in organizations compared with larger organizations.   Model 2 adds the 
core predictors (centralization, formalization, firm size and age).  Results show that 
centralization ( = -0.11, p = 0.03) and formalization (= -0.26, p < 0.001) 
negatively and significantly predict organizational learning.  These findings support 
Hypothesis 1a and Hypothesis 2a.  Organizational age and size do not have a 
statistical effect on organizational learning leading us to reject Hypothesis 3a and 
Hypothesis 4a.   
Model 3 adds ODRs. The result shows that formalization remains negatively and 
significantly associated with organizational learning, but centralization ( = 0.05, p = 
0.18) becomes non-significant toward organizational learning. Model 3 also reveals 
that ODRs have a negative and significant direct relation with organizational 
learning ( = -0.66, p <0.001). The adjusted R2 increases from 0.06 in model 2 to 
0.13 in model 3.  The F-value also increases from 3.52 to 6.62, which shows that 
goodness of fit of these two models is statistically significant.  Hence, ODRs make 
the largest contribution to predicting organizational learning compared to other 
variables in the model.  Organizational age and size remain non-significant.  
Model 4 investigates whether the association between the main predictors 
(centralization, formalization, age, and size) and organizational learning depends on 
the extent of organizational defensive routines.  Aguinis’s (2004) method of 
analyzing moderation effect is adopted in this study. The study dichotomized 
organizational defensive routines and defined the upper 25% of their values as high 
level.  The researcher centered centralization and formalization. Then the researcher 
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computed ODRs-by-centralization, ODRs-by-formalization, ODRs-by-
organizational size and ODRs-by-organizational age are added as new variables in 
Model 4.   The results of Model 4 indicate that ODRs moderate the relationship 
between formalization and organizational learning, with   = -0.24, p=0.03. R2 
slightly increases to 0.18 from 0.16. Therefore, Hypothesis 2b is supported, but 1b, 
3b and 4b are not supported in this study.  
Figure 7 displays the simple slopes for the relationship between formalization and 
organizational learning at low levels and high levels of ODRs. The slope shows that 
when defensive routines are high, organization learning declines.  
 
170 
 
Table 13: Multiple regression analysis (N=358) 
DV=OL Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
  Coeff. Std.Error    p Coeff. Std.Error      p Coeff. Std.Error      p Coeff. Std.Error     p 
(Constant) 4.61 0.16 0.00** 5.99 0.38 0.00** 6.05 0.37 0.00** 5.62 0.44 0.00** 
Full time 0.11 0.14 0.42 0.11 0.13 0.43 0.07 0.13 0.58 0.1 0.13 0.44 
Tenure -0.12 0.11 0.28 -0.13 0.12 0.26 -0.16 0.11 0.16 -0.15 0.11 0.17 
Not for profit 0.42 0.23 0.07* 0.42 0.22 0.06 0.5 0.21 0.02 0.53 0.22 0.02 
Public 0.13 0.12 0.27 0.05 0.12 0.68 0.08 0.11 0.46 0.1 0.11 0.37 
General staff -0.08 0.11 0.5 -0.06 0.11 0.61 -0.06 0.11 0.61 -0.04 0.11 0.74 
Firm Age    0.08 0.12 0.5 0.03 0.12 0.79 0.01 0.13 0.96 
Firm Size    -0.06 0.12 0.61 -0.07 0.12 0.55 -0.05 0.14 0.7 
Centralization    -0.11 0.05 0.03* -0.07 0.05 0.18 -0.04 0.06 0.5 
Formalization    -0.26 0.05 0.00* -0.26 0.05 0.00** -0.18 0.06 0.00** 
ODR       -0.66 0.12 0.00** 0.24 0.76 0.75 
ODR*centralization          -0.03 0.12 0.77 
ODR *formalization          -0.24 0.11 0.03* 
ODR *firm age          0.1 0.27 0.71 
ODR *firm size          -0.02 0.26 0.96 
R
2 0.02 0.06 0.16 0.18 
Adjusted R
2 0 0.06 0.13 0.14 
F F(5), 1.17; p=0.33 F(9), 3.52; p<0.001 F(10), 6.62; p<0.001 F(14), 5.20; p<0.001 
1.Note: *p<0.05; **P<0.01; DV: Organizational Learning; Control variables: Firm age (<21 years) is coded as “1”; others are coded as “0”.   Firm Size (<500) is 
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coded as “1”; others are coded as “0”. Full time is coded as “1”; others are coded as “0”. Tenure (2-5) is coded as “1”; others are coded as “0”. Private companies 
are coded as “0”. General staff is coded “1”, others are coded as 
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Figure 7: Regression slopes for organizational defensive routines 
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5.5 Discussion, Implication and Conclusion 
 
This section provides discuss of the findings and implications to academics and 
practitioners while a more general discussion appears in Chapter 7. It ends with 
concluding remarks.  
 
5.5.1 Discussion  
 
One purpose of the study is to test the moderating effect of ODRs on the relationship 
between organizational factors (centralization, formalization, size and age) and 
organizational learning.  The results of the data analyses only show that ODRs 
negatively moderate the relationship between formalization and organizational 
learning. 
First, the existing literature on defensive routines posited that they are a barrier to 
organizational learning (e.g. Noonan, 2007; Tranfield et al., 2000).  However, this 
proposition is rarely tested empirically.  The results show that ODRs are negatively 
associated with organizational learning.  This finding is consistent with the current 
literature, and it empirically confirms that defensive routines are a barrier for 
organizational learning.   
Second, the findings of this study also show that ODRs are negatively correlated 
with all the four sub-factors of organizational learning.  This means that their 
existence reduces employees’ desire for knowledge acquisition and distribution.  
People in an organization with high levels of defensive routines are likely to 
maintain the status quo in order to avoid risks.  Hence, they tend to advocate their 
own opinion rather than acquiring new ideas from other people (Noonan, 2007). 
Holding information which could evoke change in the current way of doing things 
becomes a strategy for people performing organizational defensive routines to stay in 
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control (Argyris, 1990).  
Among these four sub-factors, ODRs have the highest correlation with knowledge 
interpretation in a negative direction (r =-0.47, p <0.01).  This highly negative 
correlation could be explained by the manifestation of ODRs in the form of mixed 
messages (Argyris, 1990; Noonan, 2007).  Mixed messages are defined as being 
inconsistent, undiscussable, ambiguous (Wilson, 2001).  When this kind of message 
is adopted to convey the issues causing embarrassment or threat, message receivers 
could interpret the information incorrectly.  Subsequently, it can result in poor 
organizational memory.  
The findings suggest that formalization is negatively associated with organizational 
learning. This confirms our Hypothesis 2a.  High formalization hinders 
organizational learning because formalization constrains people to make decisions 
based on rules and procedures instead of being based on situations (Child, 1972).  
Highly formalized organizations could increase efficiency and reduce cost in terms 
of meeting organizations’ standards and deadlines, but this does not allow for any 
slack for organizations to reflect on their procedures and come out with creative 
ideas for (radical) changes (Lavie, Stettner & Tushman, 2010).   
Third, the findings also show a non-significant relationship between organizational 
age and organizational learning.  The theory section highlighted that age goes along 
with experience which is beneficial for organizational learning.  In general, old 
organizations often have more knowledge of their market environment.  However, 
their regular usage of the experience can disguise their ability to see the difference 
between organizational competence and environmental needs (Sorensen & Stuart, 
2000).  Therefore, old organizations might be better at exploitative learning rather 
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than exploratory learning (March, 1991).  This requires future research to test 
whether the divergent effect of age is caused by the different types of learning.  
Because the data did not show statistical significance between these two factors and 
organizational learning.  Hence, the insignificant moderation effect is a natural result 
of these relationship.  
Forth, the findings of this study suggest that structure has more significant effect on 
organizational learning than age and size.  The reason why it is this case could be 
that structure is detrimental to the control of decision making and autonomy (Grinyer 
& Yasai-Ardekani, 1980), but not age and size.  Structure could also influence the 
way of coordination between employees (Mintzberg, 1983); it also affects the way of 
sharing information (Cohen, 1991). When organizations have a very centralized 
structure, the communication tend to flow from top to bottom, and is likely to be 
formal and regulated in order to generate stability (Sakalas & Venskus, 2007).  This 
could potentially encourage employees at organizations to follow strict rules and 
procedures to protect themselves from contributing to unexpected outcomes.  It also 
discourages employees to discuss mistakes and errors openly at organizations.   
Consequently, this kind of structure can potentially breed ODRs which tend to 
reinforce the centralized and formalized structure.   
Finally, the study did not find statistically support for the moderating effect of ODRs 
on the relationship between centralization and organizational learning.  There are 
three possible explanations of this non-significant relationship.  First, the study used 
samples from different organizations with different levels of ODRs and different 
levels of centralization.  Perhaps the testing of interaction in a specific sample of 
workers could result in a significant interaction effect as they have similar perception 
on the centralization and ODRs.  Second, in most cases, small sample sizes have 
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implication of overestimation of any significant interaction terms (Brogh et al. 2013; 
Aguinis, 2004).  Given sample size of this study (358) is not small, overestimation 
should not be an issue. Therefore, the research can interpret the moderating effect 
with some degree of confidence. Third, time of collecting data could affect 
moderating effect because ODRs are more prevalent when organizations are going 
through changes.  
5.5.2 Implications 
 
The findings of this study contribute to the current literature on both organizational 
learning and organizational defensive routines.  Firstly, this empirical study provides 
support for the theoretical proposition on the importance of organizational structure 
for organizational learning (Dodgson, 1993; Fiol & Lyles, 1985).  A less formalized 
organizational structure facilitates organizational learning.  Secondly, the study 
shows that organizational age and size do not have much effect on organizational 
learning. That means organizational defensive routines negatively affect 
organizational learning regardless of organizational age and size. Thirdly, the present 
study investigates three basic organizational characteristics (structure, age and size) 
with respect to organizational learning.   
This study also has some implications for practitioners. It is important for 
organizations to identify and reduce ODRs, as it can significantly prevent 
organizations from learning regardless of organizational age, size, structure and 
sector. A less formalized structure could encourage employees to communicate the 
issues at hand in accordance with the situations they are facing. By analyzing the 
different information and opinions collected from employees, organizations could 
understand the issues better so that they learn more than organizations with high 
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formalization. Furthermore, this study should sensitize managers for the fact that 
organizational defensive routines can negatively moderate the relationship between 
formalization and organizational learning. One way of reducing these negative 
routines is to have a culture embracing open discussion on issues which could evoke 
embarrassment and threat.  
 
5.5.3 Limitations and future research 
 
At least four limitations of this study should be pointed out.  Firstly, this study 
applied the scale of ODRs at the organizational level.  Literature shows that ODRs at 
the individual level and at the organizational level reinforce each other.  Hence, 
testing the effect of collective ODRs on organizational learning creates incomplete 
understanding of the concept.  Future studies should apply the scale of ODRs at 
individual level to an empirical study and assess their effect on organizational 
learning.  Second, common method bias may affect the results.  However, the 
researcher tried to control this through the survey design following recommendations 
by Podsakoff et al. (2003).  For example, the researcher randomized the construct of 
ODRs with other constructs in the same questionnaire.  The questionnaire is also 
self-administered and answered anonymously. Additionally, Siemsen et al. (2010) 
have shown that common method bias does not affect moderation effects. Hence the 
researcher’s main results hold even under the presence of small CMB.  Third, the 
researcher treated originally continuous variables such as age and size as if they were 
categorical. However, as a robustness check, the researcher compared two methods 
for each variable. First, following common practice the researcher treated the 
variable as quasi continuous variable. Secondly, the researcher categorized the 
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variable into dummy variables based on frequency.  For organizational age, 
organizations operating for less than 21 years are considered young organizations; 
otherwise, they are old organizations.  For organizational size, organizations with 
less than 500 employees are considered as small and medium enterprises (SME), 
otherwise, they are treated as large organizations. The last one is about the way of 
understanding organizational learning.  Huber’s cognition perspective of 
understanding learning procedures is adopted at this study.  Even though the 
researcher appreciate this is a view of cognition that became outdated after the 
distributed/embodied cognitive revolution of the Nineties (e.g., Hutchins, 1995; 
Varela et al., 1992), the researcher deems that isolating these four components is 
useful. Clearly, with Huber’s approach the researcher am only dealing with the 
‘information’ component of learning and cognition.  The researcher acknowledge it 
is not a broad view but it is a starting point. 
This study empirically confirmed the negative effects of ODRs. The theory has 
suggested that centralization could negatively affect organizational learning, but our 
findings could not support this deduction consistently.  Hence, future studies should 
be carried out to understand the relationship between centralization and 
organizational learning.  Future studies could also focus to identify the antecedents 
of organizational defensive routines in order to help organizations reduce them.  Last 
but not least, this study controlled the type of industries in order to control over the 
potential effect of different environmental dynamism.  Public sector organizations 
are often considered to face a more stable environment and require less changes than 
private companies.  Hence, this study only roughly divided industries into public, 
private and non-profit organizations.  However, future studies could have more 
precise categorizations on industries.  For example, a technological company and a 
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consumer food production company both belong to private sectors, but changes in 
technological companies could be more radical and volatile than the food production 
companies.  
 5.5.4 Conclusion  
 
This chapter implemented the scale of ODRs into an empirical study.  The finding of 
this study shows that ODRs moderates the relationship between formalization and 
organizational learning. This study partially tested the framework proposed in 
Chapter 2.  As the above stated limitation pointed out it is necessary to assess the 
effect ODRs at individual level on organizational learning.  The following chapter 
empirically evaluates the role of ODRs at the relationship between individual 
personalities and organizational learning.  
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CHAPTER SIX: ODRs, Personality Traits and Organizational Learning
8
 
 
The previous chapter has empirically tested one part of the theoretical framework 
developed in Chapter 2 which assesses the role of ODRs on the relationship between 
organizational factors and organizational learning.  This chapter empirically tests the 
other part of framework which is about the role of ODRs on the relationship between 
individual personality and organizational learning. The researcher realizes that there 
is some repetition on structuring hypotheses which have been discussed in Chapter 2 
for constructing propositions. However, the researcher thinks the repetition could 
enhance readability of this chapter.   
 
 
  
                                                 
8 A paper is based on this chapter was presented at the 2016 European Academy of 
Management Annual Conference.   
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6.1 Introduction  
 
 The purpose of this chapter is to analyze what roles ODRs play in the relationship 
between individual personality traits and organizational learning.  A pervasive 
assumption in the literature on ODRs is that they hinder learning, are overprotective 
and self-sealing (Argyris, 1990). However, as previous chapters already pointed out, 
there is a lack of empirical support on this assumption.  The prevalence of ODRs and 
limited understanding of ODR call academics to provide systematic evidence to 
further comprehend such learning barriers.  
 
Chapter 2 discussed organizational learning from the perspective of individual 
learning theory which posited that individuals are agents of learning (Argyris & 
Schon, 1978).  The importance of individuals in organizational learning is depicted 
clearly through Simon (1991, p.125) generalized two mechanisms of how 
organizations learn “(a) by the learning of its members or (b) by ingesting new 
members who have knowledge the organization didn't previously have”. Each one of 
the two creates collective learning that is grounded in individuals.  Nevertheless, it 
should not be misunderstood that organizational learning is equal to individual 
learning, because organizations can operate even when any specific individual leaves 
(Kim, 1993) but not when every participant leaves — there would be no organization 
in that case (Scott, 2003).  However, the process of institutionalizing integrates 
individual learning into the organization resulting in coherent interactions of 
members in organizations (Crossan, Lane & White, 1999). Hence, organizations can 
learn independently from any individual, but simultaneously also rely on the 
collection of individual learning.  Consequently, individuals play a decisive role in 
organizational learning.  Surprisingly, very little research has explored how 
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individual characteristics affect learning in organizations.  
ODRs have a significant psychological component and lean on rather passive 
cognitive mechanisms (Secchi & Bardone, 2013). Personality influences learning 
styles and, for example, academic outcomes (e.g. Klein & Lee, 2006; Noftle & 
Robins, 2007).  Klein and Lee (2006) studied 157 students and concluded that 
learning goal orientation relates positively and significantly to conscientiousness and 
openness to experience.  Because individual learning is one essential part of 
organizational learning, it is rational to assume that individuals’ personality would 
affect institutional learning ultimately.  Researchers also found individuals’ 
personality traits influence knowledge sharing and knowledge acquisition in the 
workplace (Matzler, Renzl, Mooradian, von Krogh & Mueller, 2011a).  Some 
organizations use personality tests (e.g. Big Five Dimensions) in personnel selection 
(Hurtz & Donovan, 2000).  Hence, individual personality can be crucial for the 
understanding of organizational learning.  However, the puzzle is that even 
organizations with high quality selection processes still fail to reach their expected 
learning outcomes (Gino & Staats, 2015).  The researcher argues that organizational 
defensive routines may interfere with the effect personality traits have on 
organizational learning.   
Hence this chapter makes three contributions to the literature. First, the researcher 
provides empirical evidence on the relation between personality traits and 
organizational learning.  Second, the researcher theoretically and empirically 
integrates ODRs into the model thereby extending knowledge on a particular set of 
routines that is likely to be a barrier to organizational learning.  Third, the results are 
of relevance for researchers and practitioners alike as they strive to improve 
organizations’ learning capabilities. 
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6.2 Theoretical Framework 
 
6.2.1 Organizational learning 
 
The importance of organizational learning has been discussed in Chapter 2 and again 
in Chapter 5.  Chapter 2 reviews organizational learning from three perspectives, 
individual learning theories, social learning view and organizational routines.  These 
perspectives interpret learning differently, but they all positon individuals as learning 
agents through which organizations learn.  Chapter 5 specifically adopted a learning 
model created by Huber (1991) which treats organizational learning as an 
information process including knowledge acquisition, knowledge dispersion and 
knowledge interpretation and organizational memory. This view of organizational 
learning once again emphasizes the importance of individuals at transferring 
knowledge from individual level to institutional level.   
6.2.2 Personality traits 
 
Chapter 2 showed that individual learning is considered a component of 
organizational learning (Kim, 1993).  Organizational learning is a mixture of 
individual, group and an organizational level of learning.  Individual learning is 
recommended as the first step of learning at the social level, through which 
alternative solutions to organizational issues are recognized based on individual 
experience (Crossan et al., 1999).  As important as individual learning is to 
organizational learning, individuals’ characteristics may, to some extent, be able to 
explain organizational learning.  
Despite the recognition of the importance that individual learning processes have on 
the organization, little research has been conducted in estimating the effect of 
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individual characteristics such as personality traits on organizational learning.  
Personality is a psychological concept while learning is mostly cognitive.  Huber’s 
(1991) framework (see above) has the potential to explain how the effects of 
personality can be transferred to cognitive learning. This is easily done if one realizes 
that information distribution, for example, requires a particular prosocial personality 
to be executed. Or, for example, knowledge interpretation is mostly based on social 
psychological mechanisms that operate together with the most obvious cognitive 
processes.  In other words, the characterization of Huber’s model provided above 
indicates that workers’ personalities are extremely important to understand proactive 
engagement in organizational knowledge processes.  
This research adopts the Big Five personality traits to understand the relationship 
between personality traits and organizational learning.  The reason for selecting Big 
Five is because it is a dominant framework that is used for personnel selection (Hurtz 
& Donovan, 2000). Modern personality research uses the Big Five to systematically 
categorize personality traits at the broadest level (Flynn, Chatman & Spataro, 2001). 
The Big Five are also considered as a ‘parsimonious and comprehensive’ way to 
describe the human sphere (Gupta, 2008).  The Big Five traits comprise neuroticism, 
extraversion, agreeableness, openness to experience and conscientiousness.   
The study in this chapter focuses on three traits, namely, conscientiousness, openness 
to experience and neuroticism. This is because the literature suggests that 
conscientiousness and neuroticism are robust and consistent predictors of job 
attitudes (Judge & Ilies, 2002). Openness to experience is often used to explain 
knowledge sharing and decision making in organizations (LePine, Colquitt & Erez, 
2000; Matzler, Renzl, Müller, Herting & Mooradian, 2008).  Therefore, these three 
traits should be particularly relevant in understanding the relationship between 
  
185 
personality traits and organizational learning.  
 
Openness to experience. Openness to experience is often linked with characteristics 
such as being imaginative, open-minded, aesthetic sensitivity, originality and 
intellectual curiosity (Barrick & Mount, 1991).  People with high level of openness 
are willing to engage in self-monitoring and assessment which is necessary for 
identifying learning possibilities (Blickle, 1996). Open individuals tend to try new 
things, experience different feelings and embrace changes (LePine et al., 2000).  
Hence, open individuals are more ready to participate in learning (Barrick & Mount, 
1991) and tend to have a high learning orientation (Matzler, Renzl, Mooradian, von 
Krogh & Mueller, 2011b).  Individuals high in openness to experience are more 
willing to query other people’s insight and share their own knowledge, it is 
anticipated that open individuals are more likely to involve knowledge acquisition 
and dissemination with teams (Matzler et al., 2008).  
(Note:  Numbering hypothesis continues from the previous chapter in order to be 
consistent with the framework developed at Chapter 2). 
 
Hypothesis 5a: Openness to experience is positively related to organizational 
learning. 
 
Conscientiousness. Conscientious people are considered to be independent, 
organized, responsible, achievement oriented and perseverant (Barrick & Mount, 
1991).  People who are perseverant tend to be committed to their goals regardless of 
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difficulties they are facing, and they are more likely to weigh different information in 
order to accomplish tasks (LePine et al., 2000).  People who assess different 
information might have a more accurate interpretation resulting in better decision 
making than people who are less conscientious (LePine et al., 2000). Furthermore, 
empirical studies on organizational citizenship found that conscientiousness drives 
people to work on extra things which go beyond their job requirement, and 
conscientious people also enjoy working with other people in a team and help 
organizations as a whole (Organ, 1994).  It is rational to predict that people enjoying 
affiliation in organizations may be more likely willing to exchange information 
resulting in better knowledge sharing in organizations.  Empirical research among IT 
professionals has showed that a high level of conscientiousness is positively related 
to tacit knowledge sharing (Borges, 2013).   Highly conscientious people also show 
high tendencies of documenting knowledge for organizational usage (Matzler et al., 
2011a).  While new knowledge is institutionalized, it will become part of 
organizational memory to guide future decision-making.  Consequently, it will 
contribute to organizational learning.  
Hypothesis 6a: Conscientiousness is  positively related to organizational learning 
Neuroticism. Neuroticism sometimes is labeled as “emotionality” and “negative 
affectivity” (Watson & Clark, 1984).  People with high neuroticism are likely to 
experience a high degree of negative affect such as anxiety, stress, and depression 
and negative self-assessment (Gore, Kiefner, & Combs, 2012).  Highly neurotic 
people are less happy to share tacit knowledge (Borges, 2013), it is more challenging 
for them to adjust in new circumstances (Gore et al., 2012), they tend to be less 
satisfied with their job (Barrick, Mount & Judge, 2001) and are more likely to 
remember negative experiences that happened in the workplace (Watson & Clark, 
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1984).  In terms of organizational learning, this requires employees’ participation in 
detecting and correcting the problematic aspects of their own behavior, and in turn, it 
improves the processes of large organizations (Mazutis, Slawinski & Slaiwinski, 
2008).  Highly neurotic people are less confident in promoting their own opinions 
and handle criticism from other people in a way that has negative repercussions on 
themselves (Borges, 2013).  Organizational learning often involves negotiation and 
argument in order to achieve a shared mental map before learning happens (Huber, 
1991) and neurotic people may find the process stressful.  
Hypothesis 7a: Neuroticism is negatively related to organizational learning. 
6.3 Organizational Defensive Routines 
 
As previous chapters already suggested that social virtues are learned from early life 
and become guidance to behavior in later work life for handling situations which 
normally elicit embarrassment or threat to themselves or others.  However, in the 
organizational context, the disposition to be nice to colleagues could motivate people 
to self-censoring or sugarcoating important organizational information. In turn, this 
may result in destructive behavior in organizations.  This section explains ODRs 
from a social cognition view.  
The way how organizational culture influences on individuals’ behavior can be 
explained from a social cognitive studies in that they propose that social context 
influences an individual’s way of interpreting information people generate or 
information received from other people (Fiske & Taylor, 2013).  In particular, 
attribution theory suggests that individual’s behavior is an outcome of personal 
attributions and contextual attribution (Augoustinos, Walker & Donaghue, 2009).  In 
this study’s context, individuals who perform defensive routines do that because they 
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focus on avoidance of negative consequences and they are preoccupied of staying in 
control with an organizational culture which treats failure as embarrassment (Secchi 
& Bardone, 2013).   
According to Bandura (2012), people learn their behavior via interpersonal 
influences with other people by observation.  In return, their learnt behavior will 
shape or reinforce the external environment (Bandura, 2012). For defensive routines, 
individuals design mixed messages to avoid evoking embarrassment for themselves 
or others. However, the message receivers recognize the inconsistency of the 
information, but sometimes decide to be in congruence with the message senders’ 
way of dealing with the source of embarrassment.  This double-blind way to conceal 
the cause of embarrassment makes ODRs identification a real challenge (Argyris, 
2001). As a consequence, individuals behave defensively because it is socially 
acceptable.  
6.4 Integrating Different Levels of ODRs with Social Cognition 
 
 
An individual’s motives to perform organizational defensive routines depend on their 
self-assessment about whether their candid opinion can cause embarrassment or put 
themselves at a risk. This self-assessment is conducted in an individual’s mind 
privately. Without deliberate reflection initiated by an external source (e.g. 
consultants) on their behavior, the organizational defensive routines are considered 
as rational by performers (Noonan, 2007).  Their rationality comes from their deepest 
and implicit assumption which is to defend themselves from pain and simultaneously 
cover up the cause of pain (Senge, 1991). Thus, organizational defensive routines are 
the outcome of both individual and organizational factors.  
At an individual perspective, the motive of performing defensive routines is seen 
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related to an individual’s cognition (e.g. their mental assumption on embarrassment 
and change) and external stimuli from social context.  Why do other people (e.g., co-
workers, managers, etc.) join this dysfunctional behavior?  One way to understand 
this integration process from individuals to organizational level is to consider 
organizational defensive routines as a collective behavior that is distributed to 
individuals in organizations. However, it should not be misunderstood that 
organizational defensive routines are a simple sum of individual defensiveness. 
Organizational defensive routines are understood as a phenomenon that supports and 
stimulates individual defensiveness.  Argyris simply put it as “people are the carriers 
of defensive routines, and organizations are the hosts. Once organizations have been 
infected, they too become carriers” (Argyris, 1985 cited in Senge, 1991, p. 234). 
Hence, individual defensive routines and organizational defensive routines reinforce 
each other.  Studying one without the other could generate incorrect understanding of 
organizational defensive routines. 
  
According to social cognition, ODRs are considerably stable and automatic via social 
cognition. When a social cognition process meets any of the following qualities it is 
considered automatic: unintentional, uncontrollable, efficient, autonomous responses 
and outside awareness (Bargh, 1989). In terms of the process of ODRs, these are 
peoples’ effortless behavior under a situation which is most likely to cause 
embarrassment and threat to the initiators or receivers in the workplace (Argyris, 
1990).  People’s defensiveness results in anti-learning attitudes and limits learning in 
all levels, but people who are involved in the process of ODRs tend to shift blames 
on to other people and fail to realize their own contribution to such 
counterproductive behavior (Noonan, 2007). Hence, defensive behavior also is an 
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unintentional and undeliberate behavior in situations where embarrassment and 
threat are mostly likely to be stimulated.  Therefore, it is context based.  Because of 
organizational defensive routines’ automatic characteristics, it shares the 
characteristics as general routines being repetitive, recurrent and stable.  
 6.5 Organizational Defensive Routines: Hypotheses Development 
 
 Hypotheses 5a to 7a posit that individuals’ personality traits (openness to 
experience, conscientiousness, neuroticism) influence and contribute to explaining 
organizational learning.  But how do ODRs and these traits interact with respect to 
organizational learning? This section develops the hypothesis that organizational 
defensive routines act as a moderator in this relationship.  
 People with high openness to experience have shown willingness to knowledge 
sharing and learning (Matzler et al., 2008).  When the level of ODRs is high, certain 
issues, which may elicit embarrassment and threat, are considered as inappropriate or 
counterproductive to reveal.  In other words, organizations with high organizational 
defensive routines lack a culture to encourage open discussion and appreciate 
innovative ideas.  This kind of culture may constrain people with high openness to 
experience from freely expressing their opinion. Consequently, it will demotivate 
‘open’ people to share their knowledge.  
Hypothesis 5b: Organizational defensive routines moderate the positive relation 
between openness to experience and organizational learning, such that the 
relationship is weaker when organizations have high organizational defensive 
routines.  
Organizations with high ODRs tend to use ambiguous language to convey negative 
messages (Noonan, 2007).  The opaque information can be misguiding for 
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employees to work towards their goals.  Given that conscientious people are goal 
driven (Barrick et al., 2001), they may find it frustrating to work on a vague goal.  If 
they clarify the ambiguity of the message, they will have to query the reason why the 
message was designed as ambiguous initially.  This could embarrass the message 
initiator.  If they pretend the non-existence of ambiguity of the message, they may 
end up doing the wrong things.  High ODRs also cause certain valuable information 
to be hidden under the carpet (Argyris, 1990).  The fragmented information creates 
barriers for people with high conscientiousness from having correct understanding of 
the situation.  When people’s abilities of identifying errors are constrained by the 
organizational defensive culture, it is challenging to generate learning in 
organizations. Thus, the researcher hypothesizes: 
Hypothesis 6b: Organizational defensive routines moderate the relationship between  
conscientiousness and organizational learning, such that the relationship is weaker 
when organizations have high organizational defensive routines.  
 
Highly neurotic people were predicted to be not good at adjusting to changes 
(Watson & Clark, 1984).  Organizations with high ODRs tend to avoid conflict and 
embarrassment, so the working environment seems ‘nice’.  Whereas, this so called 
‘nice’ working environment only produces temporary changes in behavior, or 
mediocre adjustment to current organizational practice (Argyris, 1990).  Neurotic 
people working in this kind of organization find it comfortable. It may reinforce 
neurotic people’s negative thinking on change and it may encourage neurotic people 
to hold valid information which may trigger the change in organizations.  
Hypothesis 7b: Organizational defensive routines moderate the relationship between 
neuroticism and organizational learning, such that the relationship is stronger when 
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organizations have high organizational defensive routines.  
6.6 Method 
 
6.6.1 Data and sample 
 
This chapter used the same sample as the study at Chapter 5. It also had 440 
participants who completed the survey.  After deleting unengaged participants and 
outliers, the final usable data is 351 participants. 51.4% of the sample is male, and 
48.6% are female.  79% of respondents work at full time jobs. The average age is 38 
and the standard deviation is 11.66.  
In terms of reducing common method bias, the researcher randomized the order of 
questions (Podsakoff et al., 2003). The researcher also employed the single factor 
test (Harman, 1967) by forcing all the predictors and outcome variables to load on 
one factors to check common method bias.  The result shows that one factor only 
explains 20.71% of total various (61.95). Statistically this suggests there is no 
common method bias issue.  
 
6.6.2 Variables 
 
The main predictors of the study are conscientiousness, openness to experience and 
neuroticism.  Additionally, the study controls for gender, education, age, tenure, job 
status (full time or part time). Job positions in organizations have an influence on the 
knowledge of organizational issues.  Generally, people at the managerial level are 
more involved than general staff in decision-making on organizational changes and 
learning. Full-time employees spend more time in organizations, they may have a 
different opinion than people working part-time.  The researcher also controlled for 
age, size of organizations due to their known influence on organizational learning.  
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6.6.3 Measures 
 
Participants indicate their agreement with each item using a 7-point Likert-type scale 
running from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree).  
6.6.3.1 Dependent variable 
 
Organizational learning. this study also used the same scale of measuring 
organizational learning as it is in Chapter 5. The scale is developed by Pérez López, 
Peón, and Ordás (2004) and tested by Jiménez-Jiménez and Sanz-Valle (2011) and 
Pérez López, Peón, and Ordás (2005).  The overall scale has a reliability of alpha = 
0.91.  
6.6.3.2 Independent variables 
 
Personality traits (openness to experience, conscientiousness, and neuroticism). The 
researcher measured these three traits with 27 items from John & Srivastava's work 
(1999).  It had nine items for conscientiousness (alpha = 0.83), eight items for 
neuroticism (0.83) and ten items for openness to experience (0.77).  The example 
items are: “Does a thorough job” and “Can be somewhat careless” (reverse coded) 
are measures conscientiousness; “has few artistic interests” (reverse coded) and “is 
curious about many different things” measures openness to experience; “worries a 
lot” and “is emotionally stable, not easily upset” measures neuroticism.  
Organizational defensive routines: This is a newly developed measurement and is 
composed of 14 items.  Eight items measure individual perception on organizational 
defensive routines at the organizational level.  Six items measure individuals’ 
perception on organizational defensive routines at the individual level.  The process 
of developing the scale of ODRs is described at Chapter 4.  Chapter 4 shows that the 
scale has gone through various validity tests such as CFA, discriminate and 
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convergent validity test, predictive validity test and cross-cultural measurement 
invariance test.  All of the tests show the scale is reliable and meets generally 
accepted cut-off values for fit indices (Hu & Bentler, 1999; Nunally, 1978). Each 
level of analysis has two sub-factors.  This chapter focuses on ODRs at an individual 
level, it contains embarrassment avoidance (alpha = 0.80) and rigidity (alpha = 0.77). 
The overall Cronbach’s alpha for measuring organizational defensive routines is 
0.74. “When dealing with work-related procedures and processes, I do not like 
changes” is an example item to measure rigidity. “I avoid speaking to the point if this 
would embarrass my colleagues” is an example item to measure embarrassment 
avoidance.  
6.7 Analysis and Result 
 
6.7.1 Descriptive statistics 
 
Means, standard deviation, reliability coefficients and correlations for the measures 
appear in Table 14.  Before addressing the hypotheses, it is worth noting that 
organizational learning is negatively correlated with neuroticism (r = -0.32, p < 
0.01), but positively correlated with conscientiousness (r = 0.19, p < 0.01) and 
openness (r = 0.32, p < 0.01).  Organizational learning is not correlated with 
organizational defensive routines (r = - 0.04, p > 0.05). Organizational defensive 
routines are positively and significantly correlated with neuroticism (r = 0.45, p < 
0.01), but negatively and significantly correlated with conscientiousness (r = -0.37, p 
< 0.01) and openness (r = -0.29, p < 0.01).  This suggests that people with high 
neuroticism generally tend to display more defensiveness in a situation when 
embarrassment and threat may occur.  
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Table 14:Descriptive Information about Variables 
  Mean Std.  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11  
1.Gender 0.52 0.50             
2.Age 38.50 11.63 0.11            
3.Education 2.28 1.01 -0.10 -0.19**           
4.Tenure 2.92 1.43 0.15** 0.52** -0.15**          
5.Firm Size 3.03 1.03 0.06 0.01 0.14** 0.14**         
6.Full time 0.78 0.41 0.29** -0.03 0.08 0.07 0.10        
7.Supervisors 0.50 0.50 0.14** 0.16** 0.14* 0.15** -0.18** 0.17**       
8.Conscientiousness 5.17 0.87 -0.08 0.31** -0.14* 0.15** -0.04 -0.01 0.11* 0.83     
9.Neuroticism 3.69 1.07 -0.08 -0.16** -0.02 -0.11* -0.05 -0.08 -0.15** -0.48** 0.83    
10.Openness 4.74 0.77 0.03 0.07 0.15** -0.03 -0.05 0.05 0.20** 0.38** -0.22** 0.77   
11.iODR 3.93 1.06 0.05 -0.33** -0.03 -0.12* 0.07 0.03 -0.25** -0.37** 0.45** -0.29** 0.74  
12.OL 4.74 0.96 0.02 -0.03 0.10 0.02 0.12* 0.08 0.05 0.19** -0.32** 0.32** -0.04  0.91 
 
Note: N=351; **p<0.01; *p<0.05 ; OL= organizational learning. iODR=Organizational defensive routines at individual level; Cronbach alpha is 
on the diagonal.  Con= Conscientiousness  
Full time is coded as “1”, others are codes as “0”; Supervisors includes supervisors, middle level management and senior level management is 
coded as “1” and general staff is coded as “0”  
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6.7.2 Personality traits and organizational learning  
 
Multiple regression analyses are used to examine the relationship between 
personality traits and organizational learning. Organizational defensive routines and 
variables for personality traits are centered.  Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) for all 
the variables is at an acceptable level.  The mean VIF is 1.35. The single highest VIF 
is 1.76. Thus, there are no strong concerns about multicollinearity.  
The main results are presented in Table 15. Model 1 (see Table 15) only including 
control variables shows that only organizational size is positively associated with 
organizational learning. That means as organizations get older, they learn better. 
Model 2 added the main predictors, namely conscientiousness, neuroticism and 
openness to experience.  It shows that conscientiousness (β = -0.02; p = 0.77) does 
not have any influence on organizational learning and this leads us to reject 
Hypothesis 6a.  Neuroticism can negatively and significantly predict organizational 
learning (β = -0.26; p < 0.001).  Openness to experience also has a significant, but 
positive influence on organizational learning (β = 0.34; p < 0.001).  
Model 3 (see Table 15) investigates the interactions between organizational 
defensive routines and the three personality traits of interest (conscientiousness, 
neuroticism, openness).  Results show that conscientiousness stays non-significant to 
organizational learning (β = -0.01; p = 0.90).  Neuroticism (β = -0.31; p < 0.001) and 
openness to experience (β = 0.37; p < 0.001) maintain their significance. Therefore, 
the researcher can conclude that neuroticism and openness to experience are 
significant predictors of organizational learning. Therefore, hypothesis 6a is rejected 
while hypothesis 5a and hypothesis 7a are supported. Unexpectedly, model 3 also 
shows that organizational defensive routines (β = 0.43; p  < 0.001) have a positive 
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significant direct association with organizational learning.  An analysis on 
correlations of organizational defensive routines with four components of 
organizational learning are not significant except of knowledge interpretation (r = -
0.11, p < 0.05).  That means the higher ODRs is related to the lower knowledge 
interpretation in organizations.  
Although theoretically the researcher has proposed that organizational defensive 
routines will negatively moderate the relationship between personality 
(conscientiousness, neuroticism and openness) and organizational learning, the result 
of data analysis (see Model 3) does not support the hypotheses.  That means the level 
of organizational defensive routines does not have a statistically significant effect on 
the relations between personality traits (openness to experience (β = 0.04, p = 0.60), 
conscientiousness (β = -0.07, p = 0.32) and neuroticism (β = 0.06, p =0.23)) and 
organizational learning. Hence, hypotheses 5b, 6b and 7b on the moderation effect of 
organizational defensive routines are not supported. 
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Table 15: Regressions results for Conscientiousness, Neuroticism and Openness 
Note: *p<0.05; **P<0.01,  1. Job status is dummy variable. Full time is coded as 1, part-time is coded 
as 0.    2.Tenure is dummy variable. 1-5 years is coded as 1; others are coded as 0.  3.Job position is 
dummy variable. Supervisors, middle managers, senior managers and executives are coded as 1. 
General staff is coded as 0.   4. iODR= defensive routines at individual level
DV=OL Model1 Model2 Model3 
   β p  β p β p 
(Constant) 4.19 0.00** 4.58 0.00** 4.42 0.00** 
Age 0.00 0.62 -0.01 0.12 0.00 0.45 
Gender 0.00 0.99 -0.04 0.72 -0.08 0.44 
Education 0.06 0.26 0.02 0.73 0.02 0.62 
Firm size 0.11 0.03* 0.11 0.02* 0.11 0.02* 
Full time 0.11 0.39 0.07 0.56 0.05 0.70 
Supervisors 0.12 0.27 -0.02 0.87 0.03 0.74 
Tenure 0.10 0.82 0.02 0.57 0.01 0.82 
Conscientiousness   -0.02 0.77 -0.02 0.73 
Neuroticism   -0.26 0.00 -0.31 0.00** 
Openness   0.34 0.00 0.37 0.00** 
iODR     0.18 0.00** 
iODR* Conscientiousness    -0.07 0.32 
iODR * Neuroticism    0.06 0.23 
iODR * Openness     0.04 0.60 
       
Observation (351)             
R2 0.03 0.19 0.22 
Adjusted R2 0.01 0.17 0.19 
F F(6), 1.74, p=0.11 F(9), 8.85, p<0.001 F(13), 7.49, p<0.001 
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6.8 Discussion 
 
The study in this chapter makes three contributions to the literature.  First, by 
examining three well-studied personality traits (conscientiousness, neuroticism and 
openness to experience) and organizational learning, it empirically showed that 
individual traits can influence organizational learning.  Hopefully, this will stimulate 
more empirical studies to explore what other individual factors can affect 
organizational learning.  Second, the positive relationship found between ODRs and 
organizational learning brings a novel perspective to the existing literature on ODRs 
and learning.  Third, the findings of this study enrich the literature on both 
organizational learning and ODRs. They also benefit practitioners wishing to 
improve learning capabilities by carefully selecting people. 
The findings of the study did not show statistical support for the hypotheses that 
ODRs negatively moderate the relation between personality traits (conscientiousness, 
neuroticism and openness to experience) and organizational learning.  Because these 
findings deviate from theory as presented in earlier sections, the researcher uses OLS 
regression analysis to test what the effect of ODRs sub-factors are on the 
components of organizational learning.  The results indicate that rigidity significantly 
and positively relates to organizational memory (β = 0.48, p < 0.05) only.  This is 
consistent with Argyris’ (1990) theory on ODRs leading to routine learning. 
However, “embarrassment avoidance” is significantly and positively related to all the 
components of organizational learning. This finding contradicts the existing literature 
which advocates the negative influence of organizational defensive routines on 
organizational performance, decision making and learning (e.g. Argyris, 1990; 
Ashforth & Lee, 1990; Noonan, 2007).  Two potential reasons can explain this 
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finding.  Firstly, ODRs may not be as bad as Argyris originally portrayed them.  
Though Argyris tends to attribute the roots of organizational dysfunctions to ODRs 
and politics, some authors (e.g. Miner & Mezias, 1996) pointed out that avoiding 
embarrassment is not necessarily negative behavior.  In fact, such behavior may be 
seen as part of the normal process of resolving differences of opinion between 
organizational members and an inevitable consequence of the different interests that 
are created by the process and technology of organizing’ (Easterby-Smith, Snell, & 
Gherardi, 1998, p. 263).  Miner and Mezias (1996) suggested that covering up and by 
passing issues related to embarrassment and threat only can encourage incremental 
and routine learning which is also an important part of organizational development.  
ODRs are not as well studied as incremental learning.  
Secondly, it was explicitly stated by Argyris (1990, 2001) and agreed by some other 
scholars (e.g. Riley, Cudney & Long, 2013; Wilson, 2001; Yau & Cheng, 2011) that 
organizational defensive routines are anti-learning.  However, organizational 
learning can take various shapes.  Argyris (1990) divided learning into single-loop 
and double-loop.  Fiol & Lyles (1985) equated single-loop learning to low levels of 
learning, and double-loop learning to high level of learning.  It was not clear if “anti-
learning” here means a specific kind of learning.  Most of Argyris' (1990, 1993, 
2002) work focuses on advocating the idea of dysfunctional effects of organizational 
defensive routines on double-loop learning.  If learning can be divided into levels, 
maybe organizational learning should be measured in its components.  the findings 
of this study may reveal to be different and this implies that more research is needed.  
Building on the thought of measuring organizational learning based on levels, the 
researcher also agrees with Huber (1991) that different levels of learning may be 
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extremely difficult to isolate empirically as one aspect can overlap and/or be 
intertwined with another as well as mask or determine another. Some existing 
research on explorative (double-loop) and exploitative learning (single – loop) 
suggested these two levels learning are complementary, coexist in organizations (e.g. 
Lavie et al. 2010; Kim et al. 2012). Thus, the complexity of measuring 
organizational learning and also contributed to the seemingly unusual finding.   
 
This study also revealed how individuals’ personality traits affect organizational 
learning.  High neuroticism has a negative effect on organizational learning.  High 
openness to experience has positive influence on organizational learning.  Though 
research on academic and job performance has produced consistent and positive 
findings on conscientiousness (e.g. Barrick et al., 2001; Blickle, 1996), this study is 
not able to support them. One plausible reason to explain why conscientiousness 
does not explain learning in this study stems from the perspective of learning itself. 
Learning is about potentially changing behaviors (Huber, 1991).  Hence, individuals 
being open minded and thinking out of box are more likely to identify alternative 
ways of improving their work.  People high on conscientiousness have the 
characteristics of order, dutifulness and deliberation (Barrick and Mount, 1991) 
which are important for goal achievement. However, people with high 
conscientiousness could be too focused on following orders, and thus, do not notice 
the need for change in their behavior for better learning.  High conscientious people 
are not as good at adapting to a changing task as people with low conscientiousness 
(LePine et al., 2000).  Originally, the researcher thought being orderly and persevere 
could help individuals to restore knowledge in organizations so that they could 
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contribute to organizational learning.  However, the researcher did not consider the 
possibility that individuals scoring high in conscientiousness could prefer to maintain 
routine rather than seeking new ways of doing things which might explain the 
finding.  In addition, on the one hand, conscientious individuals tend to engage in 
self-deception which is used to avoid self-confrontation and attributions of failure 
(Martocchio & Judge, 1997).  The self-deceivers are likely to adopt a cognitive 
strategy to deny negative attribution to their self-image, which could lead to diminish 
learning opportunities at the early stage of learning (Lee & Klein, 2002).  On the 
other hand, high conscientious people are also high self-efficient (Martocchio & 
Judge, 1997).  Individuals who have high self-efficacy tend to set high challenging 
goals and perform better at learning (Lee & Klein, 2002).   The dual mediating roles 
of negative self-deception and positive self-efficacy negate each other resulting in 
insignificant relationship between conscientiousness and learning (Martocchio & 
Judge, 1997).  This might also be the reason to explain the finding of this study.  
This study also has some implications for practitioners.  This study suggests that 
openness and neuroticism are relevant factors for organizational learning. In the 
current competitive market place, organizations embrace the idea of being learning 
organizations.  Individuals are an implicit and valuable organizational asset for 
organizations to achieve their idea of constant learning.  Organizations may give 
more preference to individuals who are high at openness to experience for initiating 
creative ideas.  Training on the knowledge of individual personality and 
organizational learning can help individuals understand how their own personality 
can either assist organizations to learn better or become a barrier for organizational 
learning unconsciously.  
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This study also contributes to explain the reason why employees are resistant to 
change.  Resistance to change has been concluded as one source leading to the 
failure of many large-scale corporate change programs (Bovey & Hede, 2001).   The 
finding of this study shed some light on the causes of resistance to change.  It shows 
that people perceive their defensiveness as a rational reaction toward the threat of 
their self or organizational interest.  This perception leads them to cover up and 
bypass certain organizational issues.  Traditionally, change agents are described as 
“angels”, but people being changed are demonized as being “mulish and obstinate” 
(Dobosz-Bourne & Jankowicz, 2006, p. 2030).  This finding indicates that maybe it 
is time to appreciate certain resistant behavior or make some effort to understand 
their reasons to against change before labelling them as trouble makers.  The current 
trend of studying resistance to change started to challenge the traditional 
understanding of this concept (e.g. Dobosz-Bourne & Jankowicz, 2006; Thomas & 
Hardy, 2011) 
Finally, there are two possible explanations that why the interaction effect of ODRs 
on all the relationship between individual factors and organizational learning is non-
significant. First, the research did not consider organizational context. If the sample 
is collected at the time when organizations remain in a stable development, less 
challenges to the established rules happen in organizations. ODRs could be perceived 
as rational practice. Second, the sample size could also contribute to non-significant 
finding. Aguinis (2003) suggested that 800 cases are needed for studying 
moderation. Considering the sample of this study is comparably large (N=351), there 
is some confidence of interpreting the findings of moderating effect.  
6.9 Limitations, Future research and Conclusion 
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This study has some limitations that require discussion.  First, the accuracy of 
information the researcher asked from respondents might be a problem.  Some 
individuals may not have the knowledge about organizational issues.  The study 
disqualified respondents who have less than one year of experience in order to 
improve the reliability of organizational information the respondents provided.  
Second, the researcher has grounded the model in the degree to how personality traits 
will affect organizational learning.  This removed the researcher’s focus on the 
possibility of exploring how personality traits contribute to organizational defensive 
routines.  For example, the data in this study showed a high correlation between 
neuroticism and organizational defensive routines.  Neuroticism has also found be an 
explanatory factor to employees’ behavior on censoring organizational information 
(Brinsfield, 2013).  This deserves further exploration in the future. The third 
limitation is related to the measurement of organizational learning.  Due to the 
divergent and complex concept of organizational learning (Easterby-Smith et al., 
1998), it is easy to conceptualize learning, but challenging to systematically study 
organizational learning with quantitative studies (Miner & Mezias, 1996).  The 
measurement has proven to be robust (Pérez López et al., 2004), but it did not divide 
learning into low and high level of learning.  However, the literature studied 
organizational defensive routines against different levels of learning.  Therefore, 
using this measurement of organizational learning may not be ideal. However, the 
measurement choice is restricted by the lack of valid measurement scales on low or 
high levels of organizational learning until now.   
Future research should analyze the relationship between each phase of organizational 
learning and the different types of personality traits. The idea is stimulated by the 
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finding on conscientiousness which shows a non-significant relation to learning.  In 
consideration of its consistent positive effect on work performance (e.g. Judge & 
Llies, 2002), this finding is unexpected.  Future research could explore the possible 
mediator or a moderator which may need to be incorporated into this model.  For 
example, Martocchio and Judge (1997) included self-deception and self-efficacy into 
a model to understand the effect of conscientiousness and learning.    
Furthermore, the way the researcher collected samples may have some influence on 
the finding.  Organizational defensive routines are an automatic and unconscious 
behavior employees perform in organizations.  They become more prevalent when 
people are going through changes in organizations (Noonan, 2007).  Because 
changes involve uncertainty and risk, this uncertainty of future can catalyze 
organizational defensive routines in organizations in order to keep status quo.  
Longitudinal data collected when organizations are going through a turbulent 
scenario will capture this negative performance better and future research should 
strive to collect such data.  
6.10 Summary 
 
This chapter empirically tests the moderating role of ODRs on the relationship 
between personality traits (conscientiousness, openness to experience and 
neuroticism) and organizational learning. Though the findings of the data analysis 
did not support the theoretically assumption on that the level of ODRs can moderates 
the impact of personality traits on organizational learning, yet these unexpected 
findings stimulation further exploration on ODRs. The following Chapter 7 provides 
a general discussion on the findings of all the studies.  
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CHAPTER SEVEN: General Discussion and Conclusion 
 
The implication and contribution has been discussed in their respective chapters. 
This chapter discusses the implications of all the findings for academics and 
management practitioners.  In so doing, it first provides a brief summary of the 
findings for the whole thesis. Then it discusses the implications based on these 
findings.  
 
7.1 Summary of Findings  
 
Theoretically the study deduces that ODRs could moderate the relationship between 
organizational factors (size, age and organizational structures) and organizational 
learning.  Theoretical deduction also shows that ODRs could moderate the 
relationship between personality (conscientiousness, neuroticism, and openness to 
experience) and organizational learning.  This theoretical framework serves as a 
guideline for the empirical studies.  In order to test this framework, the study devotes 
a whole chapter to explain the process of scale development.  The result of the study 
shows that ODRs are composed of two levels, namely organizational and individual 
levels.  The organizational level of ODRs is measured by two factors (with four sub-
items), organizational cover-up and organizational pretense. The individual level of 
ODRs is measured by two factors, namely embarrassment avoidance and rigidity at 
work (with six sub-items).  
 
The verified scales are applied to two empirical studies to test the framework in 
Chapter 5 and Chapter 6.  Chapter 5 finds statistical evidence to support that ODRs 
moderate the relationship between formalization and organizational learning, 
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increasing the negative impact that the former has on the latter.  The study also finds 
that formalization and centralization are negatively associated with organizational 
learning, but fails to find the hypothesized effect of ODRs as a moderator on the 
relationship between centralization and organizational learning.   
 
The verified scale of ODRs at an individual level is applied to an empirical study in 
Chapter 6.  The findings indicate that openness to experience is positively related to 
organizational learning, and neuroticism is negatively related to organizational 
learning.  Surprisingly, the study does not find statistical evidence to support the 
moderating effect of ODRs on these relationships which are theoretically 
hypothesized.  In contrast with mainstream literature which suggests the negative 
effect of ODRs on organizational learning, this study shows that ODRs at an 
individual level are positively related to organizational learning.  
 
Table 16 summarizes the findings of the empirical studies. These findings offer 
meaningful theoretical contributions to the literature on organizational defensive 
routines, organizational learning and organizational routines.  
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Table 16: Summary of Support for the Hypotheses across Two Empirical 
Studies 
Hypothesis  
Number Hypothesized Relationship  
Support in 
Chapter 5 
Support  
in Chapter 6 
1a Centralization → OL (-)a Yes  
1b 
ODR s Moderate 
(Centralization→ OL) No  
2a Formalization → OL (-) Yes  
2b 
ODR Moderate (Formalization→ 
OL) Yes  
3a Size → OL (-) No  
3b ODRs Moderate (Size→ OL) No  
4a Age → OL (-) No  
4b ODR Moderate (Age→ OL) No  
5a Openness → OL (+)  Yes 
5b 
ODR s Moderate (Openness→ 
OL)  No 
6a Conscientiousness →  OL (+)b  No 
6b 
ODRs  Moderate 
(Conscientiousness→ OL)  No 
7a Neuroticism → OL (-)  Yes 
7b 
ODRs  Moderate (Neuroticism→ 
OL)   No 
Note: OL= organizational learning.  a means the relationship of two variables is negative; 
b
 means the relationship of two variables is positive.  
 
7.2 Overall implications of the findings 
 
The implications of this work are discussed in the following sections from three 
vantage points: organizational defensive routines, organizational learning and 
organizational routines.  
 
7.2.1 Implications for organizational defensive routines  
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This study developed a scale to measure ODRs at two levels. This new scale enriches 
the existing theory of understanding ODRs.  First, it clarifies the definition of ODRs.  
The original definition of ODRs captures some main characteristics of ODRs, such 
as avoidance of embarrassment and threat (Argyris, 1990).  However, there is no 
clear link with general routines, and it also restricts the contribution of ODRs at 
individual and group levels.  These limitations are clearly reflected in most of 
Argyris’ work which mainly focuses on people at managerial level.  This study 
shows that ODRs can be both organizational and individual.  These two levels of 
ODRs are interactive and reinforce each other.  This expanded understanding on 
ODRs moves the focus from specific individuals to organizational context.  
Organizational context here means that the factors are independent from individual 
actors.  This context is like the soil nurturing ODRs at the individual level.  Based on 
this study, the researcher suggests modifying the definition of ODRs as such:  
policies and repetitive actions which individuals in organizations 
collectively apply to prevent themselves from experiencing embarrassment 
and threat.   
Such an enhanced definition positions ODRs as an organizational issue instead of 
some specific individuals’ flawed behavior. This is better suited to understand the 
complexity of studying organizational concepts which often contains multiple levels.  
 
Second, this newly developed scale provides a tool for academics to explore the 
effects of ODRs on other important organizational concepts and build up its 
nomological network through future empirical works.  Thus, academics have more 
opportunities to gain a more comprehensive view on the role ODRs play in day to 
day organizational life.  When the study tests the predictive validity of the scale of 
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measuring ODRs, the finding reveals that ODRs are negatively associated with 
psychological safety.  It also negatively affects job satisfaction.  The potential of 
applying the scale to explore the relationship between ODRs and other 
organizational concepts is far beyond what this thesis covers.   
 
Future studies can further explore the effect of ODRs on other organizational 
concepts.  For example, one concept that could be related to ODRs is organizational 
commitment. If ODRs exist, employees’ opinions to certain organizational issues 
either are self-censored or neglected by the decision makers.  In the long term, 
employees could feel they are not valued by organizations.  As a result, employees’ 
willingness to exert effort towards organizational goals could drop and their desire of 
maintaining organizational membership tends to reduce.  These processes could lead 
to low organizational commitment (Porter, Steers, Mowday & Boulian, 1974). 
Empirical evidence on the study of micro-politics, which is one manifestation of 
ODRs, shows that politics is negatively associated with organizational commitment 
in general (Cropanzano, Howes, Grandey & Toth, 1997).  Another organizational 
concept which ODRs may have a close relationship with is job performance.  
Organizations with ODRs are more likely to provide inconsistent and ambiguous 
feedback to employees’ negative outcomes of their performance (Noonan, 2007).  
Without obtaining clear guidance on their performance, employees are not able to 
solve difficult issues, but focus on routine procedures which deal with problems at 
the surface.  Additionally, they may not be motivated to reveal their advice on how 
to improve their performance through streaming existing routines or reducing slack 
resources, because employees in organizations with ODRs fear to cause 
embarrassment and threat to themselves or others by challenging the authorities or 
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the main streams.  Consequently, employees will only produce mediocre 
performance by sustaining the status quo.   
 
Third, the scale creates an opportunity to bridge practitioners and academics’ 
understanding of ODRs.  Previous studies on ODRs are mainly based on consultants’ 
experience.  These studies are beneficial in conceptualizing ODRs, but it is 
challenging for academics to systematically understand ODRs.  This scale can be 
applied to complement the traditional method practitioners rely on.  With the 
assistance of the scale, practitioners can gain the initial knowledge of ODRs in 
organizations before further investigation, or apply it as a tool to confirm their 
findings.  Hence, it creates a communication channel between practitioners and 
academics and increases the applications of works in both fields.  Last but not the 
least, this scale benefits organizations of any size, age and types at any stage of their 
development.  As pointed out previously, ODRs are omnipresent in most of 
organizations.  Due to the obscure characteristics of ODRs, organizations often failed 
to realize their existence until their damage are deep into the core of organizational 
issues.  By then, it will be arduous for organizations to eliminate them.  The scale 
could be a tool for organizations to self-assess the existence of ODRs, especially 
when they are going through radical changes and making some crucial decisions, as a 
seemingly unanimous decision often contains covert differences which could be 
valuable in decision making.  The awareness of ODRs can prevent organizations 
from making mistakes based on an incomplete picture.   
 
Fourth, the seemingly contradicted findings of the two empirical studies indicate that 
ODRs may have some positive effect. This positive effect has not been well 
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discussed in the current literature.  However, micro-politics as a relevant concept to 
ODRs have been praised as “social energy that transforms the insights of individuals 
and groups into the institutions of an organization” (Lawance, et al., 2005).  
Meanwhile, micro-politics is also criticized by academics as a detrimental factor to 
organizational outcomes (Llian, et al., 2015) and employees’ job satisfaction 
(Randall et al., 1999; Breaux et al., 2009; Rosen et al., 2009).  Hence, in the same 
vein, the positive side of ODRs should also not be ignored.  There is a benefit of 
using soft skills to handle negative information in organizations.  This could lead to 
more democratically based and egalitarian types of organizations. Working in this 
kind of organization, employees tend to have positive emotions (Barge & Oliver, 
2003).  When social interactions and influence are accounted for in organizational 
learning, a study found that suppressing some information could enhance 
organizational learning (Fang et al., 2013).  While Barge and Oliver (2003) discuss 
the benefit of implementing appreciative inquiry, they also pointed out that full 
appreciation can cause employees to avoid discussing tough and painful information.  
Additionally, this is also suggested by Fang et al. (2013) that a low level of 
information distortion could elicit an active explorative process that improves 
learning abilities, but a high level of ODRs could impede them from identifying the 
core issues related to a higher level of organizational learning.  Top managers should 
create a climate in which people are not afraid to ask hard questions, and in which 
people treat failure as an opportunity to learn instead of an embarrassment. Creating 
this climate benefits organizations to identify errors and correct them in a more 
efficient manner.  This does not mean organizations will be free from ODRs, as it is 
unrealistic that all the employees speak up about organizational issues with no fear of 
causing embarrassment and retaliation.  Therefore, a low level of ODRs should be 
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tolerable in organizations.  Hence, we can see that certain levels of avoidance of 
embarrassment and conflict can foster an amicable organizational culture, but it also 
results in severe information distortion and learning failures.   
 
Finally, this research shows the importance of reflective communication on changing 
routines. One reason of individual contributing to ODRs is because they 
automatically assume genuine feedbacks at certain issues could cause embarrassment 
and threat to themselves or others (Aryris, 1990; Riley et al. 2013). Without 
reflective talk between employees, problems and alternative actions will emerge 
(Howard-Grenville, 2005; and Katharina et al. 2016).  Employees end up following 
the established routines which could be inappropriate at the specific time and 
situation.  This indicates that organizations need to encourage individuals reflect on 
the impact of by-passing and covering up organizational issues.  Ultimately, 
organizations should have a culture to encourage employees to try different new 
action and embrace failure as opportunities to learn.  
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7.2.2 Implication on literature of organizational routines  
 
This study contributes to the theory of organizational routines at two facets.  First, 
this study enhances the current understanding of organizational routines.  Routines 
become stable after reinforcement and repetitive usage (Hodgson, 2008).  This 
recurrent and repetitive behavior can reduce time consumption and cognitive burden 
on solving similar problems resulting in an increased economic scale (Feldman & 
Pentland, 2003).  The point of routines being stable is argued from an economic 
perspective view.  However, this thesis provides a more nuanced view of 
understanding why employees tend to fall into a habitual behavior of censoring their 
opinion and sustain this behavior from a social cognitive perspective.  The instinctive 
propensity to resort to defensive routines is a strong element in social integration.  
Revealing some negative information forthrightly could embarrass the receiver. 
Especially if the revelation is against dominant way of thinking, the initiator could 
face being labelled as a troublemaker or be ostracized by the group.  Hence, 
employees carefully weigh the risk against the benefits of speaking up.  This results 
in employees concealing the information or opinion which prevent radical changes 
with existing routines.  This perspective of understanding routines indicates that 
social cognition should be considered when seeking ways of implementing changes.  
Second, the findings of this thesis suggest that routines should be understood from 
multiple levels.  Routines rely on humans’ carrying out repetitive behaviors, hence 
individuals’ factors should be in consideration.  Individuals’ factors are the fabric of 
the collective behavior.  This shows that changing routines requires organizations to 
consider both of the factors.  
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7.2.3 Implication on literature of organizational learning 
 
The study also contributes to enrich the current theory of organizational learning. 
The majority of studies in organizational learning focus on its conceptualization and 
outcome, but this study tries to identify antecedents of organizational learning based 
on empirical studies.  The results indicate that both organizational and individual 
factors could have a decisive effect on organizational learning.  For example, 
centralization and formalization are negatively related to organizational learning; and 
openness to experience is positively related to organizational learning.  Hence, 
organizations who want to improve their learning capabilities have to adopt 
appropriate structures, but also need to implement a rigorous personnel selection. 
With the satisfaction of these two conditions, it is also necessary to reduce ODRs at a 
certain level in order to clear away the barriers of organizational learning.  
 
7.3 Conclusion  
 
This thesis first develops a framework which posits that the level of ODRs moderates 
the relationship between organizational factors (size, age and structure) / individual 
factors (conscientiousness, openness to experience and neuroticism) and 
organizational learning.  Based on the framework, hypotheses are developed for the 
subsequent empirical studies. Following the literature review, the researcher explains 
the research design and her choice of research paradigm. Prior to conducting 
empirical studies, the researcher develops a scale for measuring ODRs via six 
individual studies.  After testing the reliability and validity of the scale, the 
researcher was confident to implement the newly developed scale into two empirical 
studies.  
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Briefly, the main contributions of this thesis are: 1) a theoretical refinement of 
ODRs, 2) a scale of ODRs for other researchers to use in future work, and 3) the 
provision of evidence to show that the effect of ODRs is more nuanced than 
originally thought. Two empirical studies show that ODRs moderate the relationship 
between formalization and organizational learning at organizational level, but do not 
have statistical significant on the relationship between individuals’ personality traits 
and organizational learning.   
 
7.4  Limitations of the Study  
 
The individual chapters have stated the limitations of the respective studies presented 
in each chapter.  This section highlights the main limitations of the studies. 
 
First, one of main limitations of the study is its exclusive use of perceptual measures 
to study organizational issues.  One concern of using individual perceptions is about 
whether they are able to represent organizations.  The research has tried to reduce the 
limitation by controlling participants’ tenure to be over one year in order to increase 
the reliability of information, though it is inevitable that individuals may have biased 
views due to their bounded rationality and the extent of involvement with 
organizations.  Due to the research questions and availability of resources, the 
researcher chooses a self-selection sampling technique to collect data.  Based on the 
available information they provided, the majority of respondents are from different 
organizations with tenures longer than one year.  This means that they should have 
adequate knowledge about their organizations.  Moreover, the survey statements 
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clearly invite participants to answer questions voluntarily, so if they feel the 
questions are out of their knowledge, they could drop out anytime.  
 
The second main limitation is about measurement of organizational learning.  
Organizational learning is a complex concept which researchers have endeavored to 
apply different principles and different levels to capture the meaning of 
organizational learning (e.g. Antonacopoulou & Chiva, 2007; Berends & Lammers, 
2010; Easterby-Smith, Snell & Gherardi, 1998).  Though this enriches the 
understanding of learning; it simultaneously causes confusion to grasp the 
determinants of the concept and makes it excruciatingly hard to test it empirically.  
However, there is a need to systematically test those converged theoretical 
propositions deduced from qualitative studies and computer simulations (Miner and 
Mezias, 1996).  The research has explored the existing measurements (e.g. Jiménez-
Jiménez & Sanz-Valle, 2011; Martínez-León & Martínez-García, 2011; Pérez López 
et al., 2005; Putz et al., 2012; Tippins & Sohi, 2003).  Based on the researcher’s 
knowledge, the most empirically tested measurement is based on the information 
process model proposed by Huber (1990) and developed by (Pérez López et al., 
2004). Hence this scale was chosen for the study. Despite the literature review on the 
available measures of organizational learning, the researcher is aware of the fact that 
the measurement may still not be comprehensive enough to reflect this complex 
phenomenon.  Especially, ODRs are often linked with a higher level of 
organizational learning.  Currently, academics suspect that learning can be clearly 
cut into different levels (Fiol & Lyles, 1985; Miner & Mezias, 1996).  All in all, 
there is a need to carry out more systematic empirical research to further understand 
learning mechanism in the future.  
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The third significant limitation of the study is using cross-sectional data.  If 
organizational learning is based on information processes as the literature presented, 
there should be a change from before and after the new knowledge assimilating into 
organization and driving changes on behavior.  Thus, longitudinal data could yield 
better internal validity and enable the researcher to make causal claims.  However, 
the emphasis of this thesis is to develop a scale measuring ODRs and to empirically 
test the new scale.  Now the scale has gone through a robust process to establish its 
validity. Future research can assess causal effects using longitudinal data.  
 
7.5 Recommendation for Future Research 
 
First, a future study should obtain longitudinal data.  This study shows that ODRs 
become more prevalent when organizations are going through changes.  Changes 
often involve adjusting or abandoning the established routine.  In an uncertain 
environment, people are more likely to bypass and cover-up information which could 
cause a threat to their job security, but this information would be crucial for 
organizations to make right decisions.  The use of longitudinal data, combined with 
other methods, for instance, agent based modeling would assist researchers to see 
behavior changes through the learning process.  In terms of collecting longitudinal 
data in the future, the researcher should collect data from organizations before and 
after significant organizational changes in action in order to get insights into ODRs 
over time.  This procedure would also enable the researcher to check if there are 
group effects impacting the results before proposing a causal effect exists.    
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Second, future research could conduct a cross-culture study to compare whether 
cultural differences can influence ODRs.  Existing research on ODRs have not 
explored this area, but there is a possibility of that organizations operating in 
countries with high power distance may show a higher level of ODRs than 
organizations in countries with low power distance.  This is because Hofstede (1982) 
posited that people in a society with high power distance accept hierarchical order.  
This cultural influence could make people feel it is disrespectable and risky to 
challenge authorities’ decisions.  Additionally, Zhang et al. (2014) stated that people 
with high collectivism tend to apply indirect conflict communication style and a 
conflict avoidance style.  They found that the Chinese group in their study tends to 
avoid or compromise the conflict in order to save face or save others’ in comparison 
with their American counterparts.  Hence, cultural dimensions could affect the level 
of ODRs to some extent.  At least, they can affect types of ODRs they refer to.  The 
future study should endeavor to identify the cultural effect on ODRs.   
 
Third, future work should explore the antecedents of ODRs.  The current 
understanding on ODRs mainly focus on the identifying ODRs and attenuating their 
damage on organizational learning.  Individuals’ personality traits could explain why 
certain individuals are prone to engage in ODRs than others.  Though it was not the 
focus of this study to identify antecedents of ODRs, yet this study showed that 
neuroticism is positively related to ODRs. This deserves further exploration in the 
future study.  Another antecedent could be leadership styles.  Vakola and Bouradas 
(2005) found that supervisors’ attitude towards negative feedback is a strong 
prediction of organizational silence.  This is consistent with Morrison and Milliken’s 
suggestion (2014) that fear of suffering negative consequences and being labelled as 
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a troublemaker makes employees suppress their disagreements or different opinions 
in organizations.  Change-oriented leaders are willing to appreciate subordinates’ 
perceptions, which gives employees’ an impression that there is little risk at raising 
different opinions (Detert, et al., 2013; Detert & Burris, 2007).  Hence, leadership 
style could be a critical contextual influence on ODRs.  
 
Fourth, it is important to explore the effects of ODRs on both individual and 
organizations.  The current study almost solely focuses on their consequences on 
organizational learning. More attention is needed on other consequences with an 
individual focus such as job satisfaction, trust, stress and attitude towards change; or 
an organizational focus such as decision making and innovation.  
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APPENDIX 1:  An Item Pool for EFA: 
 
Levels of 
ODRs Items 
ODRs at 
organizational 
level 
ODRs1-Most of the time the major decisions in my organization is already 
made before a meeting actually takes place 
ODRs2- My organization welcomes criticism of its decisions most of the 
time 
ODRs3- The majority of our meetings last a long time and deal with trivial 
issues 
ODRs4- Most of my organization’s decisions are not influenced by the 
discussion during meetings 
ODRs5- In my organization, relevant feedback is visible in the decisions 
made 
ODRs6- Each department just works for its own interest 
ODRs6- Each department just works for its own interest 
ODRs7- Playing it safe seems to be a common activity in my organization 
ODRs8- My organization encourages people to take risks and try different 
ways of doing things  
ODRs9- Subtle and covert controlling actions are typically taken in my 
organization 
ODRs10- The causes of negative events are openly discussed in my 
organization 
ODRs11- Criticism in my organization is encouraged to be given in a subtle 
way 
ODRs12- My organization has an unspoken norm not to embarrass 
employees openly 
ODRs13- When things go wrong in my organization, nobody stands up to 
take responsibility 
ODRs14- My organization has too many rigid rules and regulations 
ODRs15- My organization gives mixed messages 
ODRs at 
individual level 
EMB1-I try my best not to embarrass my colleagues 
EMB2- I conceal my real feelings if I think these would embarrass my 
colleagues 
EMB3- I avoid speaking to the point if this would embarrass my colleagues. 
EMB4- I feel embarrassed if my opinions are challenged by my colleagues 
EMB5- I feel embarrassed to challenge my superiors’ opinions 
EMB6- I never dilute bad news to avoid embarrassment for myself or my 
colleagues  
EMB7- I do not mind confrontation with my supervisor/manager  
EMB8- If I know failure is highly probable, I do not even try in the first 
place 
RTC2- When dealing with work-related procedures and processes, I do not 
like changes 
RTC3- In my job, I usually do not change the way I do things 
RTC4- I only change the way of doing things under pressure from the 
organization 
RTC5-Organisational change makes me feel more insecure about my job 
RTC6- I like exploring different ways of doing my job rather than sticking 
to certain ways  
RTC7- When dealing with work-related matters, I do not like staying in my 
“comfort zone”  
RTC8-I am open to challenges of my opinions from colleagues. 
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APPENDIX 2: EFA Loading  
 
Items: Factor1 Factor2 Factor3 
ODR13:When things go wrong in my organization, nobody stands up to take 
responsibility. 0.81   
ODR15: My organization gives mixed messages. 0.69   
ODR14:My organization has too many rigid rules and regulations 0.52   
ODR6: Each department just works for its own interest    
ODR3: The majority of our meetings last a long time and deal with trivial issues 0.46   
ODR12: My organization has an unspoken norm not to embarrass employees openly    
ODR5r: In my organization, relevant feedback is visible in the decisions made    
ODR2r: My organization welcomes criticism of its decisions most of the time    
ODR10r: The causes of negative events are openly discussed in my organization    
ODR8r: My organization encourages people to take risks and try different ways of doing 
things     
ODR11: Criticism in my organization is encouraged to be given in a subtle way.    
ODR7: Playing it safe seems to be a common activity in my organization   0.67 
ODR4: Most of my organization’s decisions are not influenced by the discussion during 
meetings   0.61 
ODR1: Most of the time the major decisions in my organization are already made before 
a meeting actually takes place   0.54 
ODR9: Subtle and covert controlling actions are typically taken in my organization     0.49 
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APPENDIX 3: Final Items Organizational Defensive Routines 
 
Organizational Defensive Routines at organizational level 
Name of 
Factors Items 
Organizational 
cover-up 
1: When things go wrong in my organization, nobody stands 
up to take responsibility. 
2: My organization gives mixed messages. 
3: My organization has too many rigid rules and regulations 
4: The majority of our meetings last a long time and deal 
with trivial issues 
Organizational 
pretense 
5: Playing it safe seems to be a common activity in my 
organization 
6: Most of my organization’s decisions are not influenced by 
the discussion during meetings 
7: Most of the time the major decisions in my organization 
are already made before a meeting actually takes place 
8: Subtle and covert controlling actions are typically taken in 
my organization 
 
The final items for organizational defensive routines at individual level 
Name of 
Factors Items 
 Rigidity at 
Work 
When dealing with work-related procedures and processes, I 
do not like changes 
In my job, I usually do not change the way I do things.  
I only change the way of doing things under pressure from 
the organization. 
Embarrassment 
Avoidance 
I avoid speaking to the point if this would embarrass my 
colleagues. 
I feel embarrassed if my opinions are challenged by my 
colleagues 
 I feel uncomfortable to challenge my managers’ opinions.  
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APPENDIX 4: Research tool 1 for Exploratory Factor Analysis 
 
BOURNEMOUTH UNIVERSITY 
BUSINESS SCHOOL, FACULTY OF MANAGEMENT 
OUT OF CONTROL: ORGANIZATIONAL DEFENSIVE ROUTINES  
 
You are being invited to participate in a research study on organizational behavior. 
The purpose of this research study is to explore elements that relate to the work 
environment. Judging on previous trial runs, it is estimated that the questionnaire 
takes approximately six minutes to complete. Your participation in this study is 
entirely voluntary and you can withdraw at any time. There are no right or wrong 
answers, so please answer the questions as honestly as possible. Participants remain 
anonymous and their answers are confidential. This research is part of a PhD 
research conducted at Bournemouth University and data are only used for this 
purpose.  If you are interested in the results, have questions, suggestions, or 
comments; please feel free to email Yumei Yang at yangy@bournemouth.ac.uk. 
Your participation is very much appreciated, thank you very much for your 
cooperation.  
 
I. This section gathers demographic information of the respondents and the 
companies they work 
1. What is your gender? ☐ Female      ☐ Male  
 
2. What is your age?  (     ) 
 
3. What is the highest level of education you have completed? 
 
☐ High School 
☐ College/Vocational Training    
☐ Bachelors Degree & Equivalent 
☐ Postgraduate for Master degree 
☐ PhD 
☐ Professional Qualification 
4. Which town/city do you work in? (Please indicate the country if you are not 
working in the UK) ____________________ 
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5. What country are you originally from? [List of countries]  
 
6. What is your employment status?   
 
☐ full-time   ☐ Part-time ☐unemployed 
  
7. What is the name of your organization? (optional) 
 
8. How many years has your organization been founded?  
 
☐0-1 year  ☐ 2-5 ☐6-10 ☐10-20 ☐21-50 ☐more than 50 
 
9. How long have you been with the organization that currently employs you?  
 
☐ less than a year  ☐1-2  ☐  3-5  ☐6-10  ☐ 11-15   ☐ 16-20   ☐ more than 20 
years 
 
10.The organization you work for operates in the: 
 
☐Public sector  
☐Private sector  
☐Not-for-profit  
 
11. Number of employees in your organization?  
 
☐ up to 10     ☐ 11-50    ☐ 51-500 ☐ more than  
 
12. What is your position in the organization?  
 
 ☐Staff  ☐Supervisory/First Line Manager  ☐Middle level Management   ☐Senior 
Level Management 
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II. This section assesses the items for measuring ODRs at organizational level Think 
of your place of work and please read and assess each of the following items in terms 
of how much you agree or disagree on the seven-point scale from ‘strongly disagree’ 
to ‘strongly agree’. Note: In the items below "mixed message" means that the 
messages delivered by the organization are illogical, inconsistent and never up for 
discussion. 
 
 Strongly 
disagree 
Disagree Somewhat 
disagree 
Neither 
agree nor 
disagree 
Somewhat 
Agree 
Agree Strongly 
agree 
13. Most of the time 
the major decisions 
in my organization 
are already made 
before a meeting 
actually takes place. 
       
14. My organization 
welcomes criticism 
of its decisions most 
of the time 
       
15.The majority of 
our meetings last a 
long time and deal 
with trivial issues 
       
16.Most of my 
organization’s 
decisions are not 
influenced by the 
discussion during 
meetings 
       
17.In my 
organization, 
relevant feedback is 
visible in the 
decisions made 
       
18.Each department 
just works for its 
own interest 
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19.Playing it safe 
seems to be a 
common activity in 
my organization 
       
20.My organization 
encourages people to 
take risks and try 
different ways of 
doing things 
       
21.Subtle and covert 
controlling actions 
are typically taken in 
my organization 
       
22.The causes of 
negative events are 
openly discussed in 
my organization 
       
23.Criticism in my 
organization is 
encouraged to be 
given in a subtle way 
       
24.My organization 
has an unspoken 
norm not to 
embarrass 
employees openly 
       
25.When things go 
wrong in my 
organization, nobody 
stands up to take 
responsibility. 
       
26.My organization 
has too many rigid 
rules and regulations 
       
27.My organization 
gives mixed 
messages 
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III. This section of the survey assesses items of ODRs in individual level 
 Strongly 
disagree 
Disagre
e 
Somewhat 
disagree 
Neither 
agree 
nor 
disagree 
Somewhat 
agree 
Agree Strongly 
agree 
28.I try my best not to 
embarrass my 
colleagues 
       
29.I conceal my real 
feelings if I think these 
would embarrass my 
colleagues. 
       
30.I avoid speaking to 
the point if this would 
embarrass my 
colleagues. 
       
31.I feel embarrassed 
if my opinions are 
challenged by my 
colleagues 
       
32.I feel embarrassed 
to challenge my 
superiors' opinions 
       
33.I never dilute bad 
news to avoid 
embarrassment for 
myself or my 
colleagues 
       
34.I do not mind 
confrontation with my 
superiors 
       
35.If I know failure is 
highly probable, I do 
not even try in the first 
place 
       
36.When dealing with 
work-related 
procedures and 
processes, I do not like 
changes 
       
37.In my job, I usually 
do not change the way 
I do things 
       
38.I only change the 
way of doing things 
under pressure from 
the organization 
       
39.Organisational 
change makes me feel 
more insecure about 
my job. 
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40.I like exploring 
different ways of doing 
my job rather than 
sticking to certain 
ways 
       
41.When dealing with 
work-related matters, I 
do not like staying in 
my "comfort zone" 
       
42.I am open to 
challenges of my 
opinions from 
colleagues 
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APPENDIX 5: Research Tool 2 for CFA and Empirical Studies 
 
I. This section gathers demographic information of the respondents and the 
companies they work 
1. What is your gender? ☐ Female      ☐ Male  
 
2. What is your age?  (     ) 
 
3. What is the highest level of education you have completed? 
 
☐ High School 
☐ College/Vocational Training    
☐ Bachelors Degree & Equivalent 
☐ Postgraduate for Master degree 
☐ PhD 
☐ Professional Qualification 
4. Which town/city do you work in? (Please indicate the country if you are not 
working in the UK) ____________________ 
 
5. What country are you originally from? [List of countries]  
 
6. What is your employment status?   
 
☐ full-time   ☐ Part-time ☐unemployed 
  
7. What is the name of your organization? (optional) 
 
8. How many years has your organization been founded?  
 
☐0-1 year  ☐ 2-5 ☐6-10 ☐10-20 ☐21-50 ☐more than 50 
 
9. How long have you been with the organization that currently employs you?  
 
☐ less than a year  ☐1-2  ☐  3-5  ☐6-10  ☐ 11-15   ☐ 16-20   ☐ more than 20 
years 
 
10.The organization you work for operates in the: 
 
☐Public sector  
☐Private sector  
☐Not-for-profit  
 
11. Number of employees in your organization?  
 
☐ up to 10     ☐ 11-50    ☐ 51-500 ☐ more than  
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12. What is your position in the organization?  
 
 ☐Staff  ☐Supervisory/First Line Manager  ☐Middle level Management   ☐Senior 
manager  ☐Executive 
 
II. This section measures organizational defensive routines with the items suggested 
by EFA. Respondents are asked to rate the level of defensive routines.  
 Strongly 
disagree 
Disagree Somewhat 
disagree 
Neither 
agree nor 
disagree 
Somewhat 
Agree 
Agree Strongly 
agree 
13.Most of the time 
the major decisions in 
my organization are 
already made before a 
meeting actually takes 
place. 
       
14.The majority of 
our meetings last a 
long time and deal 
with trivial issues 
       
15.Most of my 
organization’s 
decisions are not 
influenced by the 
discussion during 
meetings 
       
16.Playing it safe 
seems to be a 
common activity in 
my organization 
       
17.Subtle and covert 
controlling actions are 
typically taken in my 
organization 
       
18.When things go 
wrong in my 
organization, nobody 
stands up to take 
responsibility. 
       
19.My organisation 
has too many rigid 
rules and regulations 
       
20.My organisation 
gives mixed messages 
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21When dealing with 
work-related 
procedures and 
processes, I do not 
like changes 
       
22.In my job, I 
usually do not change 
the way I do things. 
       
23. I only change the 
way of doing things 
under pressure from 
the organization 
       
24.I avoid speaking to 
the point if this would 
embarrass my 
colleagues. 
       
25.I feel embarrassed 
if my opinions are 
challenged by my 
colleagues 
       
26.I feel 
uncomfortable to 
challenge my 
managers’ opinions. 
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III. This section of the survey is based on the work of (Pérez López et al. 2004). 
This section asks the respondents to rate the level of organizational learning in 
their organizations 
 Strongly 
disagree 
Disagree Somewhat 
disagree 
Neither 
agree nor 
disagree 
Somewhat 
agree 
Agree Strongly 
agree 
27.The employees 
attend fairs and 
exhibitions regularly 
       
28.There is a 
consolidated and 
resourceful R&D 
policy 
       
29.New ideas and 
approaches to work 
performance are 
experimented 
continually 
       
30.The company has 
formal mechanisms 
to guarantee the 
sharing of best 
practices among the 
different fields of 
activity 
       
31.There are 
individuals within 
the organization who 
take part in several 
teams or divisions 
and who also act as 
links between them 
       
32.There are 
individuals 
responsible for 
collecting, 
assembling and 
distributing 
employees’ 
suggestions 
internally 
       
33.All the members 
of the organization 
share the same aim, 
to which they feel 
committed 
       
34.Employees share 
knowledge and 
experience by talking 
to each other 
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Teamwork is a very 
common practice in 
the company 
       
35.The company has 
directories or emails 
filed according to the 
field they belong to, 
so as to find an 
expert on a specific 
issue at any time 
       
36.The company has 
up-to-date databases 
of its clients 
       
37.There is access to 
the organization’s 
database and 
documents through 
some kind of 
network( Microsoft 
SharePoint/Office 
365, intranet, etc.) 
       
38.Databases are 
always kept up-to-
date 
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IV. this section of survey is based on Ferrell and Skinner’s work (1998).  The 
respondents rate the extent of centralization and formalization in their current 
organizations.  
 
 Strongly 
disagree 
Disagree Somewhat 
disagree 
Neither 
agree nor 
disagree 
Somewhat 
agree 
Agree Strongly 
agree 
39. Any major 
decision that I 
make has to have 
this company’s 
approval. 
       
40. In my dealings 
with this 
company, even 
quite small 
matters have to 
referred to 
someone higher 
up for a final 
answer 
       
41. My dealings 
with this company 
are subject to a lot 
of rules and 
procedures stating 
how various 
aspects of my job 
are to be done. 
       
42. I have to ask 
company reps 
before I do almost 
anything in my 
business 
       
43. I can take very 
little action on my 
own until this 
company or its 
reps approve it 
       
44.If a written rule 
does not cover 
some situation, we 
make up informal 
rules for doing 
things as we go 
along 
       
There are many 
things in my 
business that are 
not covered by 
some formal 
procedure for 
doing it 
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45. Usually, my 
contact with my 
company and its 
representatives 
involves doing 
things "by the rule 
book" 
       
46. Contact with 
my company and 
its representatives 
are on a formal 
preplanned basis 
       
47. I ignore the 
rules and reach 
informal 
agreements to 
handle some 
situations 
       
48. When rules 
and procedures 
exist in my 
company. They 
are usually written 
agreements 
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V. This section is based on John and Srivastava ‘s work (1999). The items 
measure three personality traits, namely conscientiousness, openness, 
neuroticism). 
 
 Strongly 
disagree 
Disagree Somewhat 
disagree 
Neither 
agree nor 
disagree 
Somewhat 
agree 
Agree Strongl
y agree 
49. Do a thorough job        
50.Can be somewhat 
careless 
       
51. Am a reliable 
worker 
       
52.Tend to be 
disorganized 
       
53.Tend to be lazy        
54.Persevere until the 
task is finished 
       
55.Do things 
efficiently 
       
56. Am easily 
distracted 
       
57. Make plans and 
follows through with 
them 
       
58. Am depressed, 
blue 
       
59. Am relaxed, 
handles stress well 
       
60. Can be tense        
61. Worry a lot        
62. Am emotionally 
stable, not easily 
upset 
       
63. Can be moody        
64. Remain calm in 
tense situations 
       
65. Get nervous easily        
66. Am original, come 
up with new ideas 
       
67. Am ingenious, a 
deep thinker 
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68. Am curious about 
many different things 
       
69. Have an active 
imagination 
       
70. Am inventive        
71. Value artistic, 
aesthetic experiences 
       
72. Prefer work that is 
routine 
       
73. Like to reflect, 
play with ideas 
       
74. Have few artistic 
interests 
       
75. Am sophisticated 
in art, music, or 
literature 
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APPENDIX 6: Research Tool 3 for Discriminant and Convergent Validity Test 
 
I. This section gathers demographic information of the respondents and the 
companies they work 
1.What is your nationality? 
❍ UK (1) 
❍ US (2) 
❍ Other (33) 
2. Please indicate your gender. 
 Male (0) Female (1) 
Are you male or female? 
(1) 
  
 
 
 
3.  Are you currently employed? 
❍ Yes, full time (1) 
❍ Yes, part time (2) 
❍ No (3) 
 
4. In which sector do you work? 
❍ Public Sector (1) 
❍ Private Sector (2) 
❍ Non-Profit Sector (3) 
 
5.  How long have you been with the organization that currently employs you 
(indicate years)?  
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II This section is based on the newly development scale of ODRs by the 
researcher. It asks respondents to rate the level of ODRs at their current 
organizations. 
 
 Strongly 
disagree 
Disagree Some
what 
disagr
ee 
Neither 
agree nor 
disagree 
Somewhat 
Agree 
Agree Strongly 
agree 
6. Most of the time 
the major decisions 
in my organization 
are already made 
before a meeting 
actually takes 
place. 
       
7. The majority of 
our meetings last a 
long time and deal 
with trivial issues 
       
8.Most of my 
organization’s 
decisions are not 
influenced by the 
discussion during 
meetings 
       
9.Playing it safe 
seems to be a 
common activity in 
my organization 
       
10..Subtle and 
covert controlling 
actions are 
typically taken in 
my organization 
       
11.When things go 
wrong in my 
organization, 
nobody stands up 
to take 
responsibility. 
       
12.My organization 
has too many rigid 
rules and 
regulations 
       
13.My organization 
gives mixed 
messages 
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III the section uses a global measure of job satisfaction. The items ask 
respondent rate how satisfied they are with their current job.  
 
20. Overall, how satisfied or unsatisfied are you with your current job? 
❍ Very Dissatisfied (1) 
❍ Dissatisfied (2) 
❍ Somewhat Dissatisfied (3) 
❍ Neutral (4) 
❍ Somewhat Satisfied (5) 
❍ Satisfied (6) 
❍ Very Satisfied (7) 
 
  
14.When dealing 
with work-related 
procedures and 
processes, I do not 
like changes 
       
15.In my job, I 
usually do not 
change the way I 
do things. 
       
16. I only change 
the way of doing 
things under 
pressure from the 
organization 
       
17.I avoid speaking 
to the point if this 
would embarrass 
my colleagues. 
       
18.I feel 
embarrassed if my 
opinions are 
challenged by my 
colleagues 
       
19.I feel 
uncomfortable to 
challenge my 
managers’ 
opinions. 
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IV The section is based on Brinsfield’s work (2013). It asks respondents to 
indicate the extent to which you typically experience the stated reasons for 
wanting to remain silent in response to important issues, events, or concerns in 
your current job.  
 
 Strongly 
Disagree 
(1) 
Disagree 
(2) 
Somewhat 
Disagree 
(3) 
Neither 
Agree 
nor 
Disagree 
(4) 
Somewhat 
Agree (5) 
Agree 
(6) 
Strongly 
Agree 
(7) 
21. I felt it 
was 
dangerous to 
speak up  
       
22. To 
protect 
myself form 
harm  
       
23.I felt it 
was risky to 
speak up  
       
24.I believed 
that 
speaking up 
may 
negatively 
impact my 
career  
       
25.I was 
afraid of 
adverse 
consequence
s (e.g., being 
criticized, 
losing my 
job)  
       
26.Due to 
fear of 
retaliation  
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V. This section based on the work of Bozeman and Feeney (2011). It asks 
respondents to indicate the extent of red tape in their organizations.  
 
 
 Strongly 
Disagree (1) 
Disagree (2) Neither Agree 
nor Disagree 
(3) 
Agree (4) Strongly 
Agree (5) 
27. The 
employees 
here are 
constantly 
being watched 
to check for 
rule violations.  
     
28. People 
here feel as 
though they 
are constantly 
being watched 
to see they 
obey all the 
rules. 
     
29.Please 
select "Neither 
Agree nor 
Disagree" 
here.  
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VI This section is based on Vakola and Bouradas’ work (2005). It asks 
respondents indicate the organizational silence 
 Strongly 
Disagree (1) 
Disagree 
(2) 
Neither Agree 
nor Disagree 
(3) 
Agree (4) Strongly 
Agree (5) 
30. Top 
management of 
the organization 
encourages 
employees to 
express their 
disagreements 
regarding 
company issues. 
     
31. In this 
organization, 
people feel free to 
express 
themselves.  
     
32. If you 
disagree about 
issues present in 
the organization, 
you can be 
characterized as 
troublemaker by 
the top 
management  
     
33. If you express 
you 
disagreements 
regarding issues 
in the 
organization, you 
may suffer 
negative 
consequences 
coming from the 
top management  
     
34. If you 
disagree about  
issues in the 
organization, it 
can be perceived 
as lack of loyalty 
by the top 
management  
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Employee Silence Behavior. This is based on the work of Vakola and Bouradas’ work (2005) 
measuring employees’ silence behavior.  
 
 Please rate how easily you express your disagreements to your managers concerning the following 
issues? 1=with great difficulty; 7= easily 
35. ______ Regarding company issues (1) 
36. ______ Regarding my department's issues (2) 
37. ______ Regarding my job (3) 
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APPENDIX 7: Tables for Descriptive Information of the Predictive Validity 
Test 
 
Descriptive Information of the Predictive Validity Test at Individual Level 
 
  Mean s.d. 1 2 3 4 5   
1. Tenure 10.70 9.39       
2. Gender 0.48 0.50 -0.15      
3. Employ Status 1.25 0.43 -0.21** 0.47**     
4. Sectors 0.44 0.48 -0.09 -0.01 0.07    
5. Job Satisfaction 5.12 1.64 0.03 -0.06 0.06 0.08   
6. iODRs 3.76 1.23 -0.15 0.17* 0.18* 0.03 -0.35** 0.87 
Note: N=151, Reliability of iODRs is at the diagonal.  Public sector is coded as “1” 
and private sector is coded as “0”.  
 ** P < 0.01; * P < 0.05 
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Descriptive Information about the Predictive Validity Test at Organizational 
level 
 
  mean s.d. 1 2 3 4      5   
1. Tenure 10.7 9.39       
2. Gender 0.48 0.50 -0.15      
3. Employ Status 1.25 0.43    -0.21      0.47**    
4. Public Sector 0.44 0.50 0.09 0.00 -0.07    
5. psychological 
safety 4.31 1.24 0.04 0.09 -0.02 -0.15   
6.OrgODRs 4.14 1.29 -0.01 -0.09 -0.07  0.16* 
-
0.58** 0.90** 
 
Note: N=151, Reliability of iODRs is at the diagonal.  Public sector is coded as “1” 
and private sector is coded as “0”.  
 ** P < 0.01; * P < 0.05 
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APPENDIX 8: Glossaries 
 
Organizational defensive routines (ODRs): are actions and policies that prevent 
individuals or segments of the organization from experiencing embarrassment or 
threat.  
Mixed messages: the messages delivered by the organization are illogical, 
inconsistent and never up for discussion 
Facework:  strategies people use to mitigate face threatening or face losing. 
Rigidity: individuals playing safe to avoid changes and showing insecure feelings 
under the support of organizational defensive context. 
Embarrassment avoidance: refers to individuals who avoid challenges from other 
people or challenges to other people in order to prevent embarrassment.  
Organizational cover-up:  organizations cover-up the existing organizational issues 
whose exposure could cause embarrassment or threat.  
Organizational pretense: that organizations disguise themselves being competent 
 
 
